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**POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE:
AMERICA AS NO. 1 NATION
VOLUME II**

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STATUS AND PERCEPTIONS



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POWER, PRIMACY, AND PERSPECTIVE: AMERICA AS NO. 1 NATION

Volume II


STATUS AND PERCEPTIONS

by

Anthony L. Wermuth

15 December 1976

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
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FOREWORD

This is Volume II of a three-volume work which explores the domestic and international significance of America's being the world's number one nation. Volume II explores positive, neutral, and negative aspects of American primacy, particularly via objective rankings of major elements of power and status among nations, as well as via foreign and domestic perceptions of American power and American values.

Volume I examines theoretical concepts for appraising the relative standing of nations, and Volume III considers potential impacts from the changing world upon American primacy in the future. Volume III also contains an extensive bibliography. A summary of all three volumes has also been published.

In publishing such works, the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical studies on subjects of current importance. This three-volume work was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not necessarily reflect the official view of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.


JOSEPH E. PIZZI
Colonel, Infantry
Director

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Dr. ANTHONY L. WERMUTH joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1974. He holds masters degrees from Columbia University in English and from George Washington University in international affairs and a doctorate from Boston University in political science. A West Point graduate, Dr. Wermuth's military assignments included brigade command; Assistant for Central Europe (OASD, ISA); and Military Assistant (Public Affairs) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He spent seven years on the West Point and US Army War College faculties. Following retirement, he served for seven years as Director, Social Science Studies, Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, Westinghouse Electric Corporation. He has written many articles on civil-military affairs in professional journals, and is a member of numerous professional associations.

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Summary of Volume II: Status and Perceptions

We focus first on an objective appraisal of various indicators of United States standing relative to the rest of the world.

Various indices of power among nations rank the United States as No. 5 in 1875 and No. 4 in 1900, No. 1 temporarily about 1914, and No. 1 "permanently" since the early 1930's. By 1945, the United States was generating 1/2 of the entire world's Gross National Product (GNP), and enjoying 1/3 of the world's income. Until the 1970's, the American GNP exceeded the combined GNP of Europe and the USSR.

In the mid-1970's, the United States is one of the world's five largest nations in area, and the 4th largest in population. In military power, the United States is one of the two world superpowers. The GNP of the United States still amounts to 1/4 of the entire world's GNP. The United States produces 1/4 of the world's total industrial output, 1/5 of the grain. In GNP per capita, the United States (except for a recent spurt in three small countries) heads the world. More computers are produced and employed in the United States than in the rest of the world put together.

A significant factor in world status is the unparalleled generosity of the United States toward other nations--arsenal of the democratic world in both World Wars, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War; refuser of postwar reparations; Marshall Plan rehabilitator of both allies and former enemies; provider of unmatched amounts of economic aid, technological aid, and military assistance to other nations; contributor of prompt aid in times of disaster; and supporter of self-determination and human rights.

The United States pays 25% of the cost of upkeep of the United Nations--at least twice the portion contributed by any other of the world's 150 nations. The United States maintains the largest national diplomatic representation around the world. More than half of all Nobel Prizes awarded since the 1930's have been awarded to American scientists, scholars, and writers.

In development, or "mastery of its domestic environment," as distinguished from exercise of power in the external environment, the United States has stood first or near first among the world's nations since 1913 in numerous other factors that combine to constitute modern domestic strength, such as production and consumption of energy; income; education; health services; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and radio, television, and news media available.

Freedom House still lists the United States in the highest category 1; the USSR, among others, continues to be listed in the lowest category, 5.

Its differential of power in relation to all other nations has declined in relative terms, but the United States continues to exceed the power and influence commanded by any other single nation. The USSR has succeeded in achieving rough parity with the United States in a single category: military strength. In no other major category of strength and influence, nor in composite overall standing, is any other nation in a position to challenge America's standing as Number One Nation.

Many foreigners over 200 years have expressed their perceptions of the United States as a unique country, the nation likely to advance farther and earliest in the realization of objectives common to free societies. In many foreign countries, the United States is recognized as the world's most powerful and most important country. Asked whether they prefer the United States ahead in the struggle for strategic preeminence, or the USSR ahead, or neither ahead, in recent years the proportion preferring neither ahead has risen from about 1/3 to about 2/3. At the same time, the percentage preferring that the preeminent nation be the USSR (the only rival to the United States suggested) remains in the vicinity of zero.

In sum, the United States is widely perceived by foreigners and foreign nations to be Number One and to be likely to remain so.

Among individualistic, pragmatic, pluralistic, egalitarian American society, an overwhelming consensus is rarely achieved. In general, to some minor degree, some Americans have at times exhibited myopia, bombast, and self-congratulation; but of major weight have been domestic perceptions of America as hard-working, competitive, humanitarian, dedicated to live-and-let-live interactions with other countries, more realistic in action than in rhetoric, and not aggressive, not imperialistic.

By 1970, however, the domestic environment had changed in important ways. Domestic concerns came to overshadow international issues. Americans frankly recognize the United States as being Number One nation; it is foreseen as likely to share essential parity with the USSR in ten more years--not through US decline but through faster USSR growth.

Over the past 10 years, the percentage of Americans holding that the United States should remain Number One nation "at all costs" has declined from 56% to 42%. It appears that Americans perceive the standing of the United States to be at the top of the international hierarchy by a slim margin, which is likely to narrow so as to become nominal in a decade. American relative power and prestige are perceived by Americans to be slightly lower than they appear to exist in reality. And Americans appraise American power and influence at a level lower than foreigners perceive.

CHAPTER 3

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES

General

The preceding two chapters, constituting Volume I of this study have explored a number of concepts related to unequal status among nations, and the factors and forces influencing the interactions, including shifts in status, among them. Primacy has been cited herein for special attention from time to time. More often, the more important relationship examined is that of superior-inferior interaction at any level; and primary attention is focused in this study, as in real life, on nations at or near the top of the international status hierarchy. In any event, the discussion so far provides, it is hoped, at least illumination of the context in which real nations relate to each other.

Volume II, comprising three chapters, is devoted to appraisals of the status of the United States in the modern global context. Chapter 3, in hand, investigates the current status of the United States, as expressed in objective terms, i.e., what are the facts? Chapter 4 is devoted to perceptions of the United States as expressed by foreigners. Chapter 5 records self-perceptions of the United States, as expressed, of course, by Americans.

In Chapter 3, which we now begin, we shall present a general section, followed by a number of indicators of American status up to the present time. The chapter culminates in the most recent comprehensive world ranking of nations in 1974 or 1975, as a

composite status (while well aware that most indicators identify forces that are dynamic, not static). The final brief section of this Chapter 3 notes a few status trends in motion in 1974-1975 which appear likely to exert substantial effect, up or down, on America's status over time subsequent to the 1974-1975 year.

The reference to the 1974-1975 year should be taken loosely; the data compiled provide measurements as up to date as possible, especially to 1974-1975 if available. A few could not be "modernized" beyond the mid-1960's; others apply no further than various early years of the 1970's. Major, comprehensive tables of world rankings are presented in the "current" section, no matter how dated they may be, since they are usually presented in contemporary publications as the most "recent" available compilation of the author's work in that field.

A substantial amount of data is becoming available. For example, the 1973 Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations includes 209 tables involving hundreds of variables (among which, interactions are not invariably clear). As Professor R. J. Rummel puts it in The Dimensions of Nations:

The interrelations of these masses of data, in addition, may be highly complex. Some variables may be independent of each other; others may vary positively or negatively; still others may hide or 'mediate' existing relationships. Moreover, these relationships may be linear or curvilinear, additive, or interactive, and causal or interdependent.¹

It is emphasized that what we have sought to present are not only discrete analyses and evaluations of the attributes of the United States and other single nations, but comparative analyses

and evaluations of a certain number of nations measured according to identical criteria and, at the same time, arranged in ranked order. So far as we are aware, these are the principal available rankings from the best known theorists and analysts.²

A further point--as is evident so far and as will be evident to the end, this study stresses power, and comparative rankings among nations in power status, including the principal forms of physical and material power. Some indicators are universally recognized--none but Americans, for example, have walked on the moon.

No nation except America has ever offered the world anything like the Baruch Plan. No other nation has ever carried out anything like the Marshall Plan. However we are not confined exclusively to material attributes. Beyond the realities of physical power and comparisons of power, we are interested in the realities of national purpose, character, values, perception, objectives, and performance. We are interested not only in how much power America has, but also in what America does with its power, how, in relations with other states, it uses and applies its power in action, which opportunities it exploits, and which temptations it rejects. How does America stand, not only in power rankings, but, as Henry Barbera asks, also in development, or standard of living rankings? How does American society stand in appraisals of cultural activities?

The United States may be envied for its power. Is it also feared? Is it admired? Is it trusted? Is it respected for its restraint in use of power? Such questions will be pursued mainly in the next chapters; nevertheless, it seems appropriate to introduce them here, in order to reassure the reader that we are well aware that cold comparisons of power, however objective and accurate they may be, do not convey complete understanding of the totality of any one nation's status relative to any other.

One attribute of the United States is widely misconstrued. As a nation-state, the United States, when compared to the oldest nations (but not, of course, when compared to the dozens of new nations appearing since World War II), is relatively young in certain respects. It was, as Lipset has called it, the first new nation,

springing full-bodied into existence. As a culture distinguished by its unique identity, America is not nearly as old as the long-established cultures and their modern versions. But as an open political system, a stable structure of government, America is as old as any other on earth--perhaps the oldest. In conducting foreign policy based on domestic values according to a stable system, America's system of government has matured and withstood, not only its greatest challenge, the Civil War, but also the test of time.

As already stated, this chapter attempts to present objective evaluations of the comparative status, the world ranking, of the United States in terms of overall power, and in a number of attributes which are components of power. By "objective" is meant unbiased, not parochial, not selectively loaded in a direction favored by the author. But objectivity is notoriously hard to achieve, and truly objective evaluations of national status are not easy to find. Many compilations are presented in this study, but most (not all) of the sources are American. The fact that the author is American may incline the reader to skepticism about the text's objectivity.

It is probably tenable to argue that American scholars and analysts are, on the whole, as carefully objective as those of any other nationality. It is also arguable that in certain areas of a number of social sciences, one must use American data or largely do without; for there are few others. Therefore, in this chapter, a number of American sources are cited because they are thought

to be objective and impartial, while more parochial views by Americans are relegated to Chapter 5 (on American self-perceptions). Nevertheless, I recognize that here and there a source cited in this chapter, especially at the outset, may appear (and actually be) parochial. If so, perhaps such lapses may be regarded as not substantially vitiating a predominant objectivity.

First, for purposes of basic comparative orientation, we articulate relative statistics concerning several basic attributes of nations.

Basic Attributes of Major Nations

Table 3-1: Largest Countries³

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Area in Square Miles</u>
1	Soviet Union.....	8,647,249
2	Canada.....	3,850,789
3	Communist China.....	3,690,546
4	UNITED STATES.....	3,614,254
5	Brazil.....	3,294,110
6	Australia.....	2,967,108
7	India.....	1,261,482
8	Argentina.....	1,071,879
9	Sudan.....	967,243
10	Algeria.....	919,352
11	Congo (Kinshasa).....	905,327
12	Saudi Arabia.....	829,786
13	Mexico.....	761,402

Table 3-2: Largest Populations⁴

<u>Country</u>	<u>Midyear 1972 Estimate (In Millions of People)</u>	<u>Density Per Square Mile</u>
Communist China	800.72	216.9
India	563.49	446.5
USSR	247.46	28.6
UNITED STATES	208.84	57.8
Indonesia	120.40	31.3
Japan	106.96	748.0
Brazil	98.85	30.0
Bangladesh	75.00	1360.0
Nigeria	58.02	158.5
West Germany	59.60	620.8
United Kingdom	55.79	593.5
Italy	54.35	468.5
Pakistan	53.00	132.1
France	51.72	245.1

Table 3-3: Gross National Product, 1972⁵

<u>Country</u>	<u>1972 GNP in Current Dollars (billions)</u>
USA	1155.2
USSR	748.
Japan	335.
FRG	285.9
France	217.8
UK	151.4
Sweden	43.6
Switzerland	37.0
Denmark	23.2

Table 3-4: Gross National Product Per Capita, 1973⁶

<u>Country</u>	<u>In US Dollars</u>
Switzerland	5763
USA	5532
Sweden	5369
Kuwait	5280
Canada	4696
FRG	4633
Denmark	4557
France	4213
Australia	3924
Western Europe	3314
Japan	3165
UK	2714
World	1256
Far East	908
Latin America	604
Middle East	549
Africa	252
South Asia	96

Some World Statistics on the Economics of Food

According to James P. Grant, of the Overseas Development Council, in the late 1940's, the world economy reached \$1 trillion; in the early 1970's, it reached \$3 trillion (in dollars of the same value, but \$5 trillion in current dollars). Food demand experienced annual increase in the early 1900's of 4 million tons; in the early 1950's, of 12 million tons; and in the early 1970's, of 25-30 million tons. The global demand for grain alone was about 1.2 billion tons from 1969-1971, but will increase to 1.7 billion tons in 1985; one-half will be demanded for the one billion people in the developed countries, and one-half for the three billion people in the developing countries.⁷

In relation to the proportion of food provided by fish, world fish catches totaled 20 million tons in 1950 and 68 million tons

in 1970; but the total has begun to decline in the most recent years due to over-fishing the oceans.

World food reserves in the form of grain were in 1970, 69 days; in 1973, 40 days; in 1974, 26 days; in 1975, less than 26.⁸

The United States and Primacy: General

Said political scientist George Liska in 1967: "The United States is now clearly the most powerful state in the world by any criterion; it is the only truly global power."⁹

In 1968, political scientist A. F. K Organski asserted: "The dominant international order is headed by the most powerful single nation on earth, formerly England, today the United States."¹⁰

Table 3-5: US National Wealth, 1952-1968¹¹
(Approximate only; in billions of current dollars; omits Alaska and Hawaii.)

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>
Total Tangible Assets	1115.4	1851.3	2474.8	3079.4
Total Reproducible Assets	916.0	1439.6	1880.5	2364.0

Table 3-6: United States Gross National Product, 1929-1973¹²

<u>Year</u>	<u>\$ Current billions</u>	<u>\$Constant 1958 billions</u>
1929	103.1	--
1930	90.4	--
1933	55.6	--
1935	72.2	--
1940	99.7	--
1945	211.9	--
1950	284.8	355.3
1955	389.0	438.0
1960	503.7	478.7
1965	684.9	617.8
1968	864.2	706.6
1969	930.3	725.6
1970	977.1	722.5
1971	1055.5	745.4
1972	1155.2	790.7
1973	1289.1	837.4

One foreign observer, Robert Hargreaves gives, in Superpower, a highly generalized appraisal of the United States economy:

Devaluation and inflation notwithstanding, the fact is that the American economy in the 1970s remains and is likely to remain for the rest of this century far and away the richest and most productive in the entire world. In spite of the aura of gloom that now surrounded it, the American economy passed another landmark in 1971, a year which would be remembered not only for devaluation and the freeze but also as the year of the trillion-dollar economy, the first year in which the gross national product of the United States broke through to one trillion dollars--\$1,000,000,000,000, a third of the world's total, and a figure which is moreover expected to double not long after the end of this decade. The trillion-dollar breakthrough had been marked, amid the anguished breast-beating that seems to accompany any American success these days . . . To many outsiders, it seemed that these critics, like so many Americans, had become so preoccupied with their immediate problems they no longer fully comprehended how materially rich their country still was in comparison with the rest of the world.

In every sense, America is still a country where more people die of too much food than of too little; her problems are the problems of plenty, not the problems of want with which less fortunate nations and less fortunate eras have traditionally been compelled to grapple. In their present mood of pessimism and introspection too many Americans seem unaware of that crucial fact; to paraphrase Evelyn Waugh, many of the older countries of the world count it as a good day when one thing goes right, while the Americans, who have grown used to easy success, count it as a bad day when one thing goes wrong. When things go wrong as they have in the past decade, Americans lose their self-confidence and look toward the imminent collapse of the Republic.

In this new mood of pessimism, the arrival of the trillion-dollar economy was greeted more as the harbinger of Armageddon than as the simple proof of prosperity . . . ¹³

. . . in the end it is overwhelmed by the statistics of the American economy. There can be no going back now, and nostalgia . . . wilts away before the sheer size and diversity of the modern American economy. In land area, the United States stands only fourth among the nations, and fourth also in population, but in terms of industrial output she has stood throughout the postwar era head, shoulders, and torso above

anyone else, richer until very recently than Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union combined. The United States today produces one quarter of the world's oil and consumes about a third of it. Her steel mills produce nearly a third of the western world's total, and her aircraft manufacturers have built 85 percent of the ten thousand commercial airliners now in service. Her people buy 10 million new automobiles every year (70 percent of them, in 1973, equipped with air conditioning), and they own nearly half of all the cars running anywhere. Her biggest private company, AT&T, known to friends and enemies alike as "Ma Bell," is richer than Sweden, and her largest manufacturer, General Motors, has an annual income greater than the government of France. A list of the forty richest organizations in the world includes thirty-two sovereign states--and eight private American corporations. General Motors falls in size between the Netherlands and the Argentine, the Ford Motor Company just behind Czechoslovakia, and Exxon just ahead of the Union of South Africa.¹⁴

* * * *

The proportion of the national wealth held by the top one percent of the population in America, moreover, has been dropping steadily since the 1920s. In 1922, the top one percent controlled 32 percent of all wealth; by 1953 the figure had dropped to 25 percent; and today it is estimated to be little more than 20 percent--a smaller proportion than that in most other western countries.¹⁵

* * * *

There are in fact so many "mere" millionaires in America today that they can no longer be counted with any precision, although it is estimated that somewhere around the start of this decade their total for the first time exceeded 100,000--enough millionaires to fill a city the size of Charleston, South Carolina, twice over--or enough millionaires to make up one third of the entire population of the state of Wyoming.

American millionaires are a diverse lot, to be found in almost every city and of almost every class: they include men and women, young and old, new rich and established rich. Although only some thirty-five of them are black, it has been estimated that twenty--and possibly as many as thirty--of the one hundred members of the U. S. Senate are millionaires, while perhaps most surprising of all is the fact that at least half of America's millionaires are new rich, having made their money by their own exertions in their own lifetime, often in the span of a single decade Back in 1953 there were 27,000

Americans with a gross estate worth more than a million dollars; by 1965, the figure had grown to about 90,000 and today it is over 100,000, a growth only partly explained by the rise in inflation that has occurred in the past twenty years.¹⁶

While the ownership of a million dollars may to ordinary mortals represent wealth beyond reach, it is no longer the touchstone of what Fortune magazine and others define as "great wealth." When Fortune last compiled its list of the richest men and women in America, it drew the line of super-wealth at \$100 million and after four months of research announced there were 153 individuals in the United States whose net worth, including wealth held by spouses, minor children, trusts, and foundations, made them centimillionaires. The size of the great fortunes held by these members of the super-rich passes almost beyond the bounds of comprehension, especially when compared to the earnings of the ordinary mass of mankind, even in the affluent society of the United States. The average American worker, who today earns more than ten thousand dollars every year--and spends most of it--would have to have been working at the same rate of pay since the Stone Age, ten thousand years ago, before he had earned a hundred million dollars: and even then there would still be 153 Americans richer than he was.¹⁷

* * * *

Firmly within the control of a few rich families, the gates of the American super-rich have never been closed to outsiders. In fact, of the 153 centimillionaires today, only half inherited their fortunes; the rest were largely self-made men, and fully one third of the total had been men of modest means and obscure reputation only one decade earlier, having made the bulk of their wealth in a single ten-year span It has been estimated that the new self-made super-rich are statistically the sons of lower-middle-class white parents from city environments in either the Northeast, the Southwest, or the Midwest. Only one was born on the Pacific Coast and none at all in the South outside of Texas.¹⁸

The same observer, Robert Hargreaves, also discusses a facet of affluent America which is also factual but which may be too seldom discussed in connection with the American economy:

After race, the other enduring problem of the South is poverty--poverty of a nature not encountered in most other parts of the United States, poverty that persists in the more rural areas in spite of the vast economic changes that are sweeping the newly industrialized areas of the South. Even today, one quarter of the total population of Mississippi, more than 400,000 persons, are eating federally paid-for food, and there are counties in South Carolina that have even refused to let in the federally aided food program on the grounds that by covering up the problem of hunger, the state would prove more attractive to new industry. Across America there are still twenty-six million people--the majority of them in the South--who live at or below the federally defined poverty level and who therefore cannot afford to purchase an adequate diet. . . . 19

In the entire state of Mississippi, the infant mortality rate remains the highest in the country, ominously higher today than it was even in 1940, with around 55 deaths for every 1,000 live births. In Tunica County, which borders the Mississippi River in the far north of the state, the infant mortality rate was recently up to 64.5 per 1,000 live births, some three times the national average, the majority of the infant deaths coming from such preventable conditions as pneumonia and diarrhea. Out of the County's total population of some 17,000, almost 80 percent of it black, the median income was not much more than \$1,250 a year. Of the 11,000 people below the official poverty level, only 1,500 were receiving public assistance and only 6,000 had been permitted to take part in the government's food-stamp program, largely because the others simply cannot afford to take part.

There are pockets of poverty like Tunica County all across the South, where the black sharecroppers, the poorest of the poor, have no money whatsoever. No one in these areas buys anything or sells anything, and what trade there is, is conducted by a primitive form of barter. . . .

Statistically, there are between forty and sixty thousand incomeless families in the Delta region of Mississippi alone. Because they are able-bodied, the men are not qualified for welfare payments. And because they have no money, they cannot afford to join the Food Stamp Program, under which poor families are supposed to pay around two dollars a month a head for stamps they can exchange for food.

As recently as 1967, a working party for the Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Employment visited poor people in rural Mississippi and came away shocked at what they had found:

people by the thousands 'living outside of every legal, medical and social advance our nation has made in this century '20

Thus, it is obvious that America has reached no absolute pinnacle of development. Despite incomparable progress, there is much yet to be done. It may be relevant to note that no other nation has done better, or, in the terms significant to this study, as well.

Military Power

As noted elsewhere, a number of approaches to the relative ranking of nations, in some instances for perfectly legitimate purposes, concentrate almost exclusively upon the military elements of national power. This study does not so confine itself, but cites comparative national rankings involving wide range of factors. Nevertheless, this study proceeds in full awareness that at any particular time, determination of real power and influence depends heavily, and in some conditions, almost exclusively, upon relative military power.

American military power, actualized and putative, was never considered on a par with that of the existing great powers until World War I, which still left a postwar residue of conflicting assessments of military power. In 1938, the United States Army was 18th in size among the armies of the world. It was World War II that elevated American military power to preeminence.

In 1945 the strength of the American armed forces was over 12 million. So precipitate was American demobilization that one year later, armed forces strength in 1946 was down to 3 million, and by 1947 to 1½ million.²¹ Thus, whatever end-of-hostilities American

preeminence may have existed in military power, especially in land power, was rapidly vitiated--except for one phenomenon: America's monopoly possession of the atomic bomb.

During and after the Korean experience, the United States, with powerful forces of land, sea, and air deployed worldwide, and particularly with a nuclear arsenal that included fusion warheads and delivery means in large numbers, was militarily without peer in the world. Since that time, however, the status of US primacy in military strength has been steadily eroded by USSR progress toward

nuclear parity, while maintaining massive Soviet land and air forces in being, and relentlessly increasing naval forces.

In current years, some pertinent statistics have been in controversy, and assessments partly based on them have contained uncertainty as to which of the two nations is militarily Number One-- or whether that position is now shared by the United States and the Soviet Union.

A. L. Burns, the Australian political analyst, commented in 1971:

A super power is one able to wreck half the world . . . it must command the technology and economy to maintain into the foreseeable future the strategic forces needed for that destructive capacity . . . Some commentators have grounded their assertion that the United States is the only super power on the fact that the Soviet Union cannot yet deploy . . . vast conventional power world wide: i.e., 'super power' entails 'naval power.' The latter implicitly suggested criterion looks stronger, but is actually weaker . . . than the requirement that major war conventional forces be deployable against one's chief opponents.²²

This is one of the points at which this author risks a charge of parochialism, by expressing sweeping appraisal of traditional American military policy as being preponderantly defensive. In relation to those of other nations, America's military posture has historically been maintained at the minimum level at which defense would be feasible, (and, at times, below that). As the American statesman Elihu Root expressed the purpose of the Army War College (still emphasized very seriously by that institution): ". . . not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression." Even since assuming its status

as superpower, committed to containment of a worldwide anti-American program supported by great military power, America has relied on a defensive posture linked to defensive alliances such as NATO and SEATO. To be sure, a defensive strategic posture does not preclude offensive tactics; however, the United States, with two possible exceptions (the Mexican and Spanish-American Wars), has been conspicuously absent from the category of instigators or provocateurs of war.

One special aspect of the American psyche seems relevant here. Some analysts of war insist that there are two central capabilities involved in prosecuting war successfully (any war, just or unjust): the capability to inflict punishment on the enemy, and the capability to withstand punishment. There is no question that American military forces have earned high reputation. But some critics have held that America, exclusive of dogged, staunch units in the field, does not stand up to punishment--that Americans "can dish it out" but "can't take it." Fortune has kept war away from American soil (except Hawaii) for over a century; and the American homeland has not been compelled to develop competence in suffering, in the bearing of military punishment. It may be peculiarly American, or it may be characteristic of democratic society, that, as General George Marshall once observed, a democracy will not fight a long war.

Yet, while most of us are relieved that widespread suffering has not been visited upon America, endurance must be acknowledged as a positive factor in contests of force; and to the extent that America lacks that kind of national endurance (if, in fact, it is lacking), American primacy is vulnerable to erosion should war ever come again in the future.

One does not have to advocate or excuse war to observe that the United States does not agree (nor does any other nation) with the assurances of pacifists and some others that war accomplishes nothing. In reference at least to the defender in a just war, one may paraphrase Santayana (in The Last Puritan) and observe that "one is never so impressed with what war secures for people as what it saves them from."

In any event, classic American military policy has been, and still is, characterized by three among many possible choices:

- a. The United States will not adopt an offensive strategy.
- b. The United States will maintain a defensive strategy, including a deterrent posture.
- c. If sufficiently provoked, the United States will launch offensive operations intended to prevail.

In relation to the maintenance of military establishments by democratic countries, Sir John Slessor once delivered a trenchant reminder:

It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditure on armament as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free . . .²³

One of the principal objections to military forces is their high cost. A "conservative estimate" of total United States military expenditures over the 200 years of the nation's existence is 2 trillion and 22 billion dollars, roughly 56 percent of all federal outlays since 1789. During the 28 years alone between 1946 and 1973, the United States spent over \$1.3 trillion on national

security, to be compared to \$1.6 trillion spent by the federal government for all nonmilitary American goods and services since 1789.²⁴

Such costs are elevated by especially high men and material prices for the comprehensive and sophisticated military establishment maintained by the United States. One analyst in 1972 estimated comparative average costs to maintain each military person in a few representative countries as follows:

Table 3-7: Individual Military Costs²⁵

USA	\$ 4345
Belgium	\$ 1814
Greece	\$ 430
Thailand	\$ 400
China, Taiwan	\$ 218
Korea	\$ 145

Nevertheless, as Senator John L. McClellan makes clear, American allocation of resources to maintenance of a strong military establishment has been declining steadily:

1. Over the 10 years ending in Fiscal Year 1976, total federal outlays for national defense have shrunk from 41.5% to 26.9%. Between 1966 and 1976, defense outlays declined from 7.7% to 5.9% of GNP.

2. Since 1966, the cost of the Federal Government in toto has risen from \$134.7 billion to \$349.4 billion. Of the \$214.7 billion increase, only 17.8% is attributable to defense costs. While defense costs rose by 68% (\$55.9 billion to \$94 billion), total other government costs climbed by 224%.

3. Over the same 10 years, Federal allocations increased:

- to education, from \$4.1 billion to \$14.6 billion;
- to Social Security and other retirement and disability programs, from \$21.4 to \$74.3 billion.
- to health services, from \$2.6 to \$28 billion.²⁶

The following compilation of international status related to military strength has been drawn mostly from The Military Balance 1973-1974, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London. It is a brief and succinct compilation of an inarguably crucial component area of national power and influence. Coverage has been condensed here, not in any way with an intention of contributing to disparagement of the importance of military power, but with the intention of emphasizing other factors in this context, at this time. (An analysis in greater depth of complex strategic systems is provided, for example, in "How US, USSR, and PRC Strategic Forces Compare," Department of Defense Commanders Digest, Vol. 17, No. 19, May 8, 1975.)

Table 3-8: Military-Related Attributes of Six Nations
Mostly in 1973²⁷

	<u>USA</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Population	213m	109m	62m	52m	56m	253m
Population of military age	40m	25m	12m	10m	10m	52m
GNP, 1973	\$1289b	\$439b	\$385b	\$277b	\$177b	\$748b
Defense expen	\$78.5b	\$3.8b	\$13.2b	\$ 10b	\$ 9b	\$23.8b
Strength, armed forces	2.174m	.266m	.475m	.504m	.352m	3.525m
ICBM	1054	-	-	-	-	1575
SLBM	656	-	-	48	64	720
Divisions	16	13	11	4	3	167
Tanks	2100	690	2950	325	600	7850
Aircraft						
Carriers	15	-	-	2	1	-
Submarines	73	14	13	19	30	245
Other major ship	162	27	11	49	73	221
Bombers	437	-	-	-	50	140
Combat aircraft	6950	495	600	400	500	6060

The United States Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, in his annual message to the Congress of February 5, 1975, provided, if not a thoroughly "objective" assessment, an official perspective from one in a position to know which makes clear that in strategic military power the United States recognizes that, in respect to the USSR, its status is that of parity, not primacy.

Whatever the case--and the future is clouded with uncertainty--there is no doubt about the very large military capabilities at the disposal of the USSR. What is more, these capabilities continue to grow. In our prices, the Soviets now devote more resources than the United States in most of the significant categories of defence. In overall research and development, they outstrip us by 20 per cent; in general purpose forces by 20 per cent; in procurement by 25 per cent; and in strategic nuclear offensive forces by 60 per cent.

What is more, we are now beginning to witness in the Soviet Union the largest initial deployment of

improved strategic capabilities in the history of the nuclear competition. How far it will go we do not yet know . . . large and diversified military capabilities remain in the hands of powers with whom our relationships have to some degree improved, but powers who have not traditionally wished us well or looked with cordiality upon our interests. . . we are all aware that we have become vulnerable to nuclear attack. It is also quite obvious that the United States will remain one of only two superpowers for many years to come.

The United States, while remaining the great arsenal and reserve of democracy, has also joined its first line of defence; moreover, it is alone as the super-power of the non-communist world.

It is all well and good to add up the population and gross national product of the European Economic Community and pretend that it is a substitute for the United States; but it will be many years before the nine members of the Community can act with the unity, coherence, and efficiency that we command. . . most serious students of the subject have recognized [that] the nuclear predominance of the United States has disappeared.

We must maintain an essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in the basic factors that determine force effectiveness. Because of uncertainty about the future and the shape that the strategic competition could take, we cannot allow major asymmetries to develop in throw-weight, accuracy, yield-to-weight ratios, reliability and other such factors that contribute to the effectiveness of strategic weapons and to the perceptions of the non-superpower nations.

. . . [our] requirement is for a range and magnitude of capabilities such that everyone--friend, foe, and domestic audiences alike--will perceive that we are the equal of our competitors . . .

To sum up the existing situation, we have a good second-strike deterrent, but so does the Soviet Union. Although the two forces differ in a number of important respects,²⁸ no one doubts that they are in approximate balance . . .

Yet, it remains somewhat illusory to appraise military power solely on the basis of military forces. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements declared in June 1976:

. . . there is no question that the United States is the world's greatest power. Now what does this mean? It means that our military capability in all of its aspects, coupled with our industrial base and our technology and our people and our resources, makes us in composite the world's greatest power. Fortunately, the Russians have a very keen appreciation of this fact . . .²⁹

American Politico-Military Influence

The previous section briefly outlines a rather stark comparison of US and USSR current military strength in factors which indicate relative world military rankings among several leading military nations. Such a comparison is not fully revealing of total military influence. The Soviet Union is, of course, preponderantly influential, in military affairs as in all other affairs, among Communist nations; and the Soviets have been endeavoring, with some success, to supply Soviet arms to selected countries outside the Communist countries. There are also several other competitors of the United States who produce arms in quantity and quality and sell them to other nations; such arms producers and sellers include Britain, France, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and others.

Military influence is, of course, like economic and political power, a genuine and important element of national power; its influence in history is obvious and familiar. Military eminence rests not only upon national armed forces, their equipment, and their reputation and state of training, but also upon a number of additional factors, such as military relationships beyond their borders. A nation which itself maintains powerful modern forces attracts the interest of military establishments in other countries, especially in these times when personnel and weapon costs are almost prohibitive, to the extent that it has become practically impossible for all but a handful of nations to maintain a fully versatile establishment comprising land, sea, and air forces and to keep modernizing them as technology continues to advance at a geometrical rate.

Military forces of different nations which contemplate a possibility of collaboration simplify their mutual problems enormously by, for example, employing the same weapons, ammunition, and repair systems, and the same general doctrine, terminology, and detailed procedures; and by sharing actual military experiences. In this way, the leading military nation, with its own weapons and procedures widely used, multiplies the potential power of its own military forces.

Some selected statistics will convey a sense of the scope of American military influence extending beyond its own American troops and ships and aircraft. Most of these data are drawn from a 1969 study which this author compiled.³⁰

In World War II, United States forces were stationed on various scales in over 50 foreign countries, over a vast network of bases and facilities. America furnished its allies some \$50 billion in supplies and equipment; in exchange, America received \$7.8 billion in goods and services. As World War II came to a sudden, unexpected end, the Army and Navy terminated existing contracts amounting to \$62.5 billion, and still reported some \$50 billion worth of surplus supplies and equipment on hand, much of which was sold at a discount at home and abroad.

As America reconstructed its military establishment, beginning in 1949 with the grim intensification of what (later) turned out to be the Cold War, the United States entered into history's most complex arrangement of interlocking agreements with other nations--some 4000 agreements in all. The United States provided foreign military assistance up to 1966 at an average rate of \$1.8 billion per year,

and reestablished, at the request or compliance of the nations concerned, a base network around the world in 50 countries. There were 200 major bases among 2200 military installations ranging from an acre up, and totaling 2.2 million acres; the whole network cost about \$3.7 billion for initial outlays and about \$7 billion per year to maintain--about \$2 billion of which directly entered foreign economies annually. At its peak in 1957, the American overseas base system housed over a half-million dependents; and in Europe alone, the system of American schools for dependent children was as large a school system as that maintained by the state of Nevada. Between 1950 and 1967, probably more than 10 million American servicemen served overseas, and millions of dependents accompanied them.

Two other elements of American international military influence, not approached in scale by any other nation, are arms sales and American training of foreign military persons. Many of the latter category lived in American communities while absorbing military training lasting up to a year or more. They became familiar with the American military system; and, more, they came to understand and to respect, in varying degrees, the nature of American political and social systems. Many returned to their own countries to become, after a lapse of time, high and influential officials--in the great majority of instances, friendly towards America.

Between 1950 and 1973, a whopping total of 428,476 foreigners from 72 countries (ranging from the 4 from Guinea and the 5 from Yemen to the 27,000 from South Vietnam and the 22,000 from South Korea) were provided military training in American facilities;

almost 200,000 received such training in the United States itself.

The cumulative American costs of the entire Military Assistance Program, involving 80 foreign countries through 1973, was \$36.5 billion.³¹

The cumulative value of arms and military equipment delivered abroad via the Foreign Military Sales program of the United States, also through 1973 and also involving 80 foreign countries, was \$15 billion.³²

Two final aspects of American military effectiveness and strategic power are to be cited here. The first is reflected in the remark of a Soviet colonel to American journalist Drew Middleton: ". . . you are two wars ahead of us."³³ Political scientist James Q. Wilson has noted that "This country has . . . probably the largest cadre of young, battle-tested professional military officers and noncoms of any major power in the world today."³⁴ Such a condition, however imponderable (and, over extended time, evanescent), will take a decade to lose significance.

Another aspect of American strategic strength that is difficult to quantify but that will make itself felt in any East-West shooting confrontation (in Europe, at least) is that American alliances have been forged over time by free nations. The peoples concerned have weighed, in peacetime, their probable interests should war come and have freely accepted the peacetime disadvantages as well as advantages of casting their lot for alliance with the United States. There is no reason to doubt that, should an ultimate confrontation occur within manageable terms, they will add their strength to America's.

The Soviet Union, however, cannot harbor comparable confidence. Its alliances are not with nations but with minority regimes in control of nations. For peacetime purposes (and probably also for low-intensity war purposes) those regimes do and will monopolize the employment of the power of those nations, through the imposition of force upon them. Should East-West conflict of more than minimal intensity erupt, loosening the Soviet grip, the nations concerned can be expected to rebel; for fundamentally, the nations of Eastern Europe have no quarrel with Western nations--it is overwhelmingly the Soviets alone (and their true allies, the Communist regimes of their captive states) that have a quarrel with nations on the near side of the Iron Curtain. In such a crisis, the other East European nations can be expected to strive to throw off the Communist yoke, to exert backlash against it, and to subtract their power from Soviet aggregation. Having conquered, suppressed, and exploited such nations against the will of the peoples concerned, the Soviets can never afford to cease to be wary of relying too heavily on such "allies."

These considerations, though largely amorphous, are not insubstantial in analyses relating American military strength to American primacy.

Power Rankings Prior to the 1970's

As for power rankings, a number have been constructed over time. Few are composite rankings. The typical ranking lists relative performance and status among nations along a single line, such as steel, coal, or energy. As a general example of logically-progressive development, Professor Barbera has provided preliminary data for his study of development by listing,³⁵ for example, world production of commercial sources of energy.

Table 3-9: World Production of Commercial Sources of Energy
(Electricity Equivalents in Million Megawatt Hours)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Energy</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Energy</u>
1860	1,079	1910	9,387
1870	1,674	1920	11,298
1880	2,623	1930	13,053
1880	4,056	1940	15,882
1900	6,089	1950	20,556

Klaus Knorr provides the following table³⁶ of comparisons in critical elements of power among five nations between 1850 and 1914:

Table 3-10: Coal and Steel

	<u>Coal Production</u> (Million Tons)		<u>Steel Production</u> (Million Tons)	
	<u>1850</u>	<u>1914</u>	<u>1850</u>	<u>1914</u>
Britain	57.0	292.0	3.6	6.5
Germany	6.0	277.0	2.3	14.0
France	1.2	40.0	.7	3.5
Russia	--	36.2	.4	4.1
United States	--	455.0	4.3	32.1

Clearly, while Great Britain was in 1850 the world's only important industrial power, by 1914 she had without question been overtaken by the United States, and was rivaled by Germany. France,

the greatest military power as the 19th Century opened, was fading in relative industrial power by the century's end. By 1914, the industrial capacity of the United States, with 35% of the world's manufacturing capacity, already rivaled that of all Europe put together.

These figures indicate very rapid industrial growth by the United States. But such growth was not wholly unique. Professor Knorr has provided a brief indicator of Japan's even more rapid growth in steel and electricity. In 1964, Japan produced 39.9 million tons of steel and 180 million KWH of electricity. The following chart shows rankings in these two attributes five years later, in 1969.³⁷ It also shows, of course, United States primacy in these activities:

Table 3-11: Crude Steel and Electricity

	Production of Crude Steel, 1969 (<u>Million metric tons</u>)	Production of Electricity 1969 (<u>Million kallowatt hours</u>)
United States	131.4	1553
USSR	110.4	689
Japan	81.6	316
West Germany	45.6	226
United Kingdom	26.4	235
India	6.0	49

In 1960, F. Clifford German published a ranked list of power status among the ten most powerful nations of the world. He "corrected" data in a number of categories, but his calculations are too complex to be described in full here. Confining himself to "hard" elements of national power, as shown on the following chart,³⁸ German arrived at an index which placed the United States

Table 3-12: German's 1960 Power Index

Key	USA	USSR	United King- dom	China	West Ger- many	Canada	Japan	France	India	Poland
1. Area in square kilom- eters (thousands)...(7828)	(22403)	(244)	(9761)	(248)	(9974)	(370)	(551)	(3182)	(312)	
2. Area corrected for population density..(391½)	(1120)	(49)	(976)	(50)	(499)	(74)	(55)	(318)	(31)	
3. Area further corrected for rail density.... 391½	373	49	325	50	250	74	55	212	31	
4. Working population in millions.....(67½)	(75)	(23½)	(200)	(23)	(5¾)	(43½)	(19½)	(110)	(13)	
5. Above, corrected for technical efficiency(337½)	(225)	(117½)	(200)	(92)	(28½)	(87)	(58½)	(110)	(39)	
6. Plus five times manu- facturing population(78)	(60)	(45)	(20)	(40)	(7½)	(40½)	(27½)	(9)	(12½)	
7. Plus factor for "morale," based on row 4.....(34)	(37½)	(8)	(100)	(11½)	(3)	(22)	(6½)	(....)	(4)	
8. Plus or minus food supply factor.....(+ 22)	(.....)	(- 22)	(....)	(- 6)	(+ 8)	(- 14)	(....)	(- 20)	(- 3)	
9. Total population factor (rows 5, 6, 7, & 8). 471½	322½	148½	320	137½	47	135½	92½	99	52½	
10. Steel production in metric tons per year (millions).....(1022½)	(549)	(220)	(52½)	(280)	(46)	(126)	(141)	(17½)	(53)	
11. Coal production in metric tons per year (millions).....(468)	(348)	(227)	(124)	(151)	(10)	(52)	(57)	(44)	(94)	
12. Lignite production (5,000,000 metric tons per year).....(...)	(29)	(...)	(...)	(20)	(....)	(....)	(....)	(....)	(1)	
13. Crude oil production (million metric tons per year).....(354)	(113)	(...)	(1½)	(4)	(24½)	(....)	(1½)	(....)	(....)	
14. Hydroelectricity in million tons coal equivalent(203)	(61)	(4)	(....)	(20)	(119)	(87)	(38)	(9)	(1)	
15. Total industry (pro- visional)(rows 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14).....(2047½)	(1100)	(451)	(178)	(475)	(199½)	(265)	(237½)	(70½)	(149)	
16. Additional factor for directed economy....(...)	(1100)	(...)	(178)	(....)	(....)	(....)	(....)	(....)	(149)	
17. Indexes of surplus or deficit: steel.....(+102)	(....)	(...)	(....)	(+ 24)	(- 10)	(- 13)	(....)	(- 7)	(....)	
18. Indexes of surplus or deficit: oil.....(...)	(....)	(- 45)	(- 37)	(- 48)	(....)	(- 26½)	(- 24)	(- 7)	(- 30)	
19. Indexes of surplus or deficit: minerals(+102)	(+ 220)	(- 23)	(+ 37)	(- 24)	(+ 20)	(- 26½)	(+ 12)	(+ 7)	(- 15)	
20. Indexes of surplus or deficit: engineer- ing.....(+102)	(....)	(+ 45)	(- 37)	(+ 48)	(- 10)	(....)	(....)	(- 7)	(- 15)	
21. Total surplus or defi- cit factor (rows 17-20).....(+306)	(+ 220)	(- 23)	(- 37)	(....)	(....)	(- 66)	(- 12)	(- 14)	(- 60)	
22. Revised industrial total (rows 15, 16, and 21)..... 2353½	2420	428	319	475	199½	199	225½	56½	238	
23. Military personnel (millions)..... 2.6	4.5	0.6	3.5	0.1	0.15	0.2	0.1	0.55	0.3	
24. Total civil factors (rows 3, 9, and 22).(3216½)	(3115½)	(625½)	(964)	(662½)	(496½)	(408½)	(373)	(367½)	(321½)	
25. Additional factor for nuclear weapons..... 3242½	3160½	631½	
26. Grand total (rows 3, 9, 22, 23, & 25)..... 6459	6321	1257	999	663½	498	410½	383	373	324½	
RANKING.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

at the head of the list by a narrow margin over the USSR, with Britain in third place with less than 20% of the power index of the USSR, and followed by China with an index amounting to 80% of Britain's.

In an analysis of interaction between wars and the status of nations, Wayne H. Ferris developed ranked lists of power status among the world's nations at regular intervals up to 1965. Two of these lists are reproduced below. Ferris developed power rankings based on indicators of both actual and potential armed forces strength, economic capacity, and administrative capacity.³⁹ Said Ferris, in a judgment applicable more or less to every statistical appraisal and ranking of such an amorphous attribute as "power":

The strategy chosen in this study for measuring the power capabilities of states is that of multiple indicators to be combined into a single index. It is unlikely that any one indicator will, by itself, accurately measure the power capabilities of all states, since power capabilities is a complex variable comprised of many elements, since error is undoubtedly inherent to some degree in virtually all indicators, and since missing data was certain to be a problem for any indicator selected, given the domain and timeframe of the study . . .⁴⁰

There follow two of Ferris' listings; one shows rankings and power indices of the world's ten highest and ten lowest states, at five stages (1850, 1975, 1900, 1930, and 1960) between 1850 and 1960. The other shows the listing of the ten most powerful nations every ten years between 1855 and 1965. As is indicated in Ferris' tables, the United States has been the most powerful nation in the world since prior to World War II, with (differing from German's findings) a power index in 1960 almost twice that of the USSR.

Table 3-13: Power Capabilities Scores
for Ten Highest-Scoring and Ten Lowest-Scoring States in the International System: 1950-1960
(In Thousands of Units)*1

	1850	1875	1900	1930	1960
United Kingdom	12728	Russia/U.S.S.R. 11343	Russia/U.S.S.R. 12651	United States 11755	United States 21942
Russia/U.S.S.R.	12306	France 10897	United Kingdom 12515	United Kingdom 10524	Russia/U.S.S.R. 12709
France	11737	United Kingdom 10730	France 9473	France 6710	United Kingdom 5024
Austria-Hungary	7379	Germany 7228	United States 8387	Russia/U.S.S.R. 5755	Communist China 4476
United States	4668	United States 6487	Germany 8062	China 5510	France 4019
Prussia	4523	Austria-Hungary 5859	Austria-Hungary 5792	Germany 5345	West Germany 3034
Turkey	3528	Italy 4974	Italy 4180	Italy 4184	Canada 2871
Spain	3314	China 4203	Netherlands 2940	Japan 3269	Italy 1660
Netherlands	2626	Spain 3755	Turkey 2391	Canada 2473	Sweden 1620
Uruguay	2545	Turkey 2932	Belgium 2234	Spain 2038	Australia 1582
Bolivia	633	Venezuela 627	Colombia 422	Afghanistan 326	Cameroun 144
Parma	539	Bolivia 583	Honduras 422	Costa Rica 325	Liberia 139
Guatemala	516	El Salvador 526	El Salvador 398	Guatemala 323	Congo (Braz.) 138
Haiti	487	Luxembourg 507	Haiti 392	Nicaragua 322	Honduras 137
Colombia	473	Ecuador 458	Morocco 374	Ecuador 306	Guinea 135
Luxembourg	442	Colombia 455	Guatemala 355	Dominican Rep. 289	Cen. African Rep. 132
El Salvador	309	Morocco 424	Korea 310	Honduras 286	Haiti 119
Honduras	289	Nicaragua 422	Paraguay 293	Panama 257	Upper Volta 116
Nicaragua	269	Honduras 345	Montenegro 213	Haiti 234	Dahomey 114
Liberia	220	Liberia 229	Liberia 208	Liberia 165	Togo 98

Table 3-14: Ten Highest-Scoring States on Power Capabilities Rank-Ordered: 1855-1965⁴²

1855	1865	1875	1885	1895	1905
1. United Kingdom 2. France 3. Russia/U.S.S.R. 4. Austria-Hungary 5. United States 6. Prussia 7. Spain 8. Turkey 9. Netherlands 10. Uruguay	1. United Kingdom 2. Russia/U.S.S.R. 3. France 4. United States 5. Austria-Hungary 6. Italy 7. Prussia 8. China 9. Spain 10. Turkey	1. Russia/U.S.S.R. 2. France 3. United Kingdom 4. Germany 5. United States 6. Austria-Hungary 7. Italy 8. China 9. Spain 10. Turkey	1. United Kingdom 2. France 3. Russia/U.S.S.R. 4. Germany 5. United States 6. Austria-Hungary 7. Italy 8. China 9. Spain 10. Netherlands	1. Russia/U.S.S.R. 2. France 3. United Kingdom 4. Germany 5. United States 6. Austria-Hungary 7. Italy 8. Netherlands 9. China 10. Spain	1. Russia/U.S.S.R. 2. United Kingdom 3. France 4. Germany 5. United States 6. Austria-Hungary 7. Italy 8. Netherlands 9. Japan 10. China
1915	1925	1935	1945	1955	1965
1. United Kingdom 2. Russia/U.S.S.R. 3. France 4. United States 5. Germany 6. Austria-Hungary 7. Italy 8. China 9. Japan 10. Netherlands	1. United States 2. United Kingdom 3. France 4. China 5. Germany 6. Russia/U.S.S.R. 7. Japan 8. Italy 9. Australia 10. Spain	1. Russia/U.S.S.R. 2. United Kingdom 3. France 4. United States 5. Germany 6. Italy 7. China 8. Japan 9. Poland 10. Netherlands	1. United States 2. Russia/U.S.S.R. 3. United Kingdom 4. Canada 5. China 6. Australia 7. Belgium 8. Brazil 9. Netherlands 10. Italy	1. United States 2. Russia/U.S.S.R. 3. United Kingdom 4. Communist China 5. France 6. Canada 7. West Germany 8. Australia 9. Sweden 10. Belgium	1. United States 2. Russia/U.S.S.R. 3. Communist China 4. United Kingdom 5. West Germany 6. France 7. Canada 8. Italy 9. Sweden 10. India

A Parable

It may contribute to better appreciation by Americans of their position relative to the whole world and to other peoples to digest a factual but imaginative scenario developed in the late 1950's by Henry Smith Leiper.⁴³ A few of the specific figures may require some correction, but they remain close enough in 1975 for purposes of illustrating relative status.

If, in imagination, we compress the present population of the world, now /late 1950's/ over $2\frac{1}{2}$ billion, into a group of a thousand persons living in a single town, the following is the picture of contrasts we would then vividly see:

In the whole town, 303 persons would be white; 697 would be of other races. About 300 would be Christians, including 36 Americans. Eighty persons would be Communists, and 370 under Communist domination. Almost one-half of the townspeople would not be able to read or write.

Sixty persons (6% of the whole town) would represent the United States population. The lowest income groups among the 60 Americans would be better off than most of the other people, for the 60 Americans would have one-half of the total income of the entire town. They would produce 16 percent, and eat up $14\frac{1}{4}$ percent, of the town's food supply. They would have 12 times as much electric power as all the other 940 townspeople put together; 22 times as much coal; 21 times as much petroleum; 50 times as much steel; and 50 times as much general equipment.

Literally, most of the 940 non-American people in the town would be poor, hungry, and ignorant, and many of them would be sick. Their life expectancy would average less than 40 years, while that of the 60 Americans would average 70 years.

American Disposition of Resources to Others

During World War II, the United States, for the second time, acted as the banker, arsenal, supplier, and fortifier of a tremendous array of nations, facilities, and forces around the world. In the process, the United States enjoyed (or suffered) unique experience in developing, negotiating, implementing, terminating, and withdrawing from alliances and other agreements for using facilities, with a host of political authorities around the world.

Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr was quoted in the preceding chapter to the effect that nations are not generous. We suggest that at times and in particular circumstances, the United States has constituted one of the rare exceptions. American assistance to foreign countries suffering disasters has been prompt, generous, unprecedented, unmatched, and largely unrequited. When Europe lay supine after World War II, the United States restored its allies (and economic rivals) to power and economic health. Moreover, contrary to the taking of reparations, the United States rehabilitated its enemies. Churchill called the Marshall Plan "the most unsordid act in history."

The Baruch Plan, the "Open Skies" proposal, the Nixon proposal for development of the oceans and sea beds are examples of unprecedented, openminded, generous proposals by a nation in the

position of primacy--not only in matters of money and treasure, but also even in matters of political responsibility and cooperative effort. The field of foreign aid should not be overlooked.

Since World War II, the United States has contributed \$197 billion to some 140 nations, a sum equivalent to over 40% of the current American national debt. Economic aid has totaled \$127.7 billion, and military aid \$69.3 billion. Of the overall total of \$197 billion, \$132.5 billion were provided in the form of gifts, and \$64.5 billion in the form of loans. It should be realized, of course, that certain American groups, of which the largest were farmers and defense industries, partly shared benefits from this largesse, in that about \$175 billion, almost 90%, was spent on purchasing American goods and services to provide to receiving nations.⁴⁴ The ultimate source of funds was, of course, the American taxpayer.

In connection with American generosity in sharing some of its affluence, one should take note, not only of government programs (grants, loans, aid, transport, technical and medical assistance, material, training, etc.) but also of the numerous and enormous similar programs and contributions from private sources in America--the humanitarian contributions to thousands of causes by foundations great and small, churches, refugee and child-help organizations, universities, medical missionaries, funds, etc. One particular source is practically never mentioned, an auxiliary aspect of US armed forces stationing in countries (at their request) around the world, including war in Vietnam--that is, the personal contributions

of money, goods, and services out of the pockets and good will of US servicemen--unit sponsorship of orphanages, engineering works (construction of houses, roads, bridges, wells, schools, et al) medical treatment, and even financial contributions. These are vital to local areas and in total are enormous.

The principal beneficiary nations of official aid, incidentally, were the following: since 1961, one-third of American aid has gone to Indo-China, Israel, and Korea; one-fifth has gone to India, Pakistan, Brazil, Taiwan, and Iran.⁴⁵

Another "first" occurred in this connection, and is mentioned here only for its statistical significance. The largest amount of money transferred by a single check in the history of world banking was handed by US Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan to the representative of the government of India, in New Delhi, on February 18, 1974. The amount was \$2,046,700,000. This was also the largest debt write-off in history.⁴⁶

Some Recent General United States Statistics

It is estimated in 1976 that some 19% of the world's people are genuinely free and that the United States houses a quarter of the 19%. The United States contains the largest national body of free people on earth.

A paragraph of miscellaneous data extracted from a 1969 study describes a number of other facets of American primacy, as of that time: the United States enjoys one-third of the entire world's income; the US GNP in 1968 was \$846 billion, equal to the sum of the USSR's 1968 GNP and the US's 1960 GNP. Exclusive of military personnel, other government employees, and their dependents, some 200,000 Americans live abroad. The Peace Corps maintains volunteers in 58 countries. Of 1600 private American agencies abroad, about 1000 of them spent over \$600 million overseas in 1963. The United States provides most of the personnel and financial support for missionaries abroad; 2/3 of all the world's Protestant missionaries overseas are Americans. In 1967, 18.5 million American tourists spent \$4.6 billion in foreign countries (46% in Canada and Mexico). American investments abroad reached \$50 billion by 1966. Abroad, 4200 American businesses control 14,000 foreign businesses. The Voice of America broadcasts over 800 hours per week in 33 languages, using as many as 66 languages on occasion.⁴⁷

The United States is the world's largest producer and exporter of raw materials, and the largest producer of fertilizer. Over recent years, the United States has produced one-fifth of the entire world's grain supply; of the 100 million tons of grain that moved in world trade in 1973, the United States exported three-quarters. In sum, the United States, by itself, dominates the world food situation to a greater extent than the Middle East, collectively, dominates the world's oil situation.⁴⁸

In relation to increasing world food production, the end of the "easy" possibilities was marked in 1974 when the United States placed the last of its idle land back into crop production.⁴⁹

According to Messrs. Canfield and Hadd, of the U.S. General Accounting Office, the United States level of consumption of resources is inevitably a factor in relations among the United States and other nations. During the past 30 years, the United States has consumed more minerals and mineral fuels than all the peoples in world history had used up to 1945. With 6% of world population, the United States consumes 30% of the world's energy, and 40% of metals and other non-energy minerals.⁵⁰

Annually, for each American, over 3½ tons of stone, sand, and gravel must be dug, transported, and used. In every American's name, directly or indirectly, over 500 pounds of cement are used every year, 400 pounds of clay, over 200 pounds of common salt, and over 100 pounds of phosphate rock--all together, over 20 tons of raw materials per American citizen per year.⁵¹

Comparisons of the disposition of growth include the fact that three-quarters of the world's increasing demand for food is due to population increase, while one-quarter arises from increasing affluence. For example, in 1970, India, with over 600 million people and a population growth rate of 2%, required 2 million tons of additional food annually; whereas the United States, with over 200 million people and a lower population growth rate than India, required more than 3 million additional tons of food.

It has been estimated that of consumption of food in the United States, 15-30% is wasted.⁵² It is also said by specialists that the United States in 1974 used more fertilizer for lawns, golf courses, airports, and similar land areas than was used by (or available to) all the farmers of India.⁵³

Another dimension of American waste of food emerged from an account of corn gleaners in Illinois. Gleaners pick up by hand corn left in the fields after the huge harvesting combines have passed through--corn that "would be left to rot until it was plowed under," for farmers insist that it is not economically feasible to pay people to glean.

"County extension agents estimate that a fifth of the country's corn crop is missed by the combines." In Woodford County, Illinois, alone, for example, they estimate that more than 500,000 bushels, worth almost \$1.5 million, are left each year to rot in the fields.⁵⁴

More Positive Perspectives

In reaction against denigration aimed at the United States and American society, Lewis Foy put together in December 1974 a brief listing⁵⁵ of miscellaneous current indicators of well-being in America:

- 1 in 1000 citizens is a millionaire.
- Median family income is \$12,000 per year.
- Over 60% of families own their own homes.
- 95% of the 63.5 million households have full plumbing facilities.

- Of the American consumer dollar, 18% is spent on food (in the UK: 30%; in East Europe, 40%; in the LDC's, 60%).

- 8 million Americans (25% of all Americans of college age) are attending college.

- Of all Americans 25 years and over, 52% have completed high school; 12% have completed college.

- The total American tax burden averages 28% of income per capita (2d lowest among the 13 leading industrial nations).

Status of Women⁵⁶

- Over 3 million women now earn more than their husbands.

- In 3 years, women enrolled in medical schools increased from 3894 to 7824 (9.6% to 15.4%).

- From 1971-1974, women enrolled in the Foreign Service increased from 4.9% to 15%.⁵⁷

The 1974 elections produced:⁵⁸

- America's 1st woman governor elected in her own right (Ella T. Grasso, CT).

- The 1st woman mayor of a city of over 500,000 population (Janet Hayes, San Jose, CA).

- The 1st woman chief justice of a state supreme court (Susie Sharp, North Carolina).

- The most (18) women ever in US House of Representatives.

- An increase from 470 to 587 women in state legislatures nationwide.

Status of Black Citizens⁵⁹

- 40% of black families own their own homes.

- College enrollment of blacks has gone up 80% in 8 years.

In 1972, 18% of entire 18-24 year group were attending college.

- In 1960, the percentage of black males 20-29 who had completed high school: 38%; and of black females: 43%. By 1972, these percentages had increased as follows: black males completed high school: 64%; black females: 66%.

- Blacks in technical and professional positions increased 128% in 10 years.

- The total income of 23 million black Americans, about \$52 billion, is equal to the total GNP of the 600 million people of India; and exceeds the GNP of 140 (all but 9) of the world's nations.

We shall cite here only one more worldwide indicator of American influence and primacy: the English language. Developed and spread around the world, of course, by Great Britain, English has now become the lingua franca of politics, diplomacy, science, technology, and other major international activities. While Chinese, for example, is spoken by more people than is English, Chinese-speaking is preponderantly confined to the massive population within the borders of China. Primarily pressured by the spread of American influence, English has become the primary international language. It is said that 22% of all the books printed in the world today are printed in English (17% are said to be printed in Russian).⁶⁰

International Status Indicators

The following table shows one measure of international evaluations of national power. It shows the total budget, in 1974, for four international agencies: the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, and the World Health Organization. It also shows the assessments (distribution of costs) levied on ten selected member states. One notes, for example, that while India is assessed 1.2% of the costs of the United Nations, China 5.5%, and the Soviet Union 12.97%, the United States is assessed 25%, twice the assessment of the world's only other superpower (An agreement of recent years limits the principal contributions by any one UN member to a maximum of 25%; prior to the adoption of that agreement, the United States contributed over 30%, with even a larger differential over the second-ranking contributor).

Table 3-15: International Assessments 1974⁶¹

	UN		Food & Agric Orgn		UNESCO		World Health Orgn	
	%	Amt	%	Amt	%	Amt	%	Amt
Total	100.00	\$264,322,000	100.00	\$62,650,000	100.00	\$52,720,000	100.00	\$117,865,000
United States	25.00	66,080,000	25.00	15,663,000	29.41	15,505,000	29.18	34,393,000
FR	5.86	15,489,000	7.47	4,680,000	5.60	2,952,000	5.40	6,365,000
FRG	7.10	18,767,000	9.05	5,670,000	6.34	3,342,000	6.12	7,213,000
India	1.20	3,172,000	1.53	959,000	1.45	764,000	1.40	1,650,000
Japan	7.15	18,899,000	9.11	5,707,000	5.04	2,657,000	4.86	5,728,000
USSR	12.97	34,283,000	non-member		13.23	6,925,000	12.77	15,051,000
UK	5.31	14,035,000	6.77	4,241,000	5.50	2,900,000	5.31	6,259,000
Mainland China	5.50	14,538,000	7.01	4,392,000	3.73	1,966,000	3.60	4,243,000
Maldives Islands	.02	53,000	.02	13,000	non-member		.04	47,000
Kuwait	.09	238,000	.11	69,000	.07	37,000	.07	83,000

Singer and Small attempted to classify all nation-members of the international system or community according to "attributed importance or status" between 1815 and 1940. Status is "that attributed to a given member by most of the community, or more likely, by those members whose own status is high enough to permit them to largely determine the status of others."⁶² Using a weighted measurement system based on type and scope of diplomatic representation, and mining such sources as diplomatic lists and the Almanach de Gotha, Singer and Small assessed international status every five years between 1815 and 1940, producing a single ranked list of all nations and also dividing that list into quintiles.

The status of the United States by these calculations changed as follows:⁶³

Table 3-16: US Status Since 1817

<u>Year</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Quintile</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Quintile</u>
1817-1819	17 of 23	4	1879	5 of 34	1
1824	10 of 23	2	1884	6 of 35	1
1827	13 of 24	3	1889	5 of 38	1
1832	13 of 28	2	1894	6 of 38	1
1836	7 of 38	1	1899	5 of 41	1
1840	6 of 31	1	1904	4 of 42	1
1844	5 of 35	1	1909	2 of 43	1
1849	4 of 39	1	1914	1 of 43	1
1854	3 of 40	1	1920	2 of 61	1
1859	3 of 42	1	1925	4 of 62	1
1864	5 of 39	1	1930	3 of 63	1
1869	3 of 34	1	1935	1 of 66	1
1874	4 of 31	1	1940	1 of 62	1

Diplomatic Representation

In 1954, the foreign services of three countries comprised the following numbers of personnel: France 1000, the United Kingdom 1100, the United States 4400.⁶⁴

The development of modern communications, increases in literacy, and growth of mass media, have caused a diminution in the diplomat's role as self-reliant negotiator; but he has emerged from royal courts to become an ever more visible representative of his government's interests in, and involvement with, the host nation.

The transformation of classical diplomacy has also been propelled by the growth in the number of international organizations and the increase in direct contact between national officials (heads of state, foreign ministers, other cabinet officials, and so on) and their counterparts in other nations. Testifying not only to the scope but also to the burdens of this increased contact is the United States government's official participation in 1963, for example, in over four hundred multilateral conferences involving ten thousand participating-nation votes.⁶⁵

After World War I there were about 1,100 embassies and legations in approximately 50 nations, but today the number stands at about 4,000 in over 120 nations. The most striking fact about diplomatic sending data is the very sizable contribution made to the world diplomatic community by only a few nations. Fifteen nations dispatch over half of all diplomats who are sent abroad, with the United States alone contributing 12 percent to the world total.

The United States corps is almost twice as large as the second-ranking British corps, and so is the average size of her missions. The only embassies that come close to matching United States embassies in average staff size are those of the Soviet Union, but the Soviets have 35 fewer embassies in the world. Significantly, missions from Communist China rank fifth highest in average size, and their number has grown.⁶⁶

Most nations are quantitatively involved in only a very small portion of all diplomatic intercourse. Over one hundred (104) nations have diplomats stationed in fewer than half of the national capitals, 70 nations have missions in fewer than 30 capitals, and 45 nations are represented in fewer than 20 capitals. In capitals where nations do have representatives, the embassies of more than half (61) average 4 or fewer diplomats per mission.⁶⁷

Table 3-17: Diplomats Sent Abroad by the Ten Nations
at the Head of the List⁶⁸

<u>Nation</u>	<u>Number Diplomats</u>	<u>Number Nations Sent To</u>	<u>Average Number Diplomats Sent</u>
United States	2782	100	27.8
United Kingdom	1403	95	14.6
USSR	1345	63	20.7
France	1152	98	11.8
FRG	671	88	7.6
Japan	638	71	9.0
United Arab Rep	550	67	8.2
Italy	511	87	5.9
India	467	64	7.3
Czechoslovakia	422	57	7.4

Most of the ranks of diplomats conform to common-sense notions of the diplomatic prominence of various capitals. The United States and the United Kingdom rank 1 and 2, respectively, in the number of

diplomats they receive as well as in the number they send. The United Arab Republic also duplicates receiving her high sending rank of 7; this receiving rank undoubtedly reflects the importance of Cairo as a focus of diplomatic maneuvering in the Arab-African world. West Germany, on the other hand, ranking behind both France and the Soviet Union in sending, outranks both in the number of diplomats she receives in her capital. Belgium's twentieth-fourth position as a sending country is raised (to tenth) as a receiving country, probably as a result of her importance as a headquarters for European organizations.

It is interesting to compare the top 10 nations of 1963-1964, ranked according to the number of missions in their capitals, with the top 10 rankings of 40 years earlier. Quite surprisingly, only 4 nations--the UAR, Japan, the Soviet Union, and India--broke into the top 10, and all fell at the bottom of the ladder.⁶⁹

Table 3-18: Top Ten Nations Ranked⁷⁰ According to the Number of Diplomatic Missions in Their Capitals in 1922 and 1963-64

<u>1922</u>		<u>1963-64</u>	
<u>Nation</u>	<u>No. of Missions</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>No. of Missions</u>
1 France	50	1 United States	107
2 United Kingdom	50	2 France	98
3 United States	48	3 United Kingdom	96
4 Italy	44	4 Germany (Fed. R.)	94
5 Germany	40	5 Italy	85
6 Belgium	32	6 Belgium	75
7 Netherlands	32	7 United Arab Rep.	73
8 Spain	31	8 Japan	70
9 Brazil	30	9 Soviet Union	69
10 Austria/Switzerland	29	10 India	66

Relatively, the United States and the top 5 European nations remained about where they had been. Among the newcomers, the Soviet Union made the largest jump, from a rank of 40 with only 10 missions in 1922 to her 1963-64 rank of 9 (third in absolute number of diplomats) with 69 missions. The UAR (Egypt) rose from the thirty-fourth rank (15 missions) and Japan from the eighteenth rank (24 missions). India, of course, was not an independent nation in 1922.

At the most recent accounting, the United States maintains abroad 130 embassies, 9 missions (e.g., UN, NATO, OAS), 1 Liaison Office, 74 Consulates General, and 44 Consulates.⁷¹

If the number of diplomats that a nation contributes to the international system can be accepted as one indicator of the nation's overall involvement in world affairs, then the difference between the number of diplomats a nation sends abroad and the number it receives in its capital might be considered an index of its world interest balance.

The diplomatic balance of the United States outstrips that of all other nations in magnitude: her absolute "excess" of diplomats is more than twice that of any other nation; and, in relative terms, her foreign embassies outdistance embassies in Washington by an average of 15 diplomats per embassy, whereas her nearest competitors, the Soviet Union and France, outdo their capital embassies by averages of 10 and 4 diplomats, respectively. Surprisingly, Britain has only a small positive balance of diplomats, and Italy and West Germany actually have negative balances. On the other hand, the internationalist orientation of the Communist states is reflected

by the fact that all Eastern European nations except East Germany-- whose diplomatic intercourse was vastly curtailed because she was not recognized by most nations in the world--have either positive absolute or positive average balances of diplomats.⁷²

International Organizations

Intergovernmental organizations (IGO's), whose members are all national governments, embrace a multifarious assortment of substantive concerns. For example, there is the International Office of Epizootics in Paris, which conducts research on contagious diseases of livestock, and there is the International Tea Committee in London; in Geneva there is the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, and in Rome there is the International Computation Center; the Administrative Center of Social Security for Rhine Boatmen is located in Strasbourg, France, and the Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa has headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya; and to keep track of these and more than 150 other IGO's, as well as more than 1,500 non-governmental organizations, there is the Union of International Associations in Brussels.⁷³

Henry Barbera calculated in 1973 that there then existed over 5,000 governmental and non-governmental organizations connecting 126 nations, and that there existed about 4200 bilateral and multilateral international exchange agreements among them.⁷⁴

Patterns of Representation

The average number of IGO's to which each nation belongs has been computed; but these figures deliberately exclude the United Nations and its fourteen specialized agencies, including, for example, the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Monetary Fund; because these nearly-universal organizations, with a few exceptions, include nearly all nations in the world, they would tend to add a constant to the number of shared memberships of a nation but would not significantly affect a nation's standing relative to other nations.

France tops the list, with the next 12 ranks filled only by nations of Western Europe (including Great Britain) and Scandinavia. By contrast, the United States and the Soviet Union rank only fourteenth and fortieth, respectively, in number of shared memberships in IGO's; obviously, the two superpowers are not dependent upon IGO's or any other single type of channel for international contacts.

A comparison of the organizational roots of Communist countries in this aspect of the international system is revealing. The most "revisionist" of the Communist countries, Yugoslavia, also has the highest number of shared memberships, with Poland and Rumania, two Soviet bloc nations that have shown considerable independence in the past, ranking not far behind. Forebodingly, the four Asian Communist countries--China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam--fall at the very bottom of the table, indicating their almost total lack of any cooperative institutional relations with the rest of the world.⁷⁵

The most important conclusion that emerges is that their organizational ties provide most nations with far greater access to the outside world than do their diplomatic ties. While only one-eighth of all nations have diplomatic representatives in more than half the world capitals, seven-eighths of all nations have organizational affiliations with more than half of all other nations. Organizational ties thus provide communication links between many nations that have no bilateral exchanges of diplomats.⁷⁶

Science and Technology

Before plunging directly into international standings in science and technology, one of the most important component areas of international status in current decades, it may be of interest to contemplate here one particular aspect of primacy which might have been included under a number of other category headings, such as "transiency." In taking a long perspective toward primacy, one may neglect to reflect that, as the instances of Spain, France, and Britain demonstrate, no dominance lasts forever; sooner or later, relative standings will change. Even dominance in a single field, such as technology, eventually passes to someone else.

It is probably healthy for members of the nations possessing "advanced Western technology" to a degree permitting condescension toward "ancient primitive, developing" nations of Asia, to be refreshed as to where the centers of world scientific and technological leadership were located some centuries ago, when the shoe was on the other foot.

. . . Marco Polo was born and raised in the most developed area of all the West, yet he pointed to the East when he spoke of a supremely developed place. All the evidence he presented was, of course, in traditional form: gold and diamonds, rubies and jade, gardens and temples; poetical and philosophic works, length of tradition; precious ointments, delicate porcelains, and rare spices; and personal observation of and in public administration, the road system, and diplomacy. For centuries on end, from Herodotus to Adam Smith, the East had been the region of known and admired development. In fact, through most of history Europe was a borrower of things Eastern rather than a donor. The plants and animals which made settled life in the West possible came to it from Asia, together with all its basic technologies from smelting to printing.⁷⁷

With this as a sobering introduction to the subject, we turn to various indicators of America's relative status in scientific and technological activities.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1973 published various useful statistics in Science Indicators 1972, covering various aspects of the relative status of the United States in science and technology. The NSF confined its international comparisons to general trends and to relative rather than absolute indicators, because of the paucity and limited quality of available information. This applies with particular force, said the NSF, to comparisons involving the USSR, where definitions of "R&D" and "scientific personnel" often differ from those of other countries.

Specific indicators must be interpreted with considerable caution. Indices of the level of R&D can be misleading because the costs of such activities, and differences in the productivity and functions of scientists and engineers, cannot yet be equated for the various countries. The output indices of scientific reports

and patents reflect only a small part of the total output of science and technology, whereas the last group of indicators--those dealing with technical knowledge, productivity, and international trade--include the effects of many factors, science and technology being one of them.⁷⁸

The proportion of the gross national product (GNP) spent for research and development (R&D) between 1963-71 declined in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom but increased in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Japan, and West Germany. As Table 19 shows, by 1971, US expenditures for R&D were 2.6 percent of GNP, as compared with an estimated 3.0 percent for the USSR, approximately 2.0 percent for the United Kingdom and West Germany, and 1.8 percent for both Japan and France.⁷⁹

Table 3-19: R&D Expenditures as a Percent of Gross National Product,
by Country, 1963-71⁸⁰




Table 20 shows the allocation within these countries of R&D funds to principal national objectives, including defense, space, community services, economic development, nuclear energy, and science. Table 21 shows the number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per 10,000 of population in each country during the 1963-1971 period.

Table 3-20: Distribution of Government R&D Expenditures Among National Objectives, by Country, 1961 and 1969





Table 3-21: Scientists and Engineers^(a) Engaged in R&D per 10,000 Population, by Country, 1963-71⁸²







National Rankings re Scientific Literature





Estimates of the distribution of literature among fields and countries were based upon counts of articles, letters, and notes published from 1965 through 1971 in some 500 journals covered by the Science Citation Index (published by the Institute for Scientific Information, Philadelphia, Pa.), supplemented by data from various abstracting services. The results are presented below in the 8 subject boxes of Table 22.

Overall, the US-produced literature had the highest "significance" ratio in 5 of the 7 fields, with systematic biology and mathematics the 2 exceptions. ("Economics" was omitted because of the lack of reliable citation data.) Literature of the United Kingdom received

Table 3-22: Scientific Literature in Selected Fields
Produced by Major Developed Nations, 1965-71



Scientific Literature in
Selected Fields Produced by
Major Developed Nations,
1965-71 (Continued)



the next highest rankings, placing either first or second in each field. Ranking after the United States and the United Kingdom were West Germany, Japan, USSR, and France, in that order.⁸³

The Patent Balance of the United States

Statistics on patents awarded to US nationals by foreign countries, minus patents awarded to foreign nations by the United States relative to each of the other countries (except the USSR which accounts for less than one percent of the total patent transactions considered), are presented below.⁸⁴ Overall, the US balance,

Table 3-23: Patents Awarded to U.S. Nations by Foreign Countries and to Foreign Nationals by the U. S. 1966-70





Table 3-24: U. S. Patent Balance with Selected Countries, 1966-70



while still favorable, declined in each country, with the major reduction occurring in respect to France, followed by smaller declines in relation to the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany in that order. Declines in the US balance vis-a-vis France, United Kingdom, and West Germany were due principally to reductions in the number of patents awarded to US nationals; conversely, the decline with respect to Japan was produced largely by an increasing number of awards to that country by the United States.

Thus, the US patent position, while still favorable in 1970, was eroding for two reasons: (a) a declining number of foreign patents of US origin and (b) an increasing number of US patents of foreign origin.

Productivity

Productivity expresses the relationship between the quantity of goods and services produced (the output) and the resources (e.g., labor, capital, land, and energy) used to produce them (the input). One of the most commonly used indices of productivity is "output per man-hour," which relates output to the input of labor time. R&D also contributes to productivity by providing advances in technology which increase output per man-hour. All studies of the effects of R&D on productivity growth conclude that there is a direct relationship which is "positive, significant, and high."

Indices now available do not permit comparison of absolute levels of productivity in different countries, except in the case of certain individual industries. Instead, comparisons are limited to changes in productivity which occur over time in individual

countries. Normalized data for changes in relative labor productivity and unit labor cost in manufacturing over the period 1960-71 are presented below in Tables 25 and 26 for the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan.⁸⁵

Table 3-25: Productivity in Manufacturing Industries, by Country, 1960-71 (Index 1960=100)





Table 3-26: Unit Labor Cost in Manufacturing Industries, by Country, 1960-71 (Index 1960=100)




During the period 1960-1971, the United States had an increasingly favorable position in the sale of "technical know-how"--patents, techniques, formulas, franchises, and manufacturing rights; Japan was the major purchaser of US "know-how," surpassing all of Western Europe after 1967.⁸⁶

The favorable US balance of trade in technology-intensive products grew throughout 1960-71, but became increasingly negative

in nontechnology-intensive areas, as is shown in Table 27. Within the technology-intensive areas, products with the fastest rising trade surplus are aircraft, computers, and plastics. Product areas in which the growth of imports exceeds exports include office machinery, chemical elements and compounds, medicinal products, and telecommunication apparatus.

Table 3-27: U. S. Trade Balance in Technology--and
Nontechnology--Intensive Manufactured Products,
1960-71



The favorable trade balance of the United States in high technology products rested primarily on purchases by developing nations (55 percent in 1971) and countries of Western Europe. A deficit balance with Japan, developed in the mid-1960's and continuing to grow through 1971, exists in electrical machinery, scientific and professional instruments, and non-electrical machinery.⁸⁷

Concerning that facet of technological leadership involved in innovation and patent balance, Mr. Jacob Rabinow, Chief of the Office of Invention and Innovation, National Bureau of Standards, was asked⁸⁸ at the end of 1974, "What countries are producing the best inventors?"

Answer:

The United States is doing well. We're now ranked approximately fifth in inventions per man. The 4 nations with a better per capita invention rate are, as of 1972, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, and East Germany.

Question:

Does the United States get many inventions from abroad?

Answer:

It happens more and more. Some countries develop science, and other countries build on it. The United States built its technology on European science. The great scientific achievements of the century from 1800 to 1900 were not done by the United States. The great chemists, the great physicists, were European. We took their basic work and shaped it into practical things. The Fords, the Edisons converted the science into goods.

Now the thing is swinging the other way. We are rich and spend money on the pleasant things of life. Other countries that are hungrier spend money on applying our science from past years.

Computers

Computers have become centrally identified with technological prowess (and, in turn, as an even more modern indicator of power status than steel production). Brzezinski listed the following as the worldwide distribution of computers at the end of 1969:

Africa 750; Eastern Europe 750; Switzerland 800; Netherlands 850;

Australia 900; Canada 2400; Italy 2500; USSR 3500; France 5010; Britain 5600; FRG 5750; Japan 5800; and the United States 70,000.⁸⁹

Nobel Prizes

Recognizing that Nobel Prizes, perhaps the world's most prestigious prizes, are not limited exclusively to scientific and technological fields, we may consider them to be closely enough allied as to be covered appropriately here. Actually, since 1901, the prizes have been awarded in 5 fields: physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature, and peace. A 6th field, economics, was added in 1969. (In some years, no prizes have been awarded in particular fields; in other years, multiple prizes.) Distribution of Nobel Prizes has occurred to citizens or agencies of nations around the world (and to a few international agencies), as follows:⁹⁰

Physics, 1901-1973: Total of 98 persons: US 38, UK 17, Germany 13, France 9, USSR 6, Netherlands 5, Sweden 3, Japan 2, Ireland 1, Italy 1, India 1, Austria 1, Denmark 1. After 1935, of the 59 persons in the world awarded the Nobel Prize in physics, 35 have been citizens of a single country: the United States.

Chemistry, 1901-1973: Total of 85 persons: Germany 22, US 20, UK 19, France 6, Sweden 4, Switzerland 3, Austria 2, Netherlands 1, Italy 1, Hungary 1, Finland 1, USSR 1, Czechoslovakia 1, Norway 1, Argentina 1, Canada 1.

Physiology or Medicine, 1901-1975: Total of 102 persons: US 48, UK 18, Germany 10, France 7, Switzerland 4, Denmark 4, Sweden 4, Austria 3, Belgium 3, Italy 2, Netherlands 2, Australia 2,

USSR 1, Spain 1, Canada 1, Argentina 1, Portugal 1. Of 81 names honored in medicine after 1932, 45 are names of Americans.

Literature, 1910-1973: Total of 70 persons: France 13, UK 6, US 6, Germany 6, Sweden 5, Italy 4, Norway 3, Spain 3, Denmark 3, USSR 3, Poland 2, Ireland 2, Switzerland 2, Chile 2, Belgium 1, India 1, Finland 1, Iceland 1, Yugoslavia 1, Greece 1, Israeli 1, Guatemala 1, Japan 1, Australia 1.

Peace, 1901-1973: Total of 68 persons or agencies: US 17, UK 8, France 8, Germany 4, Sweden 4, Switzerland 3, International Red Cross 3, Belgium 3, Norway 2, Austria 2, Vietnam 1, Italy 1, Canada 1, South Africa 1, Netherlands 1, Argentina 1, Institute of International Law 1, International Peace Bureau 1, Nansen International Office for Refugees 1, UNICEF 1, Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1, League of Red Cross Societies 1, International Labor Organization 1, and Alsace 1 (this last is a curious listing, for Albert Schweitzer in 1952; evidently, Schweitzer possessed prestige of such weight as to have his nationality listed as that of a province, not a nation).

Economic Science, 1969-1973: 9 persons: US 6, UK 1, Netherlands 1, Norway 1.

These listings are presented not to support some assertion of dominance or of unparalleled excellence, but to provide supplementary evidence of significant American participation at the frontiers of world science and technology, particularly since the mid-1930's. One must assume the selectors' endeavors to identify important achievements fairly and objectively; of the fields involved in Nobel

Prizes, only the "Peace" category appears subject to classification as in any degree "political"--hence, controversial. In any event, it is obvious that America's status among nations is hardly due exclusively to the possession of physical power, but also rests partially upon quantity and quality of broad intellectual and even artistic achievements, compared to the rest of the world. To the extent that Nobel Prizes indicate earned national achievement according to a relatively impeccable exercise of judgment (and achieved not at the expense of any other nation or people), the aggregate status of the United States in this category is without equal and without the possibility (in less than another half century, at least) of being equalled.

Development

As noted earlier, Sociologist Henry Barbera has attempted to distinguish between a nation's status of power (extent of territory, scope of diplomatic representation, wars fought and won, etc.) and its status of development (schools, teachers, housing, labor skills, energy, hospitals, standard of living, etc.). Essentially, Barbera says, the key differences among nations in development involves their "level of mastery over the environment," despite wars, revolutions, depressions, or crises of nature.

Barbera pursued his studies in relation to a proposition that war achieves one of four possible overall impacts on a nation's development: constructive, destructive, variable, or negligible. Barbera's finding was that, over time, war has no substantial impact

either way on the course of any particular nation's development. Concentrating his analysis upon the potential impacts of World War I and II (up to 1952) on development rankings, Barbera sought and used a number of reliable indicators.

Among many available indicators of development, Barbera uncovered⁹¹ only five satisfactory measurements in the form of broad time series covering the entire period since the beginning of the 20th Century up to 1952: rail-track length, rail-freight kilometers, rail-passenger kilometers, mail volume, and number of telephone instruments. Other series, such as iron and steel production exist, but with unsatisfactory coverage. The most accurate single indicator turned out to be the number of telephones per 1000 of population.⁹²

This is not, of course, to imply that Barbera relied exclusively upon telephone data in analyzing stages and statuses in development; he devoted considerable analysis to other interrelated indicators, such as national real income, real income per capita, steel production, and others. Table 28 shows the ranking among nations according to this criterion, in 1913, 1925, 1938, and 1952.

Barbera notes that a nation's rank in development may be quite different from its power ranking; for example, the Soviet Union stands very high in power capabilities, but as Table 29 shows, the Soviet Union stands only in the middle stratum of world rankings in development.

Table 29⁹³ indicates world rankings in 1952 according to status in development. It warrants explicit statement that the United States is ranked first in development.

Table 3-28: Ranks of Telephones per Thousand of Population⁹⁴

<u>Nation</u>	<u>1913</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1952</u>
Algeria	28	28	34	33
Argentina	15	17	17	17
Australia	7	7	7	7
Austria	19	14	15	14
Belgium	16	15	14	13
Bolivia	37	47	54	49
Brazil	30	30	35	34
Bulgaria	40	41	39	41
Burma	-	-	67	70
Canada	2	2	4	3
Ceylon	43	42	50	52
Chile	20	23	22	26
China	57	56	61	67
Colombia	45	34	40	37
Congo	62	62	69	63
Cuba	18	18	26	25
Czechoslovakia	-	-	25	18
Denmark	3	4	5	6
Ecuador	33	33	47	50
Egypt	35	35	43	43
Finland	13	13	12	10
France	17	16	16	15
Ghana	54	52	55	54
Greece	44	46	31	32
Hungary	23	22	21	31
India	56	58	66	66
Indonesia	47	48	57	62
Iran	53	54	56	55
Iraq	61	51	51	45
Ireland	-	-	23	21
Italy	26	24	24	22
Japan	22	20	20	24
Kenya	-	-	53	51
Korea	42	40	44	64
Luxemburg	11	11	11	12
Madagascar	51	53	58	57
Malawi	63	63	68	65
Malaya	43	45	49	44
Mexico	24	29	30	35
Morocco	49	39	45	36
Mozambique	52	55	60	58
Netherlands	12	12	13	11
New Zealand	4	3	2	4
Nigeria	60	60	70	68
Norway	6	6	8	8
Paraguay	46	50	46	47
Peru	39	37	42	42
Philippines	41	43	48	56
Poland	-	-	29	38
Portugal	31	31	28	27
Rhodesia	38	38	38	30
Romania	25	32	37	40
South Africa	21	21	19	19
Soviet Russia	34	44	33	29
Spain	29	25	27	23
Sudan	58	59	63	60
Sweden	5	5	3	2
Switzerland	8	8	6	5
Taiwan	32	27	36	48
Tanganyika	-	-	65	61
Thailand	55	57	62	69
Turkey	50	49	52	46
Uganda	-	-	64	59
United Kingdom	10	10	9	9
United States	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	14	19	18	20
Venezuela	27	26	32	28
West Germany	9	9	10	16
Yugoslavia	36	36	41	39
Zambia	59	61	59	53

Table 3-29: The Development Hierarchy among Nations in 1952

United States	Cuba	Taiwan
Sweden	Chile	Bolivia
Canada	Portugal	Ecuador
New Zealand	Venezuela	Kenya
Switzerland	Soviet Russia	Ceylon
Denmark	Rhodesia	Zambia
Australia	Hungary	Ghana
Norway	Greece	Iran
United Kingdom	Algeria	Philippines
Finland	Brazil	Madagascar
Netherlands	Mexico	Mozambique
Luxemburg	Morocco	Uganda
Belgium	Colombia	Sudan
Austria	Poland	Tanganyika
France	Yugoslavia	Indonesia
West Germany	Romania	Congo
Argentina	Bulgaria	South Korea
Czechoslovakia	Peru	Malawi
South Africa	Egypt	India
Uruguay	Malaya	China
Ireland	Iraq	Nigeria
Italy	Turkey	Thailand
Spain	Paraguay	Burma
Japan		

Some interesting observations about certain nations can be offered relative to these rankings. For example, with the exception of Bolivia and Ecuador, no nation in the lower stratum has ever had a large European minority, emphasizing the fact that contemporary development involves approaches to mastering the environment which have diffused from Western Europe to the rest of the world. It will also be noted that there are pronounced regional patterns. With the exception of Portugal and Greece, all the nations of Western Europe appear in the upper stratum. Nine out of the thirteen Latin American nations appear in the middle stratum. The Arab nations of the Mediterranean--Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Iran, Turkey--are in the middle stratum. Almost all of Asia and tropical Africa are in the

lower stratum. The colossi of population, India and China, occupy adjacent ranks; so do four of the Communist bloc nations: Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Obviously, changes do occur in rate and ranking of development, but very slowly. Type of polity, type of economy, and ideology play limited roles; this is not to say that they have no effect on development--it is only to observe that there is nothing causal in their relationship to development. For example, Barbera quotes spokesmen for and admirers of the Soviet Union who have claimed that the growth of the USSR has taken the form of a discontinuous leap into the forefront of progress, due to the Communist Party's control of modernization. Barbera holds that these claims are not validated by any indicators of any kind. The international rankings covering development stages before 1917 indicate clearly that the basis for the development of the USSR was steadily progressing prior to 1917, and that Soviet growth has proceeded only with gradual and proportional improvement since.⁹⁵ Barbera recalls Khrushchev's prediction in 1959 that the USSR would pass the United States in "production per head of population" by 1973, and notes in 1973 that the allotted time had passed but that the development gap between the United States and the USSR remained in 1973 just about the same as it had been in 1959.⁹⁶

Miscellaneous International Rankings

We present here a number of comparisons according to other criteria selected from a larger number available. We do not attempt to

cover every attribute, or most attributes, common to nations in the international context. These data are drawn from a variety of different sources, some second or third-hand. For example, Taylor and Hudson's World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators⁹⁷ has assembled and analyzed data from United Nations and UNESCO yearbooks, almanacs, encyclopedias, specialized works, specialized data agencies (e.g., the Freedom of Information Center, School of Journalism, University of Missouri). We do not attempt to trace such sources, but merely indicate the source from which we extracted the information, and which the reader may care to consult in order to identify further sources.

We have adapted, condensed, or otherwise revised the form and scope of data in some source charts, employing such devices as showing only the top-ranked nations or only the top- and bottom-ranked nations. In general, data lag behind for several years; much of the data in the World Handbook comes from about 1965.

In selection of categories of data, we have not felt any need to confine our data to categories favorable to the United States. We believe that in most existing quantifiable categories, the data are favorable to the United States; but some are not, and a sampling is reproduced here. One, for example, which must modify America's image as a free, peaceful, democratic society is the incidence of crime and other internal violence in American society.

The United States is the leading nation of the world in a few undesirable attributes, particularly crime and internal violence.

Not every American is a clean-cut, all-American youth, nor a humanitarian. Crime statistics cannot be denied; American society, as do other societies, harbors more than its share of muggers, beaters, stabbers, stranglers, assaulters, robbers, liars, violence-lovers, embezzlers, murderers, rapists, thugs, and bully-boys. Of this fact, one is not inclined to say "so what?" They make life miserable for many of their fellow-citizens and depreciate the American image overseas. Yet, they have counterparts in every country. Pluralistic, permissive American society puts up with much. Table 30 shows a comparison of homicides in a few selected countries

and areas, in 1957 and 1968. Obviously, in all other societies, homicides occur with drastically less frequency than in America. (During the Vietnam War it was sometimes alleged by insensitive Americans that Orientals have "less reverence for human life" than Occidentals have.)

Table 31 lists total domestic expenditures for the American criminal justice system: almost \$12 billion annually. Table 32 shows certain miscellaneous measures of crime in America, concerning homicides and particularly crime by juveniles. Table 33 displays relative data on incidence of protest demonstrations, an attribute with ambiguous connotations. Table 34 lists the relative incidence of internal rioting, not necessarily an indicator of health or a generator of envy.

Table 37 displays data on infant mortality, an aspect of advanced civilization in which the performance of the United States, tied with Ireland and Czechoslovakia for 20th place among nations, appears hardly consistent with world leadership. Differences among leading nations, however, are not substantial, and the implications of performance in this activity are highly complex.

Table 38 shows data on food supply--or, rather, on that aspect of food supply concerned with food consumption, listing average calories and protein grams consumed per capita per day. It may occasion mild surprise to many to learn that the Irish and New Zealanders consume more daily calories than any other nationalities, and that the average consumption by Americans places them in 9th place. The high levels of consumption (and supply) in leading

nations may be compared with that in, for example, Sierra Leone-- about 1400 calories per day.

Table 39 shows that 11 nations have higher densities of physicians in their population than does the United States. This fact provides no information on the levels of physician competence involved, and none on the quality of the respective medical systems. The gap is eloquent between the 2393 physicians per 100,000 people of Israel and the 22 physicians per 100,000 in Indonesia (and the 6 per 100,000 in Yemen).

Table 40 exhibits relative standings in the availability and usage in 3 forms of mass media per 1000 of population: newspapers, radios, and television receivers. While American newspaper circulation per capita is exceeded by at least 15 nations, the United States exceeds by wide margins all other nations in number of radios and TV sets. The United States is, in fact, the only nation in the world with radios in excess of one per citizen.

Table 41 attempts to indicate relative degrees of press freedom--hardly an attribute capable of being measured with precision. It is indicated that the United States has a very high positive standing, tied with Finland for 7th place. Countries with negative evaluations in this category include the United Arab Republic (76th), the Soviet Union (83d), and Albania (91st).

Table 42 lists 133 nations in order of dimensions of Gross National Product (GNP), using data relevant to the early and mid-1960's. (Some limited comparisons of GNP in later years appear elsewhere in this study.) As is well known, the United States leads the world,

with double the GNP of the closest other nation, the Soviet Union. Table 43 shows the closely related standings according to GNP per capita, also as of the early and mid-1960's. Again, the United States heads the list, with Kuwait the only close other nation (a more recent comparison of GNP per capita among leading nations is shown in the final section of this chapter). Again, the gap between leading and lagging nations is so large as to numb one's appreciation of it--from \$3575 in the United States and \$1357 in the Soviet Union to \$74 in Haiti and \$38 in Papua/New Guinea.

Table 44 lists the 1965 standings in the consumption of energy. Kuwait is listed in the World Handbook as 1st, because its per capita consumption is higher than that of the 2d nation, the United States. On the other hand, total energy developed and used by the United States is 300 times the total of Kuwait and double that of the closest nation, the Soviet Union. Again, the gap in per capita consumption is dramatic, from 12,000 kilograms in Kuwait to 10 in Ethiopia and 8 in Nepal.

Table 45 displays relative standings in 1965 in percentage of economically active male population engaged in professional and technical occupations. The United States heads the world list at 23%. Only 12 other nations in the world had more than 10% so engaged. The Dominican Republic, Iran, Pakistan, and Thailand have 1.9% so engaged, and Sierra Leone .2%.

Table 46 shows Hargreaves' adaptation of 1969 OECD data to show, for 6 countries, the percentage of 20-24-year-olds enrolled in

higher education. Again, the United States stands Number One in the world. Hargreaves elucidates on his data:

On the face of it, therefore, Americans are now far and away the best educated people in the world. According to the Census bureau, almost a third of the undergraduates now at college are the sons and daughters of parents who never even completed high school--so that the son of the fry cook in Cambridge today has, in fact, an excellent chance of getting a college education. Indeed, even the average American black now has as good a chance of receiving a university education as the average Englishman or Canadian. The consequences can hardly fail to be profound--both for America, and for the rest of the world.⁹⁸

Current Rankings According to Power

One of the rare (perhaps the only one) power rankings that are calculated on composite bases and other data calculated as of 1967 (and published in 1973) is the list compiled by Cox and Jacobson, identified in this chapter as Table 47. These authors, as noted in the previous chapter, used five indicators (GNP; GNP per capita; population; nuclear capability; and prestige) to arrive at power rankings among the highest 39 nations in three key years: 1950, 1958, and 1967. During the first period (1945-1954) represented by the year 1950, United States economic ascendancy was at its peak, with GNP three times that of the USSR, and with the combined GNP of France, Italy, the UK, and West Germany amounting to 42% of the GNP of the United States. This ranking places the United States in first place in power. Combined with the earlier ranking of the United States as the world's leading nation also in development, these two rankings also should be sufficient witness to the standing of the United States as Number One nation in the world. Taking into

consideration American preeminence in important attributes of nations across the board, as described in this and subsequent chapters, it becomes evident that American primacy does not depend upon one or two attributes only, but is very broadly based. In contrast, the Soviet Union comes close in critical forms of military power, but in no other categories, and not anywhere near close in development. No other nation is a credible candidate in this decade of history.

Dr. Ray Cline has developed a remarkable series of ranklists, each reflecting stages of refinement of assessment. The "unrefined" list, Table 48, combines "Critical Mass" (population and territory), and economic and military capability. We include the first 19 nations on the list.

Rather than dropping his assessments at the single-nation level, Dr. Cline further refines his rankings by aggregating regional neighbors (those whose power can expect to be aggregated in crisis) in what Cline calls "politectionic zones," designated in Table 49 by Roman numerals.

Dr. Cline further refines these rankings by integrating qualitative and necessarily somewhat subjective judgments of national purpose and national will, which appear to be factors more appropriately discussed in Chapter 6. In that chapter, we shall take up again Dr. Cline's further assessments.

Table 3-30: Homicides in Selected Countries: 1957 and 1968⁹⁹
Average annual rate per 100,000 population

Country	Male		Female	
	1957	1968	1957	1968
USA	7.6	13.4	2.4	3.4
White	3.5	6.6	1.4	2.0
Black	43.4	68.6	10.8	13.6
Canada	1.5	2.2	0.9	1.3
Scandinavia & Netherlands	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Industrialized Western Europe	1.4	--	0.6	--
UK	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.7
France	2.7	0.9	0.5	0.6
FRG	1.2	--	0.8	--
Japan	2.8	1.8	1.4	1.0

Table 3-31: US Public Expenditures for Criminal Justice System
1960-1972¹⁰⁰

All governments--Federal, State, and Local

1960:	\$ 3.349 billion
1965:	4,573 billion
1970:	8,571 billion
1972:	11,721 billion

Table 3-32: Miscellaneous Statistics on Crime in the United States

Between 1963 and 1974, in New York City alone, there were 10,654 homicides.¹⁰¹

Of 1554 homicides in New York in 1974, 57 were of persons aged 61 to 65, and 78 were of persons over 65.¹⁰²

The US Senate released a 1975 subcommittee report on crime committed by juveniles, including these data:

- 100 murders are committed annually in public schools.
- Assaults on elementary and high school teachers number 70,000 annually.
- Assaults on students number in the hundreds of thousands.
- School vandalism costs \$500 million per year--about the same as the amount spent annually on textbooks.¹⁰³

Table 3-33: Protest Demonstrations¹⁰⁴

A protest demonstration is a nonviolent gathering of people organized to protest the policies, ideology, or actions of a regime, a government, or political leaders.

	1948	1950	1955	1961	1963	1965	1967	1948-67 Total
Total	125	138	159	508	450	605	375	5400
United States	1	3	1	165	202	211	115	1200
France	11	3	22	39	12	3	7	223
India	3		13	5	2	39	37	201
South Viet Nam		1	2		54	29	12	199
West Germany	12	24	6			57	19	193
Japan	11	5	10	9	3	2	2	173
South Africa	1	2	13	16	6	1	1	145
South Korea	1		1	6	5	37	12	136
Algeria		1		35		15	1	134
United Kingdom		5	1	15	6	13	16	132
Italy	11	21	1	2	1	4	14	109
Pakistan	5		6		4		2	108
Argentina		2	22	3	2	10		99
Iran	2	1		12	9			87
Spain	6		1			9	30	86
Mexico	1			6	2	1	2	32
Bolivia		1		7	2	1		31
Chile			5	2		7		31
Denmark		7		3				31
Ecuador	1			6		6		29
Brazil		1		6		1		28
Canada					1	6	1	27
Iraq	2				2		5	26
Peru				1			1	26
Soviet Union					1	1	1	25
Trinidad and Tobago								2
Albania								1
Chad								1
El Salvador								1
Ethiopia				1				1
Liberia					1			1
Papua/New Guinea								1
Sweden							1	1
Togo								1
Yemen								1

Table 3-34. Riots¹⁰⁵

A riot is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people and characterized by material damage or bloodshed.

	1948	1950	1955	1961	1963	1965	1967	Total
Total	326	294	315	522	435	390	621	8400
United States		9		47	65	45	205	683
India	20	59	10	51		59	57	558
Italy	60	38	4	10	3	2	1	310
Morocco	10		78			10		272
South Africa	3	11	1	12	7		1	226
China	5	5					97	195
Laos								191
Algeria			20	56	1	6		187
Nigeria				2	1	38	2	177
Iran	1	1		15	21			174
Pakistan		2		5	4	15	2	145
Mexico			1	24		2	3	131
France	16	19	24				3	127
Colombia	26	2			6	11		125
Cyprus			32		6			121
United Kingdom		8		4	3	2	4	82
Tunisia			1	1			11	79
Lebanon					1	1	3	76
Zambi				11	29			74
Ecuador			1	17		6		73
Soviet Union				6	1	2	1	44
Ghana	13	10		1				43
Peru	5		5	3		2	1	41
Turkey			10	4	1	1	3	41
Guatemala		2		1				39
Australia			1				1	3
El Salvador	1							2
Kuwait		1						2
Mongolia							1	2
Albania	1							1
Liberia				1				1
North Viet Nam		(1954)	1					1

One area of power status in the international arena is that of the world's shipping fleet. Table 35 shows the growth in the world total of merchant fleets and the fluctuation in the United States' share, declining drastically over recent decades--from 36.3% in 1948 to a paltry 5.1% in 1973.

Table 3-35: World Merchant Fleet: 1910-1973¹⁰⁶

UNITED STATES				WORLD	
Year	No.	Tons Gross	percent of World	No.	Tons Gross
1910	1,636	3,788,688	10.0	22,008	37,290,695
1914	1,692	4,287,349	9.4	24,444	45,403,877
1920	4,039	14,524,691	26.9	26,513	53,904,688
1925	3,829	14,208,401	22.7	29,205	62,380,376
1930	3,399	13,103,299	19.2	29,996	68,023,804
1935	3,069	12,144,684	19.0	29,071	63,727,317
1939	2,853	11,361,533	16.6	29,763	68,509,432
1948	5,225	29,164,958	36.3	29,340	80,291,593
1950	4,953	27,513,385	32.5	30,852	84,583,155
1955	4,537	26,422,683	26.3	32,492	100,568,779
1960	4,059	24,837,069	19.1	36,311	129,769,500
1965	3,416	21,527,349	13.4	41,865	160,391,504
1970	2,983	18,463,207	8.1	52,444	227,489,864
1973	4,063	14,912,432	5.1	59,606	289,926,686

Table 36 shows the proportion of the world's total registered under the flags of 8 nations in 1973. It is interesting to note that, contrary to Soviet growth of naval strength, the Soviet share of the world's merchant marine is less than that of the United States.

Table 3-36: National Fleets 1973¹⁰⁷

	Gross Tons	Percentage
World	261,165,000	100 %
Liberia	48,274,000	17.2%
Japan	32,540,000	12.7%
UK	27,722,000	10.6%
Norway	22,988,000	8.8%
Greece	18,468,000	7 %
USA	14,912,000	5.1%
USSR	12,320,000	4.7%

Table 3-37: Infant Mortality¹⁰⁸
(Number of deaths of infants under 1 year of age per 1000 live births)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Rate</u>
1	Sweden	13
2	Netherlands	14
3	Iceland	15
4	Norway	16
6.5	Australia	18
6.5	Finland	18
6.5	Japan	18
6.5	Switzerland	18
9.5	Denmark	19
9.5	New Zealand	19
11	United Kingdom	20
12	France	22
15.5	Belgium	24
15.5	Canada	24
15.5	East Germany	24
15.5	Hong Kong	24
15.5	Luxembourg	24
15.5	West Germany	24
20	Czechoslovakia	25
20	Ireland	25
20	United States	25
22.5	Israel	26
22.5	Singapore	26
24	Soviet Union	27
*	*	*
94	Ethiopia	200
95	Dahomey	206
96	Niger	212
97	Guinea	223
98	Gabon	229
99	Upper Volta	263
100	Libya	300
101.5	Saudi Arabia	500
101.5	Yemen	500

Table 3-38: Food Supply¹⁰⁹

Rank	Country	Protein Grams	Calories
		Per Capita Per Diem	Per Capita Per Diem
1.5	Ireland	91	3460
1.5	New Zealand	110	3460
3	Poland	93	3350
4	Denmark	93	3310
5	United Kingdom	90	3250
6	Yugoslavia	96	3190
7.5	Australia	92	3160
7.5	Switzerland	88	3160
9	United States	93	3140
10	Turkey	98	3110
11	Argentina	85	3100
12	Canada	95	3090
13.5	Belgium	89	3080
13.5	Czechoslovakia	72	3080
15	Hungary	96	3050
16.5	Luxembourg	85	3040
16.5	Soviet Union	87	3040
18	Uruguay	95	3030
19	Romania	90	3020
20	East Germany	70	3010
21	Sweden	83	3000
22.5	France	101	2970
*	*	*	*
93.5	China	48	2000
95	Indonesia	38	1980
96	Sudan	65	1950
97	Mauritania	50	1920
98	Libya	50	1910
99.5	Laos	51	1900
99.5	Tunisia	51	1900
101	Bolivia	49	1860
102	Upper Volta		1840
103	Ecuador	44	1830
104.5	Haiti	46	1780
104.5	Somalia	52	1780
106	Saudi Arabia		1750
107	Sierra Leone	40	1415

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
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Table 3-39: Physicians Per One Million Population¹¹⁰

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Physicians Per One Million Population</u>
1	Israel	2393
2	Soviet Union	2053
3	Hungary	1795
4	Austria	1772
5	Czechoslovakia	1754
6	Italy	1635
7	Bulgaria	1628
8	New Zealand	1493
9	Argentina	1466
10	Switzerland	1460
11	West Germany	1445
12	United States	1439
13	Belgium	1425
14	Greece	1408
15	Romania	1384
16	Australia	1352
17	Iceland	1341
18	Denmark	1321
19	Kuwait	1279
20	Spain	1215
21	Poland	1211
22	Norway	1202
23	United Kingdom	1200
24	East Germany	1142
25	Netherlands	1140
26	Canada	1110
27	North Korea	1100
28	France	1095
29	Japan	1082
30	Ireland	1048
*	*	*
121.5	Indonesia	22
121.5	Nepal	22
123.5	Guinea	21
123.5	Uganda	21
126	Dahomey	20
126	Malawi	20
126	Maldives Islands	20
128	Upper Volta	16
130	Ethiopia	15
130	Laos	15
130	Niger	15
132	Chad	14
133	Burundi	13
134	Rwanda	10
135	Yemen	6

Table 3-40: Mass Media¹¹¹

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Newspaper Circulation Per 000 Pop.</u>	<u>Radio Receivers Per 000 Pop.</u>	<u>Television Receivers Per 000 Pop.</u>
1	United States	310	1234	362
2	Sweden	505	382	270
3	United Kingdom	479	297	248
4	Canada	218	519	271
5	West Germany	326	440	193
6	East Germany	421	337	188
7	Luxembourg	477	360	94
8	Denmark	347	334	228
9	Finland	359	334	159
10	Japan	451	209	183
11	Iceland	435	302	78
12	Norway	384	293	131
13	New Zealand	399	244	156
14	Belgium	285	320	163
15	Australia	373	222	172
16	Switzerland	376	278	105
17	Uruguay	314	339	74
18	Netherlands	293	252	172
19	Czechoslovakia	280	263	149
20	France	246	314	131
21	Soviet Union	264	320	68
22	Austria	249	297	98
23	Kuwait	28	411	141
24	Ireland	246	212	115
25	Panama	81	383	54
26	Singapore	268	214	34
27	Argentina	148	295	72
28	Hungary	178	245	82
29	Hong Kong	349	139	13
30	Israel	188	290	6
*	*	*	*	*
116	Saudi Arabia	5	12	5
117.5	Haiti	5	14	1
117.5	Ivory Coast	3	16	2
119	Nigeria	7	11	1
120	China		12	0
121	Ethiopia	2	15	0
122	Upper Volta		11	0
123	Indonesia	7	8	0
124.5	Congo - Kinshasa	1	13	0
124.5	Niger	0	14	1
126.5	Botswana	0	9	
126.5	Tanzania	3	11	0
128	Nepal	3	4	
129	Maldives Islands	3		
130	Chad	0	8	0
131	Mali	1	4	

Table 3-41: Press Freedom¹¹²

The highest possible score for press freedom is +4.00 and the lowest possible score for the lack of it is -4.00.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Index</u>
1.5	Norway	3.06
1.5	Switzerland	3.06
3	Netherlands	3.02
4	Sweden	2.83
5	Canada	2.78
6	Peru	2.76
7.5	Finland	2.72
7.5	United States	2.72
9	Costa Rica	2.68
10	Philippines	2.66
11	Denmark	2.65
12	Uruguay	2.61
13	Venezuela	2.54
14.5	Australia	2.53
14.5	Belgium	2.53
16	Japan	2.44
17	West Germany	2.43
18	Bolivia	2.39
19.5	Ireland	2.37
19.5	United Kingdom	2.37
*	*	*
76	United Arab Republic	-2.31
77	Cameroon	-2.41
78	Czechoslovakia	-2.50
79	Poland	-2.53
80	Bulgaria	-2.70
81	Chad	-2.71
82	Cuba	-3.01
83	Soviet Union	-3.07
84	Upper Volta	-3.08
85	Ethiopia	-3.09
86	China	-3.15
87.5	East Germany	-3.19
87.5	Romania	-3.19
89	Algeria	-3.25
90	North Korea	-3.38
91	Albania	-3.50

Table 3-42: Gross National Product¹¹³

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>GNP in \$ million</u>	<u>Dates</u>
1	United States	695500	1960-65
2	Soviet Union	313000	1960-65
3	West Germany	112232	1960-65
4	United Kingdom	99260	1960-65
5	France	94125	1960-65
6	Japan	84347	1960-65
7	China	76000	
8	Italy	56947	1960-65
9	India	49220	1960-65
10	Canada	48473	1960-65
11	Poland	30800	1960-65
12	Australia	22739	1960-65
13	Czechoslovakia	22100	1960-65
14	Brazil	21970	1960-65
15	East Germany	21546	
16	Sweden	19714	1960-65
17	Mexico	19432	1960-65
18	Netherlands	19106	1960-65
19	Spain	17743	1960-65
20	Argentina	17204	1960-65
*	*	*	*
120	Dahomey	165	1965
121	Malta	160	1960-65
122	Togo	156	1965
123	Rwanda	155	1965
124	Somalia	150	1965
125	Burundi	140	1965
126.5	Congo - Brazzaville	138	1965
126.5	Southern Yemen	138	1965
128	Gabon	130	1965
129	Mauritania	127	1965
130	Central African Republic	122	1965
131	Barbados	91	1965
132	Papua/New Guinea	82	1965
133	Lesotho	49	1965

Table 3-43: Gross National Product Per Capita¹¹⁴

Rank	Country	GNP Per Capita in \$	Dates
1	United States	3575	1960-65
2	Kuwait	3390	
3	Sweden	2549	1960-65
4	Canada	2473	1960-65
5	Iceland	2469	1960-65
6	Switzerland	2333	1960-65
7	Denmark	2120	1960-65
8	Australia	2002	1960-65
9	New Zealand	1980	1960-64
10	Luxembourg	1979	1960-65
11	France	1924	1960-65
12	West Germany	1901	1960-65
13	Norway	1890	1960-65
14	United Kingdom	1818	1960-65
15	Belgium	1804	1960-65
16	Finland	1749	1960-65
17	Czechoslovakia	1561	1960-65
18	Netherlands	1554	1960-65
19	Israel	1422	1960-65
20	Soviet Union	1357	1960-65
21	Austria	1287	1960-65
22	East Germany	1260	
23	Puerto Rico	1154	1960-65
24	Italy	1104	1960-65
25	Hungary	1094	1960-65
26	Ireland	980	1960-65
27	Poland	978	1960-65
28	Venezuela	882	1960-65
29	Japan	861	1960-65
*	*	*	*
116	Congo - Kinshasa	82	1965
117	Niger	75	1965
118	Haiti	74	1965
119	Mozambique	74	1965
120	Guinea	73	1965
121	Nepal	73	1965
122	Chad	72	1965
123	Tanzania	71	1960-65
124	Burma	71	1960-65
125	Dahomey	70	1965
126	Mali	65	1965
127	Botswana	61	1965
128	Somalia	60	1965
129	Lesotho	59	1965
130	Upper Volta	53	1965
131	Rwanda	50	1965
132	Malawi	47	1960-63
133	Ethiopia	45	1961-65
134	Burundi	44	1965
135	Papua/New Guinea	38	1965

Table 3-44: Energy Consumption¹¹⁵

(Basic data for 1965; however, various data are averaged over long periods, even back to 1950.)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Aggregate in Million Metric Tons</u>	<u>Per Capita in Kilograms</u>
1	Kuwait	6	12077
2	United States	1790	9201
3	Canada	150	7653
4	Czechoslovakia	80	5676
5	East Germany	93	5460
6	United Kingdom	282	5151
7	Australia	54	4795
8	Belgium	45	4727
9	Luxembourg	2	4653
10	Sweden	35	4506
11	West Germany	250	4234
12	Denmark	20	4172
13	Iceland	1	3963
14	Soviet Union	833	3611
15	Norway	13	3588
16	Poland	110	3504
17	Trinidad and Tobago	3	3482
18	Netherlands	40	3271
19	Venezuela	26	2974
20	France	144	2951
21	Hungary	29	2812
22	South Africa	54	2716
23	Finland	12	2679
24	Switzerland	16	2668
25	Austria	19	2630
26	Bulgaria	21	2571
27	New Zealand	7	2530
28	Ireland	7	2284
29	Israel	6	2239
30	Puerto Rico	6	2125
*	*	*	*
117	Haiti	0	33
118	Dahomey	0	30
119	Somalia	0	27
120	Afghanistan	0	25
121	Mali	0	21
122.5	Chad	0	15
122.5	Rwanda	0	15
124	Niger	0	13
125	Burundi	0	12
127	Ethiopia	0	10
127	Upper Volta	0	10
127	Yemen	0	10
129	Nepal	0	8

Table 3-45: Percentage of Economically Active Male Population
Engaged in Professional and Technical Occupations¹¹⁶

(Data missing for 68 countries, generally as of 1965, incl. USSR)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1	United States	23.1
2	Canada	19.7
3	Australia	14.6
4.5	New Zealand	14.1
4.5	Sweden	14.1
6	Malta	12.7
7	West Germany	12.0
8.5	France	11.5
8.5	United Kingdom	11.5
10.5	Austria	11.0
10.5	Netherlands	11.0
12	Hong Kong	10.9
13	Norway	10.4
14	Colombia	9.9
15.5	Hungary	9.7
15.5	Switzerland	9.7
17	Belgium	9.6
18	Finland	9.5
19	Israel	9.4
20	Japan	9.0
*	*	*
55	India	3.5
56	Morocco	3.4
57	South Korea	3.3
58	Guatemala	3.2
59.5	Jamaica	3.1
59.5	Portugal	3.1
61	Liberia	2.9
62	Turkey	2.7
63	Paraguay	2.5
64	Ecuador	2.4
66.5	Dominican Republic	1.9
66.5	Iran	1.9
66.5	Pakistan	1.9
66.5	Thailand	1.9
69.5	Honduras	1.8
69.5	Nicaragua	1.8
71	El Salvador	1.7
72	Sierra Leone	.2

Table 3-46: Percentage of 20-to-24-year-olds
Enrolled in Higher Education¹¹⁷

<u>Country</u>	<u>Percent Enrolled 1969</u>
USA	23.9
France	14.1
USSR	11.8
Canada	8.6
Great Britain	8.4
Italy	7.7

Table 3-47: The Stratification of Power¹¹⁸

1950			1958			1967		
Rank Order	State		Rank Order	State		Rank Order	State	
1	United States		1	United States		1	United States	
2	USSR		2	USSR		2	USSR	
3	United Kingdom		3	United Kingdom		3	United Kingdom	
4	France		4.5	People's Republic of China		5	People's Republic of China	
5	People's Republic of China		4.5	France		5	Japan	
7	Canada		6.5	Federal Republic of Germany		5	United Kingdom	
7	Federal Republic of Germany		6.5	India		7	Federal Republic of Germany	
7	India		8.5	Canada		8	Italy	
9	Japan		8.5	Italy		9.5	Canada	
12.5	Australia		10	Japan		9.5	India	
12.5	Belgium		11.5	Brazil		11	Sweden	
12.5	Brazil		11.5	Sweden		15	Australia	
12.5	Italy		15	Argentina		15	Austria	
12.5	Sweden		15	Australia		15	Netherlands	
12.5	Switzerland		15	Belgium		15	Spain	
16.5	Indonesia		15	Indonesia		15	Switzerland	
16.5	Spain		15	Switzerland		15	Yugoslavia	
20	Argentina		19.5	Mexico		15	Brazil	
20	Mexico		19.5	Netherlands		21	Argentina	
20	Netherlands		19.5	Spain		21	Belgium	
20	South Africa		19.5	South Africa		21	Pakistan	
20	Yugoslavia		26	Austria		21	Poland	
27.5	Czechoslovakia		26	Czechoslovakia		21	South Africa	
27.5	Denmark		26	Denmark		26.5	Czechoslovakia	
27.5	New Zealand		26	German Democratic Republic		26.5	Denmark	
27.5	Norway		26	Israel		26.5	German Democratic Republic	
27.5	Pakistan		26	Norway		26.5	Indonesia	
27.5	Philippines		26	Poland		26.5	Israel	
27.5	Poland		26	Yugoslavia		26.5	Mexico	
27.5	Turkey		26	Venezuela		31.5	Cuba	
27.5	United Arab Republic		33.5	Cuba		31.5	Norway	
27.5	Venezuela		33.5	New Zealand		31.5	Turkey	
34	Finland		33.5	Pakistan		31.5	United Arab Republic	
34	German Democratic Republic		33.5	Philippines		36	Finland	
34	Israel		33.5	Turkey		36	New Zealand	
37	Austria		33.5	United Arab Republic		36	Nigeria	
37	Cuba		37	Finland		36	Philippines	
37	Luxembourg		38	Luxembourg		36	Venezuela	
39	Nigeria		39	Nigeria		39	Luxembourg	

Table 3-48: Nineteen Nations Ranked¹¹⁹

Country	Critical Mass	Capability		Total
		Economic	Military	
1 United States	10	20	20	50
2 USSR	10	16	19	45
3 China (PRC)	10	7	6	23
4 Canada	8	11	1	20
5 France	5	10	5	20
6 United Kingdom	5	8	6	19
7 West Germany (FRG)	5	10	3	18
8 Japan	6	10	1	17
9 Brazil	9	5	2	16
10 India	9	4	3	16
11 Italy	5	7	3	15
12 Iran	6	5	3	14
13 Australia	5	7	0	12
14 Indonesia	8	2	2	12
15 Nigeria	6	2	3	11
16 Mexico	7	4	0	11
17 South Africa	5	6	0	11
18 Poland	4	5	2	11
19 Pakistan	6	1	4	11

Table 3-49: Eleven Regions Ranked¹²⁰

Country	Perceived Power	Total Perceived Power Weights
United States	50	
I Canada	20	81
Mexico	11	
USSR	45	
II Poland	11	66
East Germany (DRG)		
III China (PRC)	23	23
France	20	
United Kingdom	19	
West Germany (FRG)	18	
IV Italy	15	98
Spain	10	
Netherlands	8	
Yugoslavia	8	
Iran	14	
V Turkey	10	33
Egypt		
VI India	16	27
Pakistan	11	
VII Indonesia	12	12
Japan	17	
VIII China/Taiwan	8	25
Brazil	16	
IX Argentina	10	26
Nigeria	11	
X South Africa	11	22
XI Australia	12	12
		Total 425

When the power rankings of Rumania and Czechoslovakia are added to Zone II, the total index for that zone rises to 80, immediately adjacent to the index of 81 assessed for the combination of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

Recent Major Shifts

Without projecting very far into the future certain forecasts of what is in store for American economic strength and relative standings, we should probably take cognizance at this point of substantial recent alterations of the familiar trends of the early 1970's, and of forecasts projected into the immediate future.

In January 1975, the Commerce Department reported that during the last three months of 1974 the nation's total output declined at the fastest rate for any quarter in 16 years:

Table 3-50: US GNP in Billions

	<u>Current Dollars</u>	<u>Real (1958) Dollars</u>
1972	1158.	792.5 (+6.2% over 1971)
1973	1295.	839.2 (+5.9% over 1972)
1974	1397.	821.1 (-2.2% over 1973)

William Seidman, President Ford's Assistant for Economic Affairs, on February 5, 1975, noted the decline in real GNP of 9.1% in the final quarter of 1974, and forecast that real GNP would continue to decline during the first quarter of 1975 at an annual rate of 8-9% and that the decline would continue in the second quarter also. He predicted, however, that real growth would resume in the 2d half of 1975. Later statistics showed that the United States GNP declined in the first quarter of 1975 at an annual rate of 10.4%.¹²¹ Still later reports, however, indicated that the overall real GNP for the whole of 1975 had turned upward.¹²²

A substantial turnaround occurred in the 3d quarter of 1975, during which the GNP increased at an annual rate of 13.4%, the

largest quarterly increase in 25 years. However, while inflation-included GNP in the 3d quarter reached the annual dollar rate of \$1,504.4 billion, real GNP was expressed at the annual dollar rate of \$808.6 billion.¹²³

In July 1975, the New York Times published figures derived from German sources, showing (partly estimated) levels of GNP per capita in 1974 dollars, as follows.¹²⁴ Population (mostly as of 1973) is listed for purposes of making clear how many persons were provided with the respective national per capita levels:

Table 3-51: GNP per capita 1974

	<u>1974</u> <u>Dollars</u>	<u>1973</u> <u>Population</u>
Qatar	10,000	150,000
United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi)	10,000	260,000
Kuwait	8,500	916,000
USA	6,600	209,851,000
Sweden	6,080	8,145,000
Denmark	5,950	5,000,000
Canada	5,840	21,568,000
Libya	5,800	2,178,000
Switzerland	5,780	6,439,000

These figures, reflecting the fourfold 1974 increase in world oil prices, constitute a dramatic and sudden eviction of the United States from first place in this particular ranking. The change represents more of an elevation in standing of the oil-producing Arab states than decline in American standing, and is of limited immediate significance for two reasons: (1) total population of the three Arab states that have surpassed the USA in per capita GNP is 1,326,000; thus, those three states have produced at a level of \$8500-\$10,000 per each of only 1-1/3 million people, whereas the United States has produced at the level of \$6600 per each of 210 million people (1300 times the population of Qatar); (2) the per capita GNP of the Arab states, while certainly commendable in several respects, represents one year's input only; it will take many decades of comparable inputs to create a total permanent economy of dimensions (per capita) comparable to that of the United States. Nevertheless, this development is an obvious indicator of the transiency of primacy referred to several times in this study.

An interesting report was issued in mid-1975 by Professor Irving Kravis and three colleagues of the University of Pennsylvania.¹²⁵ While he makes clear that genuine precision is impossible to attain in economic measurements, Professor Kravis corrects the percentage relationships of other economies and the American economy. Due to overvaluation of the dollar, previous comparisons tended to underestimate the level of other economies. Table 50 shows¹²⁶ the revisions pertaining to selected countries:

Table 3-52: Relationship of Other Economies to America's

<u>Country</u>	<u>Pre-1971 Data for Percentage of GNP per capita to US GNP per capita</u>	<u>Revised (1975) Percentage: What 1970 Figure Should Have Shown</u>
Kenya	3.2%	5.7%
India	2.3	7.1
Colombia	7.1	15.9
Hungary	33.6	40.3
Italy	37.0	45.8
Britain	47.7	60.3
Japan	40.3	61.5
West Germany	61.6	74.7
France	65.1	75.0
United States	100.0	100.0

These revisions indicate that the differentials between America's and others' economic stature, in 1970 and earlier, while great, were not quite as great as previously believed. In analyzing 1974-1975 data, Professor Kravis feels that the American dollar is possibly undervalued. According to a derivative paper by Drs. Robert Summer and Sultan Ahmad, the following percentages¹²⁷ of United States real GNP per capita are reasonably current and accurate:

Table 3-53: Percentages of US Economy

Sweden	7/8
Switzerland	4/5
France	3/4
West Germany	3/4
Japan	2/3
Britain	3/5
Chile	1/4
India	1/14
Kenya	1/17

In reference to the economic success of two top nations, Sweden and Switzerland, the rest of the world joins in congratulating them on their efforts, and at the same time notes that as the famous economist Frederick Hayek points out, both nations benefited from remaining neutral and escaping involvement in both World Wars.¹²⁸

Thus, it is obvious that the economic primacy of the United States, in possession of one-half of the entire world's GNP in 1945 but one-quarter of the world's GNP in 1975, is declining in relative terms, as the GNP of almost all other countries are relatively gaining on that of America.

Some misgivings have been expressed in 1976 about variously-perceived decline in scientific and technological standing. A symposium of American scientists at MIT in April 1976 agreed that the lead of the United States had diminished drastically over the past decade. In February 1976, the National Science Foundation (NSF) reported decline in certain indicators, such as in major innovations (e.g., nuclear reactors, integrated circuits, remote sensors, oral contraceptives); in the 1950's, the United States developed 82%, but by the mid-1960's the United States developed only 55% of such innovations. In the 1960's foreigners received 18% of US patents;

by 1973, foreigners received 30%. The NSF reported that American scientific literature has experienced decline in quantity and quality. Some scientists disagree, holding that American scientific preeminence is still significant.¹²⁹

All in all, summarizing in May 1975 the relative American political and economic position in the world after Vietnam, Professor Robert Tucker of Johns Hopkins, wrote: "Certainly, the American position in the world today is not one that will bear favorable comparison with the American position of a decade ago."¹³⁰

Evaluation of national rankings cannot be exclusively objective. We shall cite in Chapter 5 a number of foreign perceptions of US primacy. It seems appropriate at this point, however, to cite one foreign appraisal. While aware of America's relative decline in certain factors of primacy, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of France, declared in May 1976:

This is how I see the United States: First of all, it is obviously a powerful nation--the most powerful nation in the world. Other nations have developed since, but--make no mistake--the industrial and scientific power of the U. S. is by far the greatest in the world. . . .¹³¹

Some reference seems appropriate here to extant general comparisons between Soviet and American economic strength. Evidently, the United States has no close rival. The USSR is second to America, but a substantial distance behind. Western Europe, if it ever integrated its strengths, could rival both the USSR and the United States; so that the future might see one or more of Western Europe, the USSR, or China as rivals of the United States as No. 1 Nation. But there

is little evidence that such an outcome, despite pessimistic or optimistic beliefs on either side of the Atlantic, is in the offing.

In his popular 1976 book The Russians, Hedrick Smith writes:

. . . despite constant reports of success, the efficiency gap between East and West did not noticeably narrow. The Soviet economy may rank second to the American in terms of total output, but even by Soviet statistics its output per capita in 1973 ranked 15th, and by American calculations, it ranked 25th . . . The 1973 Soviet economic yearbook rated Soviet industry as just about half as efficient as American, construction industry about two-thirds as efficient, and agriculture about one-fourth . . .

Even so, in the high priority items of crucial importance to the state, in its military and space programs and in key civilian projects as well, Soviet standards do not match those in the West. The Russians are reckoned to be up to 10 years behind America in the computer field. More than one Soviet computer expert privately told me that Soviet programming is far behind Western programming . . . 'Our computers break down all the time,' he said. 'There is no comparison in the down-time /time when computers are not operating/ of our computer to yours. Yours are much more efficient'

. . . According to the Soviet monthly, Foreign Trade, the advanced West in 1974 bought only 170 million rubles (\$220 million) worth of Soviet machinery and equipment--in other words, technology--whereas the Soviet Union bought two billion rubles worth (\$2.67 billion) from the West. A ratio of nearly 12-1 against Moscow. Were it not for oil, natural gas, gold, chromium and rare metals--the exports essentially of an underdeveloped economy--Moscow could not afford trade with the developed West. Precision mechanics, precision technology, precision biochemistry are fields that Soviet scientists acknowledge that their system is weak on. 'It is easier to produce an atomic bomb or isotopes than to produce transistors or biochemical medicines,' said a physicist. 'We have never had that kind of capability for precise technology. We are years behind.'¹³²

In time, possibly sooner than later, erosion may sap American primacy in both absolute and relative terms. For the present,

however, and for the foreseeable future (whatever that is), the United States is unquestionably the Number One nation in the world in economic base, economic strength, and economic growth, as well as in other important attributes.

ENDNOTES

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Another well-regarded project₂ grew out of the Yale University Data Analysis Program and other resources such as the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at Ann Arbor. Bruce Russett and others published the 1st edition of the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Yale University Press, 1964. Charles Taylor and Machael Hudson published the 2d edition, same press, 1972, covering 136 nation units, using about 150 variables, and using the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Attribute data were included through 1965, and events data through 1967. A notably innovative approach to power rankings was published in 1975 by Dr. Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. As will be seen, a number of others, such as Ferris and Barbera, have also produced variously useful rankings.
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It remains our policy, our genuine concern to strengthen Saudi-American relations. It would pain us deeply to see the interests of the U.S. in this area, and certainly in our country, go down the drain. Don't be surprised by our tenacious pinning of our hopes on the U. S., because historically, America has stood for freedom and liberty and the championship of just causes. Even in Viet Nam, the U.S. went across thousands of miles and committed its own forces in defense of South Viet Nam . . .

- King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
Time, February 10, 1975

God takes care of children, drunks, and the United States of America.

- attributed to Bismarck

The difficulty for the Americans is that, on the one hand, they have to act as the most important leaders of opinion and on the other, they have to avoid appearing as leaders. There are many people in the world who do not like to be led, at least who do not like this to be shown . . .

- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
of West Germany, 1974

How strange . . . that the truest things written about us as a nation seem to have been written by foreigners.

- "Aristides," The American Scholar¹

CHAPTER 4

FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES STATUS

We have considered the facts of United States status--not all the facts, by any means, but vital statistics appraising American status rankings today, primarily in terms relative to the international context in general and to other individual nations in particular.

In this chapter we shall investigate the perceptions of American status, as expressed by foreigners, and mostly contemporary. The facts are still important, and many foreigners are very well informed concerning some or many categories of America's absolute and relative status. Nevertheless, hard data is frequently not available or not used, and it is not unheard of that nationalistic or other influences serve to skew or distort some foreigners' perceptions of the United States. Here, we proceed into an area of lesser statistical precision. We have discussed the point earlier that sometimes it is more important to be aware of, not only the statistical facts of status, but also of what people believe about certain categories of status. Here, we are interested in both, including whatever, true or false or mixed, foreigners perceive United States status to be.

We shall take up various facets and approaches to this area in the following sequence:

- General.
- Early and Significant Observations by Foreigners.

- Miscellaneous Survey Rankings of the United States by Foreigners.

- Major Current Perceptions of Rankings of Power and Importance.

- Selected Foreign Perceptions and Expectations of Current and Future United States Status and Performance.

General

Without attempting extensive appraisals of quantity and quality of the proliferating literature on this subject, we may observe that over 200 years, numerous analysts have come to American shores and dispatched accounts of America, some penetrating and some driven, back to their foreign publics. In brief, America has continuously fascinated many foreigners for a number of reasons, not the least of which has been the view of America as the experimental first society in the world genuinely seeking freedom and equality for all its citizens.

This and other foci of foreign interest will receive comment in the following pages, as we explore the implications of primacy--conclusions about what William Broome may have meant when he referred to "that pompous misery of being great." Statistics will, naturally, be included, for clarity and precision in establishing comparative statuses. But such factors as values, character, and interests are not subject to measurement, but must be presented in narrative or descriptive prose. Again, no complex, pluralistic society such as America's can be adequately analyzed in brief passages; the

discussion presented here should be regarded as selective, focused on a limited number of principal themes, and heuristic.

Early and Significant Observations by Foreigners

Foreigners came early to appraise the American "experiment." Gradually, their numbers increased, for the concepts of America captured the imagination of many peoples in other lands. In 1726, George Berkeley, philosopher and Anglican bishop, wrote a poem before visiting America; one stanza is famous:

Westward the course of empire takes its way;
The first four acts are already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;
Time's noblest offering is the last.²

In the early 1800's, Hegel wrote in Philosophy of History: "America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the world's History shall reveal itself . . . it is a land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical lumber room of Old Europe."³

Gradually, for many foreigners, America came to represent "the promised land" and "the hope of the world" (for example, the French Dominican priest, R. L. Bruckberger, wrote in 1959: "Americans, Americans, return to the first seed you sowed . . . Your task is to extend the Declaration of Independence to the whole world, to all nations and all races"⁴). Lord Bryce appraised America's institutions as "the answers to mankind's longings, toward which, as by a law of fate, the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move."⁵ Nevertheless, opinion covered a wide spectrum, sometimes favorable

(e.g., Lord Bryce, Jean Francois Revel), sometimes mixed but generally favorable (e.g., Toqueville), and sometimes unfavorable (e.g., Sydney Smith, Harriet Martineau), whether the observers had visited America (e.g., Dickens, Bruckberger) or had not (e.g., Lenin).

It seems not unreasonable that representatives of the two foreign nations "closest" to America, Britain and France, have produced the largest number of analysts of America, and the most penetrating and insightful analyses. Perhaps the French have the edge in this activity, in view of the informed range of mostly favorable French critics, including de Crevecoeur, de Tocqueville, Siegfried, Maritain, Bruckberger, and Revel. However, the British are not far behind, if they are behind at all; and one of the most incisive analysts of recent decades has been a Swedish sociologist: Gunnar Myrdal.

The earliest analyst of note was J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, who published Letters from an American Farmer in 1782. Still regarded as perhaps the most insightful was the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, who published the two volumes of Democracy in America in 1835 and 1840. Another of the more comprehensive and astute analysts was the Englishman James Lord Bryce, who published The American Commonwealth in two volumes in 1889. In 1927, André Siegfried published America Comes of Age and America at Mid-Century in 1955. Revel published Without Marx or Jesus in 1971.

There are of course many other analytical works extant, across the spectrum of opinion.⁶ Sydney Smith, deploring the alleged absence of high accomplishment in America, asked in 1820, "Who reads an American book?", and was not answered effectively until Emerson published "The American Scholar" in 1837. Mrs. Trollope, mother of the great Victorian novelist, claimed to be repelled by American "adolescent braggadocio and uncultivated manners." Gorky in 1906 found the United States "a cultural swamp."⁷ Freud said in 1909, "America is a mistake--a gigantic mistake, it is true, but a mistake none the less."⁸ One can mine de Tocqueville's writings, like the Bible, for support for almost any view; in any event, whether the remark is typical or not, de Tocqueville said at one point of Americans: "The majority lives in the perpetual utterance of self-applause . . ."⁹

Thus, we can find foreign opinions of America to suit any bias or taste. Again, we must be highly selective. We shall try to combine several foreign appraisals of enduring aspects of American character and interests; some evaluations of America's current status;

and a number of opinions of America's performances and prospects in relation to other nations.

In de Tocqueville's sustained and rarely equalled level of analysis in Democracy in America, he had recourse to a device for highlighting a crucial element or aspect or dynamic--what he called "the preponderant fact" of American society: equality of condition. Equality of condition, says Roger Hilsman, was intended by de Tocqueville to mean essentially the democratic ideal, "not so much the fact of equality as the aspiration for equality, equality in all aspects of life."¹⁰ Equality of condition, for de Tocqueville, made the democratic revolution the cause, not the effect, of the Industrial Revolution.

Wrote de Tocqueville:

Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people. I readily discovered the prodigious influence that this primary fact exercises on the whole course of society; it gives a peculiar direction to public opinion and a peculiar tenor to the laws; it imparts new maxims to the governing authorities and peculiar habits to the governed.

I soon perceived that the influence of this fact extends far beyond the political character and the laws of the country, and that it has no less effect on civil society than on the government; it creates opinions, gives birth to new sentiments, founds novel customs, and modifies whatever it does not produce. The more I advanced in the study of American society, the more I perceived that this equality of condition is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived and the central point at which all my observations constantly terminated.¹¹

De Tocqueville was highly prescient about slavery and its outcomes. He predicted that eventually blacks would revolt, and that much of the blacks' political leverage would come from the guilt-feelings of whites who themselves believed in "equality of condition":

If ever America undergoes great revolutions, they will be brought about by the presence of the black race on the soil of the United States; that is to say, they will owe their origin not to the equality, but to the inequality of condition.¹²

However, he perceived that the nature of the geography, climate, and soil; the origins of the people; the prevailing religions and religious styles; and their knowledge and experience--all, as well as "equality of condition," also exercised great influence on American ways of thinking and feeling.¹³

Lord Bryce, in his classic, The American Commonwealth, which appeared 54 years after de Tocqueville's, agreed with de Tocqueville that the idea of equality is the key to understanding life in the United States. Bryce observed that America's most pleasing feature is social equality, the outward and visible sign of the faith that all persons are equal in worth.¹⁴ Bryce's comment should be contrasted with Matthew Arnold's judgment on his own English Society, in which "the religion of inequality has the natural and necessary effect, under the present circumstances, of materializing our upper class, vulgarizing our middle class, and brutalizing our lower class. And this is to fail in civilization."

In 1944, over a century after de Tocqueville, Gunnar Myrdal produced still another landmark analysis of American Society, emphasizing racial relations: An American Dilemma. Myrdal found at the absolute center of American values and beliefs a core he called "The American Creed"--not only widely shared but also integrated into law and custom.

Myrdal argued that the most striking thing about America is its heterogeneity, its gamut of internal differences, its dynamic unrest. Still, he insisted:

. . . there is evidently a strong unity in this nation and a basic homogeneity and stability in its valuations. Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, and colors, have something in common: a social ethos, a political creed. It is difficult to avoid the judgment that this 'American Creed' is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation.¹⁵

Hilsman says that the concept of the American Creed was central to Myrdal's analysis; the Creed sets extraordinarily high goals, involving emotional commitment so deep that failure to meet those goals generates guilt feelings leading to unrest in a society in which change is endemic.¹⁶ The American, asserted Myrdal, is moralistic, the opposite of a cynic. Rationalistic and pragmatic, yet "a practical idealist" also, the American believes in the dignity of the individual and in man's perfectibility. And

when the man in the street acts through his orderly collective bodies, he acts more as an American, a Christian, and as a humanitarian than if were acting independently. He thus shapes social controls that are going to condition even himself.¹⁷

Like de Tocqueville, Myrdal identified racial tension as a central dynamic of American society:

The American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American. It is there that the interracial tension has its focus. It is there that the decisive struggle goes on. This is the central viewpoint of this treatise. Though our study includes economic, social, and political race relations, at bottom our problem is the moral dilemma of the American--the conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The "American Dilemma," referred to in the title of this book, is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall

call the 'American Creed,' where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.¹⁸

Again, like de Tocqueville, Myrdal specified that equality and liberty are the main norms of the American Creed, and that equality has precedence:

Liberty, in a sense, was easiest to reach. It is a vague ideal: everything turns around whose liberty is preserved, to what extent and in what direction. In society liberty for one may mean the suppression of liberty for others. The result of competition will be determined by who got a head start and who is handicapped. In America as everywhere else--and sometimes, perhaps, on the average, a little more ruthlessly--liberty often provided an opportunity for the stronger to rob the weaker. Against this, the equalitarianism in the Creed has been persistently revolting. The struggle is far from ended. The reason why American liberty was not more dangerous to equality was, of course, the open frontier and the free land. When opportunity became bounded in the last generation, the inherent conflict between equality and liberty flared up. Equality is slowly winning. (*Italics in original.*)¹⁹

Geoffrey Gorer, of British nativity, has lived in America for many years and has written extensively and penetratingly about American life.

Gorer goes back to the American Revolution, to the collective watershed of throwing off allegiance to the colonial master. This point should be compared to Margaret Mead's similar point in the next chapter:

. . . to reject authority became a praiseworthy and specifically American act, and the sanctions of society were added to the individual motives for rejecting the family authority personified in the father . . . the making

of an American demanded that the father should be rejected both as a model and as a source of authority. Father never knew best. And once the mutation was established, it was maintained; no matter how many generations separate an American from his immigrant ancestors, he rejects his father as authority and exemplar, and expects his sons to reject him.²⁰

For every right-thinking American the object of life--indeed almost the justification for living--is to be a success, to "make good." To make good things, and more of them, is the best and most concrete way of making good, and is the reason for the very high prestige and respect accorded to the successful businessman, manufacturer, and engineer. But not all people can make things, and everyone should make good. When there are no things, how can one be sure that a person is a success? . . .²¹

Because success is so overwhelmingly important, there is always a tendency for the rule-abiding majority to be pushed toward more and more questionable practices by the ingenious or unscrupulous minority. There is little sympathy, and less support, for a failure whose failure is due to a self-righteous refusal to follow a prevailing trend. The ethical may use every endeavor to get the rules strengthened and made more watertight; but people have little use for a man who squeals because another has been smarter than he. Business competition is regulated by temporary rules, rather than by permanent ethical principles . . .²²

From the emergence of America as an independent nation two major themes appear as characteristic of Americans: the emotional egalitarianism which maintains that all (white American) men are equal to the extent that the subordination of one man to another is repugnant and legally forbidden, equal in opportunity and legal position; and the belief that authority over people is morally detestable and should be resisted, that the suspicion that others are seeking authority cannot be too vigilant, and that those who occupy the necessary positions of authority within the state should be considered as potential enemies and usurpers. The prized equality of Americans was and is dependent on the weakness of their government.²³

Gorer has incisive comments to offer on American attitudes toward authority:

The typical American attitudes toward authority have remained substantially the same as those manifested by the

framers of the American Constitution: authority is inherently bad and dangerous; the survival and growth of the state make it inevitable that some individuals must be endowed with authority; but this authority must be as circumscribed and limited as legal ingenuity can devise; and the holders of these positions should be under constant scrutiny, should be watched as potential enemies.

These attitudes toward the concept of authority over people and toward persons placed in positions of authority are basic to the understanding of American character and American behavior. They are far more than political; they are therefore quite different from the situations in, say, Ireland or Greece where to be 'agin the government' is a recognized and respected political position, but where the authority of the church in the one case, and that of the family in the other, generally remains unquestioned. With the rarest exceptions, these attitudes do not involve the abstract idealism of the philosophical anarchism of Spain or nineteenth-century Russia; despite the political implications, they are above all moral: people, or institutions, who 'push other people around' are bad, repugnant to decent feelings, thoroughly reprehensible. Authority over people is looked on as a sin, and those who seek authority as sinners.

The implications of these attitudes are manifold, and reach into nearly every sphere of American life. Thus the least respected and most suspect professions are those which, by their nature, involve the exercise of authority over other people--politics and, in peacetime, military service. People who enter these professions for any reason except to improve their social position or to make money are deeply suspect . . .

Politicians are not suspect if it is believed that they have gone into politics for their own personal advantage, to make money or to improve their position.

There is no general or widespread moral condemnation for the political 'machines' which dominate most of the big cities of the United States . . . many people would prefer to be without them, but the stability of society is not thought to be threatened Since law, and the politicians who must administer it, represent a facet of authority, the general American attitude is riddled with ambivalence . . . Walt Whitman's advice to the States, Resist much, obey little, is otiose in the case of most individuals. It follows that the exposure of the flagrant corruption of some senators in recent years was not greeted

with surprised indignation . . . their corruption was at least a reassurance that they were in politics for what they could get out of it, and not for sinister reasons.

A person who goes in for a political career for reasons other than direct personal advantage is deeply suspect; he is perhaps secretly lusting after authority, and the greatest vigilance must be exercised to see that he does not gratify this sinful craving.²⁴

. . . Any attempt to increase government authority is met, at least in the initial stages, with the greatest moral indignation and resistance. This is particularly obvious in the case of proposed government planning. Preference for 'private enterprise' represents no reasoned belief in the superiority of one method of production or distribution over another; it is not necessarily a screen behind which personal interests and hopes for profits are defended; it is a deeply sincere, quasi-religious moral attitude, as little susceptible to rational argument as the Hindus' aversion to killing cows. Since the resistance to government planning is fundamentally moral, each case has to be refought.²⁵

. . . foreigners are only worthy of respect and consideration in so far as they approximate to Americanism, and American advocates of international cooperation act as if they felt themselves forced to present a grossly distorted picture of the rest of the world to their own compatriots. Apparently to persuade Americans that war between their country and the USSR would be disastrous, many 'liberals' feel it to be necessary to paint a completely unrealistic picture of Russian society as practically identical with that of America except for a few technological developments; to admit that Soviet society is markedly different in form and in values from American society is willfully to imperil the peace. As a consequence the 'liberal' newspapers and books of contemporary America, despite their undoubted good intentions, are in general far less accurate and trustworthy, as far as foreign affairs are concerned, than those which can rightly be dubbed 'conservative.'

. . . It is this attitude . . . which gives an idiosyncratic aspect to American cooperation in international undertakings. The belief in the universal aspiration toward Americanism is so pervasive that it is abandoned with the greatest difficulty; and when circumstances force its abandonment, international cooperation is liable to be abandoned too. People so perverse as to choose to remain foreign deserve no help.

Men of good will can maintain for a long time their belief in the universal aspiration toward Americanism by stressing the distinction between peoples and their governments. With practically no exceptions, Americans regard their own government as alien; they do not identify themselves with it, do not consider themselves involved in its actions, feel free to criticize and despise it. This is most clearly demonstrated when Americans discuss American policies or activities abroad; it is 'they' who have made this policy, taken this move, written this note--never 'we.' This detached attitude is shared even by most of the members of Congress and the American civil service who are not personally involved in a given activity or foreign policy; there is no feeling of joint responsibility or indirect participation.

This almost universal consideration of the government as alien and its personnel as tainted with the lust for authority and unworthy of respect has regular repercussions on American foreign policy . . .

The general lack of identification with the government is most exaggerated among intellectuals. When they discuss foreign affairs this detachment becomes positively Olympian; the rejection of any responsibility for, or participation in, the activities of their own government gives them, it would seem, special qualifications for telling other governments how they should act.

The advance of democracy in the old world involved the lessening of the rights of the state and the increase in the rights of the individual. Uniquely, America did not start as a state, but as millions of individuals seeking their own advantage. The peril of the old world is, and always has been, tyranny; the peril of the new world is anarchy.²⁶

It is this hatred of authority which makes America a nonmilitaristic ('peace-loving') nation. The connection between the readiness of individuals to fight and the readiness of societies to go to war has been assumed rather than proved; but to the extent that such considerations are relevant, American men do not show a marked distaste for fighting or violence . . .

No, Americans are not antimilitaristic because of a general withdrawal from fighting and violence; they are antimilitaristic because they detest authority; and military service today inevitably involves discipline . . .

Because of the possibility that power, especially great power, may be transformed into authority it is imperative for those in positions of great power to manifest in their persons the absence of authority, or the desire for authority. They must be conspicuously plain citizens, with the interests and mannerisms of their fellows; whatever their private temperament they must act as 'one of the boys,' glad-handed, extravert, mindful of first names, seeing their subordinates in their shirt sleeves and with their feet on the desk, democratically obscene in their language, with private interest, if any, simple and within the reach of all.²⁷

. . . the dominant American attitude toward raw materials, toward things . . . is not, as far as I know, shared by any other society. It can perhaps best be expressed negatively. It is completely opposite to the traditional attitude of peasants, for whom the land and its products are, as it were, part of themselves, of their ancestors and descendants, so that their histories and fortunes are conceived of as intertwined, so that there is at least a measure of identification between man and material. With the partial exception of the South, this complex of attitudes is completely alien to most Americans; there is no identification between man and his raw material; man is superior and apart, imposing his will on the inhuman universe.

These attitudes are seen most clearly in the case of land itself. Land is not something to be loved and succored, but something to be exploited . . . Crops are extracted from a piece of land until it is exhausted, after which the land is abandoned, in exactly the same way as metal is extracted from a vein until that is exhausted and the mine abandoned.²⁸

More than one foreign observer has singled out for special comment the American pursuit of "success." Dennis Brogan, another astute observer born in Great Britain but a long-time resident of the United States, wrote back at the time of World War II:

. . . American life is designed for boys and young men, for girls of course, too, but not for adults. If this belief is or was widespread, one reason is to be found (as critical Americans have pointed out) in a view of life in which success is identified with competitive success--not with attaining a fixed standard, but with

winning a place in the first ten of every hundred. As far as this view is accepted, it condemns the vast majority to failure, since ninety per cent must be ranked as unsuccessful . . .²⁹

Dennis Brogan observed that "a country has the kind of army its total ethos, its institutions, resources, habits of peaceful life, make possible to it." Before recounting Brogan's generally admiring analysis of American military performance, and in the interests of reflecting foreigners' negative as well as positive perceptions of America, I reproduce here an enemy's analysis of "the American soldier" as encountered in Korea in 1951. Reprinted by Professor Russell Kirk in The American Cause, this extract was taken from a memorandum prepared by the Chief of Intelligence of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in North Korea. It analyzes not only the American soldier, of course, but really probes the nature of the prototype young American citizen, in or out of uniform. Allowing for an enemy's hostility and exaggeration, and for the unpopularity of the Korean War in America, it should not be dismissed in toto or out of hand; as an American officer remarked at the time: "No realistic person dismisses it as being entirely a figment of Communist imagination":

Based upon our observations of American soldiers and their officers captured in this war for the liberation of Korea from capitalistic and imperialistic aggression, the following facts are evidenced. The American soldier has weak loyalties to his family, his community, his country, his religion, and his fellow soldiers. His concepts of right and wrong are hazy; opportunism is easy. By himself, he feels frightened and insecure. He underestimates his own worth, his own strength, and his ability to survive. He is largely ignorant of social values, social tensions and conflicts. There is little knowledge or understanding, even among United States university graduates, of American political history and philosophy; of the federal, state, and community organizations; of state rights and civil rights; of safeguards to freedom; and of how these things supposedly operate within his own system. He is exceedingly insular

and provincial, with little or no idea of the problems and the aims of what he contemptuously describes as foreigners and their countries. . . . Based upon these facts about the imperialistic United States aggressors, the re-education and indoctrination program for American prisoners proceeds as planned.³⁰

In contrast to these perceptions, Brogan, well versed in American history, related the American military to a special complex of American values and to the rest of the world of 1944 (it should be recalled also that WW II, in contrast to the Korean War, was strongly supported in America):

. . . The professional leaders of the American army are men trained to work in obscurity and often for basically civilian objects. . . . They enter West Point as the necessary preparation for what, in all probability, will be an obscure and dull life. . . . the professional soldier learns either to avoid politics like the plague or, in rarer cases, to play that dangerous game.

And this small, almost anonymous body, serving in widely scattered posts kept up for political reasons where once the threat of Indian war provided real justification, have to deal with the elected representatives of a profoundly unmilitary people that becomes warlike only under great provocation. In peacetime they have to prepare elaborate plans for calling on the immense untapped resources of the United States in a future wartime for which no spiritual preparation can be made. They know that they can never be ready for war; that they must always have time given them that they may use space and the resources of space. They know, too, that their countrymen, brought up like all peoples to believe in a gilded version of their own history, forget that all American wars have . . . begun with disasters, not victories. They know that their countrymen are temperamental and versatile, easily bored with theory and all of them having to be shown, not simply told.

The American officer, then . . . finds that his best peacetime plans are inadequate for one basic reason: that any plan which in peacetime really tried to draw adequately on American resources would cause its author to be written off as a madman; and in wartime, it would prove to have been inadequate, pessimistic, not allowing enough for the practically limitless resources of the American people--limitless once the American people get ready to let them be used. And only war can get them ready for that. The American soldiers can draw, then, but not before, on an experience in economic improvisation and in technical adaptation which no other country can equal. They can draw, too, on a healthily unprofessional attitude.

Men will think with their civilian and very unmilitary ways of doing things, of new and efficient ways of doing military things. They will build air fields in a week and ford rivers under fire in tractors and bulldozers as part of their new day's work--all the more efficiently that it was not their old day's work.

Wars are not won by generals or by plans alone; they are won by men. And the tradition of the American soldier is a practical one--almost overhumorously practical. He has never had much use or perhaps any use for the virtues of the parade ground. When the victorious Northern armies paraded through the streets of the long-beleaguered city of Washington in 1865, the spectators saw, with a natural special affection, the much enduring Army of the Potomac, veterans of so many unsuccessful, bloody, exhausting campaigns fought over the short hundred miles between Washington and Richmond. These were their own men, finally victorious. But the real curiosity was Sherman's western army. They had not driven to and fro through the Virginia Wilderness or bogged in the swamps of the James River. They had fought and marched and fought and marched down the Mississippi, across Tennessee, 'from Atlanta to the sea' and up to the rear of Lee's army. And what the spectators saw was an army of boys--not boys in the modern American sense, i.e., men just short of middle age, but boys in their teens and young men in their early twenties. Grant's army was hardly more dressy than its shabby Commander, but Sherman's army loping along, with open necks and hardly any standard equipment, hardened and lithe, confident and brash, this was an American army, formidable, enterprising, humane, and ribald . . . 31

A country has the kind of army its total ethos, its institutions, resources, habits of peaceful life, make possible to it. The American army is the army of a country which is law-respecting without being law-abiding. It is the army of a country which, having lavish natural wealth provided for it and lavish artificial wealth created by its own efforts, is extravagant and wasteful. It is the army of a country in which melodramatic pessimism is often on the surface but below it is the permanent optimism of a people that has licked a more formidable enemy than Germany or Japan, primitive North America . . . It is the army of an untidy country which has neither the time, the temperament, nor the need for economy. It is the army of a country in which great economic power is often piled up for sudden use; a final decisive military blow is merely a special variety of 'corner.' It is the army of a country of gamblers who are more or less phlegmatic in taking and calculating their losses, but who

feel with all their instincts that they can never go wrong over a reasonable period of time in refusing to sell America short.

So the American way of war is bound to be like the American way of life. It is bound to be mechanized like the American farm and kitchen (the farms and kitchens of a lazy people who want washing machines and bulldozers to do the job for them). It is the army of a nation of colossal business enterprises, often wastefully run in detail, but winning by their mere scale and by their ability to wait until that scale tells. It is the army of a country where less attention is paid than in any other society to formal dignity, either of persons or of occupations, where results count, where being a good loser is not thought nearly so important as being a winner, good or bad . . .

. . . to the Americans war is a business, not an art; they are not interested in moral victories, but in victory . . . the United States is a great, a very great, corporation whose stockholders expect (with all their history to justify the expectation) that it will be in the black.

. . . Such a nation cannot 'get there fastest with mostest.' It must wait and plan till it can get there with mostest. This recipe has never yet failed, and Berlin and Tokyo realize, belatedly, that it is not going to fail this time--that in a war of machines it is the height of imprudence to have provoked the great makers and users of machines and, in a war of passions, to have awakened, slowly but more and more effectively, the passions of a people who hitherto have fought only one war with all their strength (and that, a civil war), but who can be induced by their enemies, not by their friends, to devote to the task of making the world tolerable for the United States that tenacity, ingenuity, and power of rational calculation which decided between 1861 and 1865 that there should be a United States which would twice crush the hopes of a nation of military professionals, to whom war is an art and a science, to be lovingly cultivated in peace and practised in war. For Americans, war is almost all of the time a nuisance, and military skill a luxury like Mah-Jongg. But when the issue is brought home to them, war becomes as important, for the necessary period, as business or sport. And it is hard to decide which is likely to be the more ominous for the Axis--an American decision that this war is sport, or that it is business.³²

For Americans, then and now, the battle is always the pay-off. . . . Victory is the aim, and the elegance of the means is a European irrelevance, recalling the days when war was the sport of kings. To Americans, war is not the sport of kings but the most serious national and personal concern which they like to fight in their own way and which, when they do fight it in their own way, they win.³³

The reader in the mid-1970's may be so impressed by the historical foreground of events of Vietnam that these remarks on American military performance may seem gratuitous. While some of Brogan's analysis appears not to be directly applicable to the American experience in Vietnam (a few of his appraisals seem a bit outdated) those who are willing to include Vietnam and earlier military experiences among analyses of "what makes America tick" may find in these foregoing passages several illuminating dynamics relevant to American primacy.

A well-disposed French critic, André Siegfried, in America at Mid-Century, described another facet of American primacy relevant to the status of the Soviet Union:

One has the impression that this country of vast possibilities, of complete good will and intense sincerity, requires dosing with a large portion of classicism. It needed a Montaigne and achieved an Emerson. Dominated by the didactic tendency of the century, it would easily be capable of forgetting that the essential aim of civilization is not technical progress, or output, or equipment, but man himself. Europe remains penetrated by Greco-Latin culture and remembers a civilization prior to the machine age. Russia, which has separated from Europe, worships technical progress and is an industrial disciple, not of Germany or France, but of the United States. From this point of view America and the U.S.S.R., though in violent opposition to each other, incline toward the same technical conception of civilization. On either hand their vast expanses of territory favor standardization and mass production and incite them toward this goal.³⁴

Still another appraisal of modern America status came in 1947 from one of the most perceptive of all observers of the United States, the Economist of London, frequently more perceptive about American policy than the American press. The following excerpts³⁵ from "Imperialism or Indifference," a 1947 editorial in the Economist not only gives an accurate estimate of US status at the end of World War II, but also a reasonably accurate forecast of American policy:

Imperialism or Indifference

In any comparison of the potential resources of the Great Powers, the United States, even before Hitler's War, far outstripped every other nation in the world in material strength, in scale of industrialisation, in weight of resources, in standards of living, by every index of output and consumption. And the war, which all but doubled the American national income while it either ruined or severely weakened every other Great Power, has enormously increased the scale upon which the United States now towers above its fellows. Like mice in the cage of an elephant, they follow with apprehension the movements of the mammoth. What change would they stand if it were to begin to throw its weight about, they who are in some danger even if it only decides to sit down?

There is indeed, one question that the analyst of power need not spend time in asking about the strength of the United States. If raw material resources, industrial capacity, scientific knowledge, productive 'know-how,' skilled labour--if these alone were the ingredients of power, then the United States could take on the rest of the world single-handed. But though these things are essential ingredients, they are not all that it takes to make a Great Power. There must also be the willingness, and the ability, to use economic resources in support of national policy. The rulers of Soviet Russia, as was suggested last week, are not likely, at least for a generation to come, to have nearly as good cards in their hand as the Americans. But the nature of their system of concentrated power and iron censorship enables them to play a forcing game. The Americans' hand is all trumps; but will any of them ever be played? And for what purpose?

There is no lack of prophets, either in America or in Europe, anxious to tell the world that the United States either will or should turn to an aggressive imperialist role in world affairs. Only those whose view of America is distorted by ignorance or malice, or obscured by dogmatism, could possibly believe any such thesis. It is true that there are individual men and women and groups, some of them with a measure of influence, who are impressed with their country's overwhelming strength and attracted by the short cuts of aggressive diplomacy. But their views should not be mistaken for the policy of the United States. The nation-wide debate that followed President Truman's request for the Greek and Turkish appropriations was the most impressive testimony to the emotional and institutional obstacles that lie in the way of canalising America's overwhelming economic strength into a sustained and effective foreign policy of any sort, be it imperialist and aggressive or constructive and cooperative . . . even an America that was fully conscious of its strength would be held back from using it by some of its most deeply rooted patterns of thought. The brake would be applied impartially to any active policy, whether of aggression or of cooperation. The old combination of liberalism at home and isolationism abroad, of a forward policy in domestic matters and of no policy at all in foreign affairs, still holds good . . . specific support for the United Nations is one strand in a wider fabric of anti-imperialist, anti-militarist thought which should certainly not be dismissed as ineffective idealism. . .

These arguments are really decisive. So long as the American Republic is constituted as it is today, a consistent policy of deliberate imperialism is out of the question. No doubt from time to time there will be imperialist overtones--some of them deliberate, far more of them unconscious--in American policy. It would be difficult to have a mood of willingness to pursue any active policy in a country where speech is so unbridled, without a lot of foolish things being said, and some done. But these imperialist overtones are unlikely to go very far or last very long. The prospect is that American policy will continue to fluctuate between a mood of activism, mainly liberal and well-intentioned but with a verbal top-dressing of aggressiveness, and a mood of wholly idealistic indifference to the rest of the world--and if this is a true forecast, the rest of the democratic world may even come to welcome the periodic reappearance of imperialist talk in Washington . . .³⁶

The eminent French contemporary social scientist, Raymond Aron, assessed the nature of American power since World War II, and published his findings in 1974 in The Imperial Republic: the United States and the World 1945-1973. Out of "the dialectic of history" there emerged, says Aron, an American "imperium," a style of influence, an environment of free interchange; it was not, and is not, imperialist in the Marxist sense and particularly does not involve subjecting foreign peoples to any American rule and does not involve economic exploitation (often, quite the opposite).³⁷

These comments, supplemented by those in the next chapter also concerning imperialism, may dispose of allegations of American imperialism, as far as the purposes of this study are concerned.

Perhaps one more aspect of foreign perception is suitable for mention at this point.

Britisher Perigrine Westhorpe asserts that Europe has always expected of the United States an unparalleled standard of behavior

For some reason, Europe accepts the idea that America is a country with a difference from whom it is reasonable to demand an exceptionally altruistic standard of behavior. It feels perfectly justified in pouring obloquy on shortcomings from the ideal; and alas, perhaps inevitably, it seems to enjoy every example of a fall from grace which contemporary America provides.³⁸

Fellow Britisher Henry Fairlie adds that this is why other countries' criticisms of the United States have a special edge not present in their criticism of any other country. Fairlie locates the core of anti-Americanism in the impact of Americanism:

... at the root of all anti-Americanism, and of the expressions of it which have been explored here, is both the understanding that the world is being Americanized and a fear of the process. In short, anti-Americanism is a response to the strength of Americanism, the awareness of a new and powerful force in the world; and this is one reason why it is a phenomenon with no parallel in the past.³⁹

Miscellaneous Survey Rankings of the United States by Foreigners

The few incisive appraisals we have cited so far will have to serve as a meagre historical melange of foreign appraisals from the past, in which the reader may compare with his appraisal of American traditional traits. Later, we shall take up a number of more modern up-to-date appraisals by perceptive foreigners. Before we do that, however, we explore collective foreign appraisals, in which we rely on quantitative data.

We turn, here, to surveys of foreign opinion. Again, with a mass of valuable and interesting material available, we are forced to be selective.

A few advance notes about the accompanying tables appear to be in order. Most surveys are expressed in terms of "net favorable," that is, the percentage of total population sample giving favorable responses minus the percentage giving unfavorable responses. Samples are all scientifically constructed via modern methods to faithfully reflect entire national populations; it is said that 95 times out of 100, the results vary no more than 3% from those that would be obtained if the entire national population were actually queried. Where the responses of "elites" have been distinguished from responses of general publics, the criterion of amount of education is usually the one used to distinguish between the two groups.

We rely here primarily upon the technically sophisticated surveys and analyses conducted by the United States Information Agency.⁴⁰ In actual contact with foreigners, of course, USIA uses foreign sampling agencies; it is important to realize that the

individual being questioned by a fellow countryman has no idea that the questions are part of an inquiry sponsored by the United States, or any other foreign country. We also refer herein to equally competent similar surveys sponsored by the International Institute for Social Science Research in Washington, directed by Dr. Lloyd A. Free. In some cases, the views of parliamentarians (members of national legislatures) are distinguished from those of general publics.⁴¹

It is a general and universal finding that most people focus on domestic rather than international issues; among domestic issues, internal economic and socio-economic issues generally predominate over political questions or other government-related issues. Very few people regard foreign economic relations as the most important issue facing their country. However, in periods of major regional or worldwide political-military confrontation, concern rises so that international issues predominate over domestic issues.⁴²

Broad attitudes toward specific external countries are relatively stable.⁴³ The more general the issue, the more gradualness characterizes changing opinion. Specific dramatic events, however, can accelerate change in opinion in limited fields. One should also be aware of the time lag, which may qualify complete acceptance of certain surveys five or more years old.

We cite the oldest surveys first, as setting post-WW II benchmarks for comparison with more recent data. Dates of surveys vary, as shown on particular surveys.

General and Cultural

We present first general background attitudes in 1959 toward the United States in general and toward facets of American culture. Almost two decades have passed since 1959 samplings, of course; the cultural ferment in all countries during the 1960's and early 1970's probably produced changes in cultural appraisals.

In 1959, people in four Western European countries (Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy) were asked to indicate their degree of esteem, if any, for four countries and the people of those countries:⁴⁴

Table 4-1: Net Esteem

<u>Esteem for</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Great Britain</u>		<u>In</u> <u>West Germany</u>		<u>In</u> <u>France</u>		<u>In</u> <u>Italy</u>	
	<u>for</u> <u>Country</u>	<u>for</u> <u>People</u>	<u>for</u> <u>Country</u>	<u>for</u> <u>People</u>	<u>for</u> <u>Country</u>	<u>for</u> <u>People</u>	<u>for</u> <u>Country</u>	<u>for</u> <u>People</u>
US & Americans	52	47	65	61	23	22	53	54
Britain & British (not asked)			34	31	37	26	25	19
France & French	11	18	10	9	(not asked)		28	21
USSR & Russians	-36	-32	-62	-51	-37	-38	-14	- 6

Note that the French, as occurred in most instances, expressed lesser esteem than other Western nations for Americans. While all took a negative view of the USSR, the Italian view was less negative, probably influenced by the concentration of Communist members and sympathizers in Italy⁴⁵ (the same was true to a lesser extent at that time in France).

In 1959, people were asked in the same four West European countries, "From impressions you have received from any sources, would you indicate your opinion of the following aspects of life in the United States?"⁴⁶

Table 4-2: Cultural Elements of American Life

Opinion of	Britain	Net Favorable Responses		Italy
		West Germany	France	
Science in America	79	66	67	70
Living conditions	77	72	54	71
Business	71	56	44	52
Labor	27	30	45	68
Education	31	38	30	56
Economic System	45	51	31	48
Religion	25	32	16	13
Family life	59	35	9	- 4
Politics	- 2	35	10	17
Literature	6	26	0	29
Architecture	24	26	- 5	26
Art	8	14	- 4	19
Music	27	0	- 9	16
Youth	4	3	12	- 6
Treatment of negroes	-58	-47	-70	-27

One notes high appreciation for American science and business, less for labor, politics, and American culture, and notes the thumping alienation on the racial issue (and these results were obtained before the decade of the 1960's).

Also in 1958, peoples of the same four West European countries were asked for their reactions to various American cultural exports.⁴⁷ The Net Favorable (or Net Unfavorable) responses were as follows:

Table 4-3: American Cultural Exports

Reaction to American	In Great Britain	In Germany	In France	In Italy
Tourists	60	44	42	53
Students	43	44	29	38
Residents	27	35	9	28
Books	11	24	2	36
Religious ideas	25	9	9	
Newspapers	- 4	18	- 6	13
Servicemen	13	9	-19	8
Foods and drinks	41	35	-41	- 8
Magazines	-17	2	-24	9
Clothing styles	13	- 2	-27	-16
Films	1	-36	-29	24
Jazz	- 2	-56	-40	-12
Voice of America	15	36	19	26

In 1948, and partially repeated in 1958, people were asked to select which attributes they felt applied to Americans and to their own people.⁴⁸

Table 4-4: National Attributes

Attributes	<u>Great Britain</u>			<u>West Germany</u>		
	Own People	Americans 1948	Americans 1958	Own People	Americans 1948	Americans 1958
Peace-loving	77%	39%	--	37%	23%	--
Brave	59	19	--	63	6	--
Hardworking	57	32	49	90	19	48
Intelligent	52	38	--	64	34	--
Generous	48	52	68	11	48	71
Practical	47	38	--	53	45	--
Self-controlled	44	10	--	12	11	--
Progressive	31	58	73	39	58	75

Attributes	<u>France</u>			<u>Italy</u>		
	Own People	Americans 1948	Americans 1958	Own People	Americans 1948	Americans 1958
Peace-loving	69%	26%	--	27%	29%	--
Brave	56	26	--	45	18	--
Hardworking	46	37	25	67	39	49
Intelligent	79	37	--	80	34	--
Generous	62	34	35	41	60	50
Practical	17	81	--	24	59	--
Self-controlled	12	34	--	5	16	--
Progressive	34	75	75	17	32	57

This is an instructive table, as people rate themselves and Americans. All rate themselves "brave," but Americans not. The Italians and French rate themselves very high in intelligence but low in self-control. All see Americans as practical and progressive. Of the four, the French rate Americans lowest as "generous" (despite France's receipt of more American Aid than any other country). The highest value recorded is the German self-view as hardworking.

In 1968, publics and parliamentarians in West Europe were asked⁴⁹ whether they perceived the interests of their country and those of

the United States, and of their country and the Soviet Union, very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different:

Table 4-5: Shared Interests

<u>Interests of US and Own Country</u>	<u>Public</u>				<u>Parliamentarians</u>			
	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Very much in agreement	15	7	6	10	29	27	12	32
Fairly well in agreement	64	35	36	40	58	43	62	32
Rather different	13	31	41	16	-	12	1	12
Very different	2	7	8	11	-	6	1	5
Don't know	6	20	9	23	-	6	1	5

<u>Interests of USSR and Own Country</u>	<u>Public</u>				<u>Parliamentarians</u>			
	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Very much in agreement	3	3	-	2	7	18	1	4
Fairly well in agreement	33	35	2	10	24	43	3	29
Rather different	38	33	17	37	51	28	27	40
Very different	15	6	73	27	17	6	68	24
Don't know	11	23	8	24	1	5	1	3

In 1968, publics in Japan and the four West European countries, and parliamentarians in the same five countries plus India, Malaysia, and the Philippines were asked,⁵⁰ "Considering both domestic and international matters, what do you admire most about the United States, and its policies and actions?"

Table 4-6: Admirable Aspects of the United States

<u>International-- Favorable</u>	<u>Public</u>					<u>Parliamentarians</u>							
	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Jap</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Jap</u>	<u>Ind</u>	<u>Mal</u>	<u>Phil</u>
US desire to do good in world; unselfishness; generous idealism; willingness to help other nations; aid; Peace Corp.	13	7	18	18	2	33	15	19	7	29	31	31	30

International-- Favorable (cont'd)	Public					Parliamentarians							
	UK	Fr	FRG	It	Jap	UK	Fr	FRG	It	Jap	Ind	Mal	Phil
American willingness to fight in Vietnam; to resist spread of Communism.	6	1	2	2	-	10	3	6	6	1	1	11	15
US sacrifices to defend peace and freedom; to defend allies.	5	2	16	11	1	6	12	27	12	8	11	28	15
Willingness to accept burdens of world power; thinking of world interests; providing balanced, prudent leadership.	1	-	4	5	1	12	3	9	4	12	9	6	3
Other (e.g., US is a strong, rich, world power).	4	1	4	5	3	5	7	7	6	25	28	11	19
Domestic--													
Favorable													
US or groups in US attempt solve economic and social problems, particularly the Negro problem; trying to build Great Society.	1	2	4	2	-	8	6	9	9	5	3	3	3
Democracy; rights, freedoms; political institutions.	7	3	11	20	4	21	21	21	28	12	33	13	36
Industrial and economic strength; technical know-how; status in science and technology; dynamism; successful free enterprise economy.	12	12	7	24	1	20	48	7	25	3	4	17	18
Characteristics of American people: warm, friendly, sincere, optimistic.	7	2	4	2	3	5	12	5	3	32	7	8	17
Others	2	4	-	-	2	4	3	1	3	1	-	-	2

The same people were then asked:⁵¹ "What do you dislike most about the United States, and its policies and actions?"

Table 4-7: Disliked Aspects of the United States


<u>International-- Unfavorable</u>	<u>Public</u>					<u>Parliamentarians</u>							
	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Jap</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Jap</u>	<u>Ind</u>	<u>Mal</u>	<u>Phil</u>
Vietnam (US losing prestige).	19	37	45	35	16	35	37	32	37	36	44	39	18
US is imperialistic, arrogant; considers self the world policeman and arbiter; desires to dominate; interferes; neo-colonialism; economic imperialism.	9	16	18	15	1	15	34	12	21	20	44	11	18
Too aggressive; escalates confrontation with Communist countries; depends too much on military strength.	2	3	1	4	1	3	-	1	6	8	2	9	1
Economic, financial difficulties internationally; balance of payments deficit; self-centered regarding trade.	2	1	3	3	1	6	8	2	4	19	5	21	8
Clumsy, inexperienced, immature; lack knowledge and sensitivity toward other nations; spoiled child.	3	2	5	4	5	15	22	25	15	61	8	32	4
Others	3	8	4	1	5	7	6	7	12	5	9	2	32

Domestic-- Unfavorable	Public					Parliamentarians							
	UK	Fr	FRG	It	Jap	UK	Fr	FRG	It	Jap	Ind	Mal	Phil
Racial, civilrights, Negro problems.	23	21	53	27	8	26	28	39	41	36	10	21	27
Inability of government to solve other prob- lems; internal dissen- sion; crime; poverty, etc.	13	2	9	5	2	7	5	19	6	2	3	6	1
Materialism; cult of the dollar	4	-	1	1	-	1	13	2	7	14	2	5	15
Other unfavorable	7	5	1	-	12	11	3	9	4	-	-	-	2

Perhaps the two features associated with the United States that have done most to alienate foreign perceptions are the racial problem and Vietnam policy. A number of surveys already presented have given evidence of the negative role played by the racial problem.

The following chart⁵² illustrates the powerful role of Vietnam in such decline as took place in foreign perceptions and esteem for the United States. Regardless of the reality of Vietnam, this chart evidences the weight of disfavor that accumulated toward America's role in Vietnam:

Table 4-8: Opinion of US Vietnam Policies Among Educated Elites



Power and Influence

In 1968, general publics of five nations and parliamentarians of eight countries were asked to place the United States and the Soviet Union somewhere on a scale of "power and importance" running from 0 to 10. The following were the results:⁵³

Table 4-9: Power and Importance Appraisals

<u>Surveyed in</u>	<u>Public View of US Power and Importance</u>	<u>Parliamentarians View of US Power and Importance</u>	<u>Public View of Soviet Power and Importance</u>	<u>Parliamentarians View of USSR Power and Importance</u>
Great Britain	8.7	9.3	8.6	8.9
France	8.7	8.9	8.5	7.6
West Germany	9.3	9.8	9.2	9.3
Italy	8.8	9.7	8.2	8.7
Japan	9.3	9.5	9.1	8.3
India	-	9.3	-	9.1
Malaysia	-	9.1	-	8.4
Philippines	-	9.7	-	8.4

Obviously, both countries are seen as immensely powerful, with the United States perceived as possessing a variable increment of advantage.

Expanding the perceptions of power and importance, the public and parliamentarians of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy were asked in 1968 to place on the scale of power and importance eight countries, including (or adding) their own country in the past, the present, and the future.⁵⁴

Table 4-10: Past, Present, Future

<u>Rate these countries</u>	<u>Parliamentarians</u>				<u>Public</u>			
	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Italy</u>
USA	9.3	8.9	9.8	9.7	8.7	8.7	9.3	8.8
USSR	8.9	7.6	9.3	8.7	8.6	8.5	9.2	8.2
PRC	5.8	5.7	6.5	6.2	6.2	7.0	7.3	6.2
Japan	4.9	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.2	6.6	6.4	7.1
France	5.0	na	5.5	5.2	5.4	na	5.8	5.8
Britain	na	4.9	5.3	6.0	na	5.7	5.5	6.3
West Germany	4.6	5.9	na	5.7	4.9	6.1	na	6.8
Italy	3.0	4.3	3.7	na	3.2	4.6	3.6	na
Own country-Past	6.6	4.5	4.2	3.2	7.6	4.5	4.3	4.6
" " -Present	5.5	5.8	5.0	4.6	5.6	6.7	5.6	5.8
" " -Future	5.9	7.0	6.3	6.9	6.2	7.4	6.7	6.9

Parliamentarians perceived a larger gap between the superpowers than the publics saw. It is interesting, among other aspects above, that only the British consider their past superior to their present and future. In any event, it is obvious that most people in these four nations in 1968 saw the USA as the world's most powerful and most important country, with the USSR the only near competitor, even in comparison with themselves.

In 1969, public and parliamentarians of the same exact countries were asked:⁵⁵ "At the present time how much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to provide wise leadership in dealing with world problems--not very much, or none at all?"

Table 4-11: Confidence in US Leadership

	<u>Public</u>					<u>Parliamentarians</u>							
	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Jap</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>Fr</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>It</u>	<u>Jap</u>	<u>Ind</u>	<u>Mal</u>	<u>Phil</u>
A great deal	14	4	17	17	2	19	3	15	27	7	14	16	46
A fair amount	30	27	44	40	31	59	45	61	25	53	20	32	28
Not very much	21	42	28	14	37	17	24	24	21	34	32	35	18
None at all	5	11	4	8	5	2	16	-	13	5	29	4	3
Don't know	10	16	7	21	25	3	12	-	14	1	13	13	5

Parliamentarians were then asked,⁵⁶ "Why do you feel this way?"

The following Tables 4-12 and 4-13 list the responses:

Table 4-12: Reasons for Confidence

<u>Reasons for Confidence in U. S. Leadership</u>	<u>Parliamentarians</u>						
	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Malaysia</u>
Democratic country; freedom	8%	12%	8%	13%	17%	6%	5%
Powerful country, economically, financially; military strength	5	9	18	13	28	12	15
Wants peace; practicing peaceful coexistence; moderation (e.g., Cuba, Middle East)	15	9	10	3	-	1	-
Willingness to help other countries; generosity; tackling world poverty	8	6	3	3	5	6	5
Sense of duty toward world responsibilities; doing its best to preserve freedom and order	18	10	13	9	6	2	5
Our traditional ally; we can depend on the U. S.	4	3	3	*	2	1	2
Political capacity; successful policies; experienced.	16	16	19	19	4	4	15
Miscellaneous favorable comments	13	3	3	4	2	1	2

Table 4-13: Lack of Confidence

<u>Reasons for Lack of Confidence in U. S. Leadership</u>							
Vietnam	8	12	9	10	20	13	4
American imperialism, pretensions to lead the world, to act as world policeman	2	15	4	12	12	19	4
War-like policies; aggressiveness	2	8	1	10	6	-	-

Reasons for Lack of Confidence in U. S. Leadership (cont'd)	Parliamentarians						
	Britain	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	India	Malaysia
Americans are clumsy, inexperienced, insensitive; politically immature; don't collaborate.	6	10	6	6	29	4	9
Critical remarks about President Johnson and his policies; nostalgic comments about Kennedy and his Administration; inadequate or faulty leadership.	4	3	9	4	13	9	7
Miscellaneous unfavorable comments	*	8	5	6	16	24	13

Among these citations of data from two sources, we interject some statistics from a third source, in order to illustrate potential differences in even elite opinions, depending, for instance, upon the scope of the elite selected. We cited in the last chapter the sizable negative element in French opinion toward the United States, and some of the data presented already in this chapter are consistent with the data presented earlier. In 1964 Professor Karl Deutsch and Associates conducted in-depth interviews of 147 of France's most eminent persons (30 politicians, 7 military, 29 opinion leaders, 30 civil servants, 19 businessmen, and 28 from miscellaneous professional groups). These views were largely confirmed in 1967 by Professor Harold Deutsch's samplings, as reported in Beck, The Changing Structure of Europe, 1970. Their responses give a somewhat different flavor from other surveys of French opinion; the differences will neither be resolved nor explained here, but they perform a valuable function in illustrating the difficulty in compiling and feeling confidence in "a nation's opinion." In any event, the responses of

this French elite are interesting in comparison to French views reported elsewhere herein:⁵⁷

Table 4-14: French Elite Opinions

France depends "completely" or "in large measure" for its ultimate military security upon the United States. 72%

With which countries will France continue to share common interests for a long period?

EEC Countries	88%
United States	87%
Great Britain	52%
Germany	37%
Soviet Union	5%
Others	6%

Another instance, involving a single country, but illustrating both gradual but relentless change in attitude and erosion of esteem for the United States in a significant country, shows the substantial drop in esteem for the US among the Japanese people since 1963. The following two charts show the changing status of America in both "most liked" and "most disliked" categories among the people of Japan, and the shifts in Japanese opinion over the past decade:

Table 4-15: Japanese Public Rating of Nations in 1973⁵⁸





Table 4-16: Japanese Rating of Liking for the U.S.⁵⁹



The previous two charts are to be compared with the following two charts, showing respectively, the course of Japanese evaluations of the USSR and Communist China over the same past decade; in the instance of China, obviously a dramatic shift has occurred:

Table 4-17: Japanese Rating of Liking for USSR⁶⁰






Table 4-18: Japanese Rating of Liking for China⁶¹



The following chart⁶² is also instructive about the course of change in opinion in a single country. It shows the course of British opinion concerning the question: "Which country, the US or the USSR, do you believe to be ahead in space developments (science, military)?" The chart shows United States standing in the U.K. from 1957 to 1971:

Table 4-19: US Space Rating by Britons



The following 1972 chart⁶³ explicitly asks for comparison of strength. Question: "Considering all the things that make a country strong, what country would you say is the strongest in the world at the present time?"

Table 4-20: Strength Ratings

	General Public							
	Soviet U.S.	Union	PRC	Japan	Great Brit.	France	West Germany	Other
<u>Western Europe</u>								
Great Britain	46%	29%	4%	2%	6%	*%	5%	1%
West Germany	59	22	6	*	-	-	1	*
France	61	16	7	4	*	2	1	1
Italy	71	12	3	1	1	*	1	*
Sweden	42	25	9	1	1	*	1	3
<u>North America</u>								
Canada	61	18	4	2	1	*	2	5
<u>E. Asia & Pacific</u>								
Japan	54	15	6	2	-	*	*	*
Australia	57	20	4	3	2	-	1	2
Manila	89	5	1	1	-	-	1	-
Kuala Lumpur	50	9	18	4	1	-	1	1
<u>Latin America</u>								
Mexico City	69	13	3	5	*	*	1	2
Caracas	52	18	5	*	*	*	1	5
<u>Near East</u>								
Israel	66	12	6	1	1	1	1	*
Beirut	75	13	1	1	1	-	1	-
<u>Africa</u>								
Nairobi	66	17	5	1	3	-	1	1

The following chart⁶⁴ is also revealing in that it attempts to distinguish between elements of US strength, as citizens of 15 foreign nations around the world perceive them. Evidently, military strength has effect, but it is American economic strength that looms largest in foreign perception. The question asked was: "What in particular makes you think the United States is the strongest country?"

Table 4-21: Perceived Bases for American Primacy

	Western Europe			North America		Latin America		East Asia and Pacific			Near East		Africa			
	Great Britain		West	France	Italy	Sweden	Canada	Mexico City	Caracas	Japan	Australia	Manila	Kuala Lumpur	Israel	Beirut	Nairobi
	23%	30%	30%	30%	51%	21%	36%	48%	25%	26%	27%	62%	35%	20%	56%	32%
General Public	Economic strength, productivity, standard of living	8	28	14	18	14	17	18	12	21	19	35	19	22	24	30
	Military strength	5	9	9	3	3	9	2	7	1	4	25	8	3	7	13
	Nuclear strength	6	8	7	4	7	7	17	16	4	6	14	12	9	17	11
	Science, technology	3	2	5	1	1	4	8	7	1	3	13	5	1	1	9
	Space	14	2	12	5	6	10	3	2	8	8	7	3	*	5	10
	Natural resources, land mass, population resources	1	1	*	-	1	*	1	1	*	-	4	1	*	1	-
	Ideological strength	1	3	2	3	1	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	6	11
	Political strength, strongest government	4	2	3	2	1	6	8	2	5	1	7	2	2	10	3
	International political power, more allies, world influence	8	5	8	3	7	11	18	9	7	15	13	2	-	9	9
	Other (social system; cultural, educational strength, quality of life, quality of leadership, national morale, etc.)	54	41	39	29	58	39	31	38	46	43	11	50	34	25	34
	Not asked															

Another revealing instance of substantial change in foreign views toward American primacy is contained in this chart,⁶⁵ showing responses to a question asked in 1958, 1964, and 1971 in Great Britain, West Germany, and France. While the wording varied each time, the sense of the question remained: "Would it be best for the US to be ahead militarily, or the USSR, or neither?"

Table 4-22: Preferences for Primacy

	Great Britain			West Germany			France		
	Oct '58	Feb '64	Jul '71	Oct '58	Feb '64	Jul '71	Oct '58	Feb '64	Jul '71
Prefer US ahead	69%	40%	31%	73%	49%	31%	43%	22%	12%
Prefer USSR ahead	2	1	3	1	-	1	3	2	3
Prefer neither ahead	21	47	56	15	35	56	36	64	71
No opinion	8	12	11	11	16	13	18	12	15

I should like to suggest that the most significant aspect of this survey--perhaps more significant even than the declining trend in support for "U. S. ahead" or the increasing trend supporting "neither ahead"--is the almost total rejection of advantage for the only conceivable rival of the United States as Number One, the repeated reflection at almost zero of any preference for "the USSR ahead." As preference for American primacy declined by 50% or more, no compensating increase in preference for Soviet primacy can be discerned. There was an increase, to be sure, but in the percentage of populations preferring that neither nation be ahead. Even so, in the greatly reduced 1971 preferences for American primacy, there is no other nation--certainly not the Soviet Union--receiving more than negligible votes of preference for its exercise of primacy.

Following up the response shown in the previous chart, those who preferred "neither ahead" were then asked in July 1971:⁶⁶ "Why would you prefer neither ahead?"

Table 4-23: Negative Bases for Rejecting Primacy

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>
<u>Less chance of war</u> --the most suitable way of preventing war, if neither ahead peace is still possible, won't attack each other if both equal.	24%	30%	31%
<u>Nuclear balance</u> --if equal one cannot dominate the world--if equal neutralize each other.	11	22	21
<u>Ban nuclear weapons</u> --no one should have nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons should be suppressed.	7	3	14
<u>Nuclear agreement more likely</u> --they will negotiate if equal.	5	*	1
<u>Stop armaments race</u> --if equal no more arms competition, prelude to disarmament.	2	1	3
<u>Don't trust US or USSR</u> --better for other countries to hold the balance.	2	*	2
<u>Financial reasons</u> --too much money wasted on nuclear weapons.	*	*	3
Other reasons	4	2	3
No opinion	3	1	3
	—	—	—
	58%	59%	81%

This result appears to give popular support to the Morgenthau thesis over the Organski thesis, i.e., that balance and equality are thought more likely than overwhelming power to deter war.

This last chart⁶⁷ of this section looks ahead. In late 1969, citizens of 12 countries were asked by Gallup International concerning the US, USSR, their own, or any other country: "Looking ahead ten years, which country do you think will have the highest standard of living?"

Table 4-24: Future Primacy in Living Standards

<u>Country/City</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Own Country</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Israel	66%	2%	-%	15%		17%
India	59	5	2	4	11%	19
Bogota	58	5	7	7	17	6
Athens	55	6	1	3	10	25
West Germany	49	13	1	-	17	22
Great Britain	47	17	2	12	10	13
Tokyo	43	22	*	6	9	21
Uruguay	41	3	4	7	12	33
Canada	41	36	*	*	5	18
Finland	40	3	3	8	35	11
Sao Paulo	34	50	1	1	8	6
Spain	33	6	3	10	9	39

Major Current Perceptions of Rankings of Power and Importance

Among the most recent and valuable surveys for the purposes of this chapter was the set undertaken in late 1974 in eight countries by the Institute for International Social Research on behalf of the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans (initially chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller). Two samples, each of about 600 persons, were interviewed in each country; one sample was scientifically drawn to represent the general public, and the other to represent the socio-economic elite. The eight countries surveyed were Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. In these surveys, the "past" was indicated to be about 10 years ago, and the "future" to be about 10 years hence.

The respondents were asked to utilize a ladder of steps graded from 0 to 10 in assessing the power and importance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the past, today, and in the future.

The figures are given in pairs in Table 4-25; the first figure is the average response of the general public; the second figure shows the response of the local elite:

Table 4-25: Perceptions of US and USSR Power and Importance⁶⁸

Country of Respondents	Ratings of United States			Ratings of the Soviet Union		
	Past	Present	Future	Past	Present	Future
British	8.5/9.1	8.5/8.8	8.7/8.5	7.0/7.5	8.1/8.4	8.6/8.6
French	8.3/8.7	8.5/8.6	8.4/8.4	6.6/6.6	8.0/7.8	8.5/8.4
German	8.0/8.3	7.8/8.1	7.5/7.7	6.3/6.6	7.4/7.7	8.0/7.9
Italian	8.3/9.2	8.5/8.9	8.5/8.7	6.4/7.0	7.7/8.1	8.3/8.4
Canadian	8.3/8.7	8.4/8.6	8.0/8.1	6.6/7.0	8.0/8.2	8.3/8.3
Mexican	8.0/9.2	9.0/9.4	9.1/9.1	7.0/7.4	8.4/8.6	8.9/8.9
Brazilian	6.8/8.5	8.0/8.4	7.6/7.8	5.0/6.6	6.5/7.9	6.9/7.8
Japanese	7.8/7.8	7.8/7.9	7.7/7.9	6.4/6.5	7.1/7.1	7.6/7.6

Remaining aware that differences, to achieve significance, should equal or exceed .06, we can extract a number of instructive observations concerning the United States from this up-to-date table, as follows:

Highest absolute rankings of U.S. past: British public (8.5);

French, Italian, and Canadian publics (8.3); Italian and Mexican elites (9.2), and British elite (9.1).

Lowest: Brazilian public (6.8); Japanese elite (7.8).

Highest absolute ranking of U.S. present: Mexican public (9.0);

Mexican (9.4), Italian (8.9), and British (8.8) elites.

Lowest: German (7.8) and Japanese (7.8) publics; German (8.1) and Japanese (7.9) elites.

Highest absolute ranking of US future: Mexican public (9.1);

Mexican (9.1) and Italian (8.7) elites.

Lowest: German (7.5), Brazilian (7.6), and Japanese (7.7) publics;

German (7.7), Brazilian (7.8), and Japanese (7.9) elites.

Trend of U.S. power seen as rising, past to present to future:

British public (8.5 to 8.5 to 8.7); Mexican public (8.0 to 9.0 to 9.1). (Not foreseen by any other public or elite).

Trend of U.S. power seen as unchanging from present to future:

Italian public (8.3 to 8.5 to 8.5); Japanese elite (7.8 to 7.9 to 7.9).

Future trend of U.S. power expected to decline: the publics of France (8.3 to 8.5 to 8.4), Germany (8.0 to 7.8 to 7.5), Canada (8.3 to 8.4 to 8.0), Brazil (6.8 to 8.0 to 7.6); and the elites of Britain (9.1 to 8.8 to 8.5), France (8.7 to 8.6 to 8.4), Germany (8.3 to 8.1 to 7.7), Italy (9.2 to 8.9 to 8.7), Canada (8.7 to 8.6 to 8.1), Mexico (9.2 to 9.4 to 9.1), and Brazil (8.5 to 8.4 to 7.8).

Similarly instructive observations concerning the Soviet Union can be extracted from the same table:

Highest absolute rankings of Soviet past: British (7.0) and Mexican (7.0) publics; British (7.5) and Mexican (7.4) elites.

Lowest: Brazilian (5.0), German (6.3), Italian (6.4), and Japanese (6.4) publics; Japanese (6.5), and French (6.6), German (6.6), and Brazilian (6.6) elites.

Highest absolute rankings of Soviet present: Mexican (8.4) public; Mexican (8.6) and British (8.4) elites.

Lowest: Brazilian (6.5) and Japanese (7.1) publics; Brazilian elite (7.1).

Highest absolute ranking of Soviet future: Mexican (8.9), British (8.6), and French (8.5) publics; Mexican (8.9), British (8.6), and French (8.4) and Italian (8.4) elites.

Lowest: Brazilian public (6.9); Japanese (7.6), Brazilian (7.8), and German (7.9) elites.

Trend of Soviet power seen as rising: Expected by all eight publics and seven of eight elites (exception: Brazil, 6.6 to 7.9 to 7.8).

Trend of Soviet power seen as unchanging from present to future: None.

Future trend of Soviet power expected to decline: None of eight publics; only one of eight elites (Brazilian, 6.6 to 7.9 to 7.8).

Table 4-26: Comparison of Appraisals
(first figure of public; 2d figure of elites)

	<u>Highest Past</u>	<u>Lowest Past</u>	<u>Highest Present</u>	<u>Lowest Present</u>	<u>Highest Future</u>	<u>Lowest Future</u>
US	8.5/9.2	6.8/7.8	9.0/9.4	7.8/8.1	9.1/8.7	7.5/7.7
USSR	7.0/7.5	5.0/6.5	8.4/8.6	6.5/7.1	8.9/8.9	6.9/7.6

Thus, we can also draw the following consensuses from this chart:

Greater U.S. present power and importance than Soviet Union: All eight publics, and all eight elites.

Greater Soviet present power and importance than U.S.: None.

Greater U.S. future power and importance than Soviet Union: Five publics (British 8.7 to 8.6, Italian 8.5 to 8.3, Mexican 9.1 to 8.9, Brazilian 7.6 to 6.9, Japanese 7.7 to 7.6) and three elites (Italian 8.7 to 8.4, Mexican 9.1 to 8.9, Japanese 7.9 to 7.6).

Standoff in future power and importance: Two elites (French 8.4 and Brazilian 7.8).

Greater Soviet future power and influence than U.S.: Three publics (French 8.5 over 8.4, German 8.0 over 7.5, Canadian 8.3 over 8.0), and three elites (British 8.6 over 8.5, German 7.9 over 7.7, Canadian 8.3 over 8.1).

It can be concluded that present U.S. power and importance are perceived as moderately superior to the Soviet Union; that U.S. absolute power is expected widely not to increase but in fact to decline appreciably; that Soviet power is likely to increase appreciably into the future, and that in the future the power and importance of the United States and the Soviet Union will be approximately equal.

A comparison of the foregoing perceptions of the U.S. and USSR with perceptions of the same people towards themselves is available by consulting Table 4-27. Again, the first figure given reflects public response; the second figure reflects elite response:

Table 4-27: Self-Assessments of Power and Importance⁶⁹

	<u>Past</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Future</u>
Britain	7.0/6.4	5.4/4.6	6.3/5.1
France	5.6/5.2	5.5/5.2	6.3/5.6
Germany	5.0/4.8	5.6/5.6	6.1/6.1
Italy	5.4/5.1	3.9/3.1	4.9/4.1
Canada	5.3/4.7	6.4/5.5	7.3/6.3
Mexico	5.3/4.5	6.4/5.4	7.5/6.7
Brazil	4.1/3.4	6.5/5.6	7.8/7.6
Japan	4.8/4.8	5.8/5.7	6.3/6.2

This table provides additional enlightenment on the status of the United States (and of the USSR) by showing how foreigners, using the same relative scale with which they assessed the United States, assessed themselves. Some inferences can be drawn concerning the relative trust and confidence with which the United States is regarded abroad. These figures reflect a few points worth underlining here:

- Not even the publics or elites of any other country (even former preeminent and still major countries) see their own nation as possessing today power and importance anywhere near to that of the United States, or anywhere near that expected to be possessed in the future by the two superpowers.

- The British and Italians are pessimistic about ever regaining status equal to their status in the past; the French, Germans, and Japanese foresee only modest improvement.

- The elites of Brazil, Mexico, and Canada, and the Brazilian public, foresee dramatic improvement in the status of their countries.

A final compilation from these data to be cited here is highly illuminating. The basic question asked was to this effect: "No matter what you believe is likely to happen, what would you like to see happen in the future--the United States more powerful, the Soviets more powerful, or both about equally powerful?"

Table 4-28: Preferred Power Alignment: U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.⁷⁰

<u>Elites:</u>	<u>U.S. More Powerful</u>	<u>Soviets More Powerful</u>	<u>About Equal</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
British	37%	1%	61%	1%
French	25	5	62	8
German	35	2	61	2
Italian	30	5	60	5
Canadian	36	2	59	3
Mexican	44	3	47	6
Brazilian	37	2	54	7
Japanese	29	3	59	9
<u>Publics:</u>				
British	49	1	47	3
French	21	6	62	11
German	39	4	51	6
Italian	28	6	54	12
Canadian	30	2	62	6
Mexican	37	8	49	6
Brazilian	42	4	45	9
Japanese	17	5	59	19

Thus, in this particular dyad of preferences of publics and elites of foreign countries, the primacy of the United States is reflected overwhelmingly. Obviously, there is greater support for equality of power than for United States primacy; but to the extent that a single country's primacy is to be preferred by any foreign peoples, that preferred country is unquestionably the United States and no other.

No doubt the perceptions of others (if their perceptions are known) play some part in the motivations of societies towards power, towards development, and towards whatever international roles are considered appropriate. Sometimes, domestic and foreign filters of perspective are distorting; for example, Barbera quotes two proponents who claim that Russia under "socialism" skipped historical stages in forging ahead. On the contrary, says Barbera "the place of Russia in comparative development has not changed significantly since the opening of the twentieth century."⁷¹

No doubt, perceptions have played some part in American development. Far more important, setting (sometimes called "propitious circumstances," as we shall see later) and historical experience exerted powerful influences on the shaping of the American character. We may also accept that the people themselves, reflecting the evolution of their own psychological growth from roots in different cultures, interacting with the physical environment and dynamic events, contributed, consciously and unconsciously, to the emergence of whatever loose cluster of distinguishing traits can be meaningfully categorized as "the American character."

Selected Foreign Perceptions and Expectations of Current and Future
United States Status and Performance

Having extracted several historical perspectives toward the United States, followed by examination of collective national perceptions of the United States, we turn to a number of perceptive individual foreigners for their appraisals of current American status and recommendations for future courses that, in their judgment, ought to be followed by the United States. Some of their evaluations are only approximately accurate; some of their advices are at least mildly controversial. On the whole, however, they contribute to a pluralistic tour d'horizon, a range of perspectives on America's present and future status that are worth pondering by Americans, and by other foreigners who deal with, or at least observe closely, the United States.

One particular argument relevant to American has not lain dormant continuously. In the first half of the 19th Century, a debate arose in Great Britain over whether democracy, as realized in the United States, was applicable elsewhere--even universally. Conservatives argued that "propitious circumstances" (that is, favorable climate

and resources acted deterministically on fortunate people and determined favorable outcomes for them) had made democracy a successful experiment confined to America. Tocqueville discussed this proposition, favorably; John Stuart Mill rejected it, arguing that in many respects the United States was the least propitious place for an experiment in democracy to be tried.

Henry Fairlie, the modern British writer, has considered the doctrine of "propitious circumstances," and has also rejected it:

. . . this is not how I read the history of America, of the character of the American. It is clear to me that it is not the "propitious circumstances" of the continent that have acted on the American so much as the American who has, by his energy and ingenuity, made a place of 'propitious circumstances' out of his continent; and this is the example, above all others, that he has set to the world.⁷²

The modern French author, Jean Francois Revel, developed a perspective towards the United States that is nominally distinct but that actually repeats one perspective from Europe that has been expressed many times. Professor Tiryakian provides in 1975 both historical and functional analysis of this view:

Just as Max Weber came to the United States in part to seek renovation in the aftermath of psychological depression, so, too, Revel came to the United States roughly five years ago to get away from a state of depression and exhaustion, but one with a different source. Like many other French left-wing intellectuals, and like all of France, Revel had lived through the critical 'events' of May 1968 . . . So Revel came to the United States, in part at least, to see what had been the fate of the American 'events' of 1968 and 1969 and whether they had been as futile a gesture in bringing about change . . .

. . . Revel sees the United States as the society most eligible for the role of the prototype nation for the achievement of the full aims embodied in the Principles

of the 1789 Revolution. This is because the United States has the following necessary conditions: (1) it enjoys a high rate of economic growth and prosperity, (2) it has a high level of technological competence and basic research, (3) it is culturally oriented toward the future rather than the past, (4) it is undergoing a revolution in behavioral standards and in the affirmation of individual freedom and equality, and (5) it rejects authoritarian control and multiplies initiative in all domains, allowing the coexistence of diverse, mutually complementary alternative sub-cultures. . . .⁷³

In Revel's own words:

Today in America--the child of European imperialism--a new revolution is rising. It is the revolution of our time. It is the only revolution that involves radical, moral, and practical opposition to the spirit of nationalism. It is the only revolution that, to that opposition, joins culture, economic and technological power, and a total affirmation of liberty for all in place of archaic prohibitions. It, therefore, offers the only possible escape for mankind today: the acceptance of technological civilization as a means and not as an end, and--since we cannot be saved either by the destruction of the civilization or by its continuation--the development of the ability to reshape that civilization without annihilating it.

It is essential for humanity that there should exist a society capable of making a revolution without sacrificing democracy. The United States seems to be in this position, and confers on this process the significance of a worldwide prototype.⁷⁴

A British journalist, Robert Hargreaves, has attempted to paint a comprehensive, timely portrait of the United States in Superpower. Many of his observations reflect the perceptions of many other foreigners as they contemplate America, warts and all, as the incumbent of the status of Number One nation:

The United States remains a superpower, a giant among nations, but the ideals of the Pax Americana, the notion that decisions taken in Washington could affect the destinies of half the globe, with Americans prepared to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship to support that role is no longer credible in the 1970's. The internationalism of the older generation of Americans that led to that

notion was, in the words of the historian Arthur Schlesinger, both spacious in design and noble in intent. 'Its flaw,' he writes, 'is that it overcommitted our country--it overcommitted our policy, our resources and our rhetoric. It was tinged with messianic pretensions. It estranged our friends without intimidating our enemies. The time has surely come to stop going abroad in search of monsters to destroy.' In short, America has lost its immunity to history. Like other, lesser nations, it too has discovered that there are in fact limits to its enormous power. As a result, the nation is engaged today in a slow, sometimes agonizing withdrawal from that earlier overcommitment.

. . . What is happening to America's domestic institutions today may in the long run prove to be even more important than the role her leaders choose to play in the world arena. For it is axiomatic that what happens in the United States today spreads to the rest of the industrialized world tomorrow. Whether the American experiment succeeds or fails is therefore of supreme and vital importance to the whole of the rest of the world.⁷⁵

The interventionist role was in fact perfectly attuned to the American psyche of that era, combining as it did an innate sense of idealism and a pragmatic belief that all problems are soluble if attacked with sufficient nerve and energy. . . . And until the tragedy of Vietnam, the policy generally worked. American influence expanded on a global scale, defense treaties were concluded with forty-two foreign nations, the United States spent over \$150 billion on foreign aid and stationed over a million of her troops abroad, twice the total of all other nations in the world combined.

There is a school of revisionist historians that claims all this was done as a form of disguised imperialism, that the real, if unstated, aim of American policy was to expand the influence of her system of capitalism to the farthest corners of the globe. Now that it has passed, the threat of Soviet expansion seems to these historians more like a specter than a reality . . . But in Europe the threat was real enough at the time--or at least it seemed real enough--and, for all its flaws, there are many nations in the world that have reason to be profoundly grateful for the American help which saw them through the perils of the immediate postwar era.

The United States, it is worth recalling, became a world power reluctantly and abruptly, the result of German and Japanese aggression in World War II and the exhaustion of both its allies and its enemies after it. When the

Cold War erupted in 1947, it was the United States, almost alone, that had carried the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining peace in Europe. For twenty more years, at first under the very real threat of Soviet expansion, America had remained an interventionist power, finding the role more and more to her taste as the years went by.

Over the years . . . the interventionist epoch underwent a subtle sea-change. U. S. policy, which had begun as a strictly limited operation to contain the nationalist expansion of the Soviet Union, developed imperceptibly into a universal crusade, ideological as much as practical . . .⁷⁶

Of all the assumptions made about the United States throughout the past generation, none seemed safer than faith in the enduring strength of the American economy. It was economic dominance, indeed, that enabled her to assume the burdens of world leadership in the postwar era; and if America is regarded as a superpower, it is not just because of the might of her nuclear arsenal or the sense of national destiny expressed by her leaders, but because of the enormous strength of her industry. It was a wealth that underpinned everything else.

And it was a wealth that led in the 1960's to an overweening sense of pride. Alone among the nations of the world, past or present, the United States had assumed she was so wealthy she could afford both guns and butter . . . It was not that America hadn't the money to pay for the war in Vietnam; even at its worst, it never directly accounted for more than 3.5 percent of the gross national product. But by dissembling about the true costs of the military involvement and attempting to pay for it out of deficit spending, Johnson and McNamara had unleashed forces that would sooner or later--but inevitably--bring America to the reckoning. Pride could do no more. . .

By the summer of 1971, the economy was in an acute state of crises . . . most people would agree that . . . the United States economy is and will remain far and away the strongest on the face of the earth. So why then has the world lost confidence in the once-mighty dollar?

The easy answer is that ever since the early 1950's the United States has been living beyond her means in the world, spending overseas billions of dollars more than she has been earning . . . as long as the US economy remained proportionately so much stronger than all the others, and as long as she maintained the role of the world's reserve banker with a stable currency against which all the others were measured, the imbalance in overseas payments was a burden which could be borne fairly lightly.

But when other countries, particularly Germany and Japan, began to build up enormous trade surpluses, as they did throughout the 1960's, the days of the dollar's hegemony were numbered. As the other currencies as a result grew stronger, the dollar, undermined by Johnson's inflation, grew weaker . . . The balance-of-payments deficit that year alone dropped down in the red to a colossal \$30.5 billion, three times the official value of all the gold in Fort Knox. Even the balance of trade, the difference between what the United States buys and sells overseas, was going steeply into deficit for the first time since World War II. Together, these alarming trends had undermined the stability of the dollar.

The economic crisis had come to a head in the middle of August that year, when President Nixon was compelled to impose the first wage-and-price freeze the United States had ever known. That same Sunday night, the value of the dollar was unpegged from its exchange rate in gold . . .⁷⁷ In the middle of his first term, the President was forced to end America's monetary hegemony over the rest of the western world, thus destroying other old assumptions . . .

During President Nixon's first term, the United States crossed a historic watershed in its relations with the rest of the world. Simply put, the Pax Americana was coming to an end, giving way to a more sober realization that in the world of the 1970's the two superpowers were no longer dominant. For reasons that were partly economic, partly military, but also in a deeper sense spiritual, the United States no longer had the capacity to meet all of the commitments it had acquired after World War II. The American tent, which, in the words of Roy Jenkins, had once stood gloriously and uniquely on the top of the highest hill, was now being lowered, and a new era of American foreign policy was clearly about to begin. The nation was in flux and with it the assumptions upon which it had built its foreign policy for almost a generation . . .⁷⁸

. . . the retreat from hegemony, which will continue throughout the 1970's, is not likely to mean a complete withdrawal into prewar isolation, but rather an acceptance of the more modest role of *primus inter pares*. As Roy Jenkins, the British M. P., said in his lecture at Yale University at the end of 1971 . . . 'America is not becoming post-imperial Spain. Her every move will still have a greater effect on the prosperity and trading health of the whole world than those of any other three countries put together.'⁷⁹

We turn to a series of individual focused views of the United States, its status, and its performance, and some expectations of American behavior internationally. These diverse views are expressed by citizens of India, the Soviet Union, France, West Germany, Japan, Argentina, Canada, and others. (Six are excerpted from a single 1974 book which, fortunately, assembled such views: A Nation Observed: Perspectives on America's World Role, edited by Donald R. Lesh.) The protagonists are all responsible, well-informed observers; an assumption that they speak for a large number of their fellow-citizens seems reasonable. They have been selected for extensive quotation here because much of what they (with the exception of Dr. Arbakov) say about the future course of international relations makes sense.

The first is A. D. Gorwala, born in 1900, writing about 1959, now an independent writer and columnist, after a quarter of a century in India's government service. During 1946-1956 he visited the United States four times, on trips ranging from two to four months, primarily to the East and West coasts.

Before World War II the United States was unknown to me. I thought of it as a vast democratic country founded by liberty-loving people in search of religious and civil freedom; a country that had fought a civil war to free its slaves, but treated the descendants of the slaves very badly; that was extremely rich, energetic, machine-minded, yet could not prevent a tremendous depression; that on the whole, though with very good intentions, seemed somehow lacking in proper organization and was prone to allow the orderly processes of its life to be upset by racketeers, graft, and businessmen of the robber-baron type. I had not met any Americans, and my knowledge of American literature was limited.

These trips acquainted me, however, with the importance and uniqueness of the United States, and the need to keep in touch with happenings and opinion there. And

in two further visits--in 1954 and 1956, as a private citizen--I felt that while the United States had its failures, its successes outnumbered its failures several times over and included some of the highest achievements the human spirit could reach. As the principal bulwark of freedom it was entitled to consideration from all who respected the basic human values.

. . . The United States was certainly 'splendid.' It was rich, powerful, egalitarian, providing opportunity for advancement to almost all its citizens. It had vanquished unemployment and hunger, and had taken great strides forward in the fight with disease and in the prolongation of life. But somehow the nation as a whole did not give the impression of being a 'happy land,' as better-integrated countries sometimes do, though poorer and less splendid.

Perhaps happiness of that nature ought not to be expected from the United States. After all, in John Dewey's words, 'We are all minorities in this country. There is no majority.' Consequently there has to be a great deal of amalgamation and adjustment, with all that this means in conformity and the suppression of individual impulses. By any calculation the result has been extremely good. Yet in some ways a complete national personality is not achieved. But in the oldest democracy in the world, dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, the thought cannot be avoided that after all these years the racial problem ought to have been solved. . .

The American employer, especially in industry, appeared to be the best in the world.

From the economic point of view, and therefore from the social, which often follows the economic, the United States appeared to present the nearest approach to a classless society. Equality of opportunity for all appeared combined with fraternity, with the result that very few people felt inferior to others because of the nature of the work they did. In such a society the absence of class politics was understandable.

A particularly engaging quality of this people is its desire to be liked and approved. As a rule strong nations, past or present, are not seriously troubled by the fact of dislike or disapproval. For them it is generally enough to be respected or even feared. The United States strikes a new note in the world's history, for its desire to be liked and approved implies also a willingness to be judged by others.

My visits of 1954 and 1956 confirmed my conclusion from previous study that the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, is in international matters the most misunderstood. To this misunderstanding its own behavior and contradictions have contributed not a little. Official, semi-official, and Congressional sources have seemed to compete with non-official sources . . .

A famous philosopher has classified American politicians into three groups. One third, he said, were the salt of the earth, fine, disinterested men with a real sense of the public good; one third were ordinary, decent men, who supported their parties and tried to do their best; while the remaining third were simple crooks. The proportions are probably not the same today. The last group may have dwindled somewhat; but whatever its strength, it does play an important, though often behind-the-scene, part in American public life. . . . The real hero of America seemed to be the businessman . . .

The record since at least the end of the war seems to show that what the United States wants above all else is to live and let live, but that Communist power has not permitted it to achieve this modest intention. It has been made to appear extremely aggressive and warlike. In reality it seems the least likely nation to want to start a war; it is invariably on the defensive, and time and again has put up with grave provocation. But it almost always conveys the worst motives for its actions. The contradictions that have plagued its reputation are numerous--including the ambiguities of its military policy, its equivocal position on colonialism, the political expediency that has driven it into alliances with totalitarian states, its somewhat ambivalent attitude toward world trade.

In 1956 my own conclusion was that in international affairs the United States was basically sound, standing in general for the right, generous in its endeavor to assist other countries and to alleviate hunger, misery, disease, and anxious to achieve solid and lasting peace. Its strength seemed the principal safeguard and real protection of all free nations. Indian businessmen are inclined to see in the United States their ideal.

Among Indian intellectuals (who include some of the principal politicians, for there is no deep gulf in India between the intellectual and the politician) a large group is inclined to see very clearly the faults and defects of the United States and not so clearly its merits and virtues. To some of these, though perhaps not to the majority, that country has taken Britain's place as the principal imperialist

power. They are inclined to equate the United States with the Soviet Union, and the fact that it is democratic rather than authoritarian makes little difference in their estimation, except that because of its democratic nature they expect from it a higher standard of behavior and substantial advances toward world peace.⁸⁰

Dr. Georgy A. Arbatov has directed the work of the Institute for the Study of the USA of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow since its founding in 1968. During that period he has traveled frequently between the USSR and the United States, and has established himself in the USSR as an authority on recent developments in American foreign policy. Some of his perceptions appear difficult to reconcile with those of other observers; still, it may be considered valuable to become cognizant of an analysis presented to the world by a Soviet observer considered to be an authority on American policy.

If I had to describe in a single word the changes now taking place in US foreign policy, in the role Americans play in the world, I could probably find no better term than accommodation--accommodation to the new realities of the international situation, to the changing foreign and domestic conditions in which US policy is being conceived and shaped. Or, to put it differently, I might say that US policy is being brought in line to a greater degree than formerly with America's resources, capabilities, potential, and national interests.

(In this connection, however, I cannot fail to recall the point of view fashionable among many Western Sovietologists throughout the 1960's, to the effect that when possibilities of American power are curtailed, the "expansionist drive" of the USSR mounts--that our country would not hesitate to rush into spheres vacated by the United States. These and many other unrealized predictions of the Sovietologists were clearly calculated to discourage any desire in the West to seek alternatives to the cold war.)

At the same time, still other initial premises of cold war policy began to totter. That policy had been built on the quite crude notion that every misfortune and difficulty

that America encountered or might encounter in the future was rooted in communism, personified primarily by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the main--if not the sole--goal of the United States was to oppose its enemy, at least to 'contain' him, and ultimately to crush him once and for all.

First of all, I would like to mention the direction in which Soviet-American relations, in my deep conviction, will not develop. They will not develop in the direction of alliance, surely, and still less toward a 'condominium of superpowers.' For we are speaking here of states divided by profound differences in socioeconomic structure, politics, and ideology, of states belonging to two social systems between which there exists and will continue to exist a historically inevitable competition.

As a result, an increasing number of Americans have been reaching the conclusion that limitation of the arms race is in accord with their national interests. This view is connected not only with the issue of priorities discussed above but with the truly exponential growth in armaments expenditures that has resulted from the scientific-technological revolution. (According to American data, the cost of a submarine rose 40 times in the period from 1945 to 1969, the cost of an aircraft carrier 10 times, the cost of a strategic bomber 36 times, and the cost of a fighter plane 130 times.) Not surprisingly, many Americans are becoming convinced that the unrestrained arms race now exceeds the economic capacity of even the wealthiest capitalist country in the world.

But as General Secretary of the CPSU Leonid I. Brezhnev emphasized during his June 24, 1973 television appearance in the United States, ' . . . we, as well as many Americans, realize only too well that renunciation of cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, and cultural fields is tantamount to both sides turning down substantial extra benefits and advantages. And, most important, such a renunciation would be so pointless as to defy any reasonable argument.'

There is obviously no need to discuss in detail those factors that are already generally known. Detente is opposed by groups in the United States whose economic interests are incompatible with it (first of all, the military-industrial complex), by certain special interest groups (for instance, representatives of counterrevolutionary emigres from the socialist countries), and finally by those bureaucrats, journalists, and social scientists who rose to prominence because of the cold war and are only able to think or act within its categories.

But many facts indicate that the old conceptions, the legacy of an attitude that Senator J. William Fulbright aptly termed the "arrogance of power," are still very much alive, and show themselves in many ways--at times generating ambiguities in official policy or determining the position of groups not belonging to the administration but capable of exerting an influence on policy (I refer, for example, to such circles in Congress or to others who shape public opinion, like the mass media).

One also gets the impression that a number of Americans have still failed to rid themselves completely of another false political assumption, namely, that the United States has special 'rights,' especially the 'right' to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to apply direct pressure upon them for that purpose, to dictate to them what is good and what is bad. Views of this sort at one time led American politicians to proclaim officially that the mission of the United States was that of 'global policeman.' Today everybody knows of the blind alleys into which this attitude led American foreign policy, first making the cold war inevitable, and then bringing on the bloody military intervention in Vietnam.

Under present-day conditions rejection of such pretensions is an absolute prerequisite of world peace, and is, after all, a central problem and cardinal principle of peaceful coexistence. For coexistence involves states with different ideologies and social orders, states that naturally will not approve of the domestic situations, traditions and laws, ways of life, political values, and ideologies of one another. If one side attempts to impose upon the other its concepts and values, there can no longer be any discussion either of detente or of normal peaceful relations between the two.⁸¹

Since 1957 Pierre Hassner has lived in France, where he has been an author, teacher, and researcher of international affairs and foreign policy. He is senior research associate at the Centre d'Etude des Relations Internationales in Paris; professor of politics at the European Center of The Johns Hopkins University in Bologna; and a lecturer at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia.

. . . In today's world, America and Europe influence each other less by the traditional mechanics of foreign policy than by what their societies are or may become.

. . . For Europeans, America in the sixties was constantly associated with the Vietnam war and its international and, even more, domestic consequences. America's benevolent image was deeply affected by what many saw as the imperialist character of the war and particularly by the monstrous dynamics of escalating involvement and destruction. Fear of war with China and of an American illusion of omnipotence were combined with, and eventually replaced by, fears that European problems and the issue of Soviet power would be neglected and America's self-confidence and external role decisively weakened. Above all, the decline in Europe's admiration and trust for the United States was caused by the American domestic crisis--which was partly triggered by the Vietnam war, but apparently much deeper and more encompassing. Europe saw assassinations and race riots, drugs and crime, and the counterculture and Middle America confronting each other through the tragic caricatures of their symbolic criminals, Charles Manson and Lieutenant Calley.

In the midst of its dramatic convulsions, however, America retained its fascination for Europeans. On one hand, Europe's ambitious managers continued to admire the American challenge and the Harvard Business School. On the other, Europe's frustrated youth found kinship with the radicals and the hippies, the students and the communes. But for those who cared about political commitment and strategic balance, the fear that the United States had become overactive and overbearing was replaced by the fear that it would become paralyzed and look only inward . . .

The foreign policy of the Nixon administration has been proclaimed in a dazzling succession of partly obvious, partly mysterious, partly complementary, partly contradictory statements about the state of the world and the desired structure of peace . . . The innumerable 'dialogues of the deaf' between American and European friends . . . together with the unpredictable variations in American social and psychological moods, tend to confirm Walter Laqueur's observation that the United States is much more difficult for a foreigner to understand and to make predictions about than a closed country like the Soviet Union.

. . . The uncertainties with which I have been dealing are both caused and limited by one essential discovery--which the quarrel between globalism and neo-isolationism has tended to distort rather than to illuminate--namely, the discovery of vulnerability.

Domestically, its foreign policy is in jeopardy primarily because the American people have discovered that the constitutional system of the United States has been vulnerable to an excessive and unscrupulous use of presidential power. Internationally, the United States has discovered in Vietnam the cost of an imperial role and of military intervention, and the associated risk to domestic unity and moral self-confidence. Strategically, the age of parity, formalized by the SALT agreement, means that America has discovered its vulnerability to destruction from abroad. Economically, the United States has discovered that its commerce is vulnerable to European and Japanese competition, especially in areas where its technological advantage had decreased or disappeared, and that it has little defense against Third World pressures on the price of scarce raw materials.

When the United States possessed unchallenged domestic institutions, a strategically invulnerable homeland, an economy that was second to none in world production and trade, and seemingly inexhaustible natural resources, it could occupy an imperial position and exercise a hegemonic world role. America could define its interests in a broad, indirect, or multilateral way, and could defend them without really having to bargain, to maneuver, or to sacrifice some interests to others. Today such a position is no longer tenable. But the emergence of domestic constraints and international obstacles does not mean that the United States, while becoming less of an empire and more of a nation, has lost its international advantage. In a world of interdependent and unequal nations, where vulnerability varies from country to country and from issue to issue, the crucial factor is comparative advantage. The new situation could lead the United States to paralysis because of contradictory impulses toward intervention and withdrawal.

. . . Current US policy has been puzzling because it seems to operate erratically. Its apparent inconsistency could be the result of day-to-day pragmatism, disguised under successive and incompatible rationalizations. It might, however, reflect a more subtle and complex attempt to establish a new international system that is, in fact, designed to operate according to different rules and with different participants in different regions and on different issues--but with the United States always directly or indirectly, singly or jointly, in the managing or balancing role.

. . . It is clear that the old multilateralism is dead. It was based on the United States' occupying such a

superior position and having so unique a responsibility in the noncommunist world that multilateral procedures involved no threat of conflict between American interests and those of the system. Given such conditions, the United States could afford to define its own interests broadly and generously, and it had the decisive voice in formulating the position of the alliance as a whole.

. . . For the United States, a policy of flexibility is more effective but also more risky than it is for a secondary power like France; it can have unforeseen consequences because of the depth and complexity of the resulting relationships and the indirect influences they produce.

Kissinger's idea of a concert is to combine flexibility and restraint, freedom of action and stability . . . he would prefer the other powers to emphasize stability while the United States--as the only true global power and the only one on speaking terms with everyone else--retains a special right to flexibility.

. . . As Kissinger remarked in 1965, 'Influencing another country's actions--however benevolent the dominant partner may be--will be demoralizing in the long run. . . . A decade and a half of hegemony have accustomed us to believing that our views represent the general interest.'

. . . The hope of any European or other friend of America will always be that the United States should be both more active and more self-denying, that it should consciously help other nations become independent of its control, yet feel responsible for their security, that it should stop being imperialist, yet continue to oppose the imperialism of others. One can understand American irritation with this kind of virtuous advice. Yet if active self-denial may be too good for this world, passive selfishness is certainly not good enough. American relations with Greece . . . show how it is possible to wind up with the worst of both worlds: . . . the present Greek regime appears unreliable and shaky, and the next one is certain to be both unpredictable and predictably anti-American. The same will one day be true for Portugal, which has been singled out as America's only faithful European ally. Moreover, America faces similar problems in the Third World . . . What does make a difference to the whole world is whether the United States is genuinely ready to accept the challenge of diversity and of peaceful change. If it is, it must hold the balance against rising powers like the Soviet Union, not just in terms of strategic parity but in diplomatic influence . . .

But the United States must also abandon its attempt to impose direct or indirect economic or ideological control over its spheres of influence, accepting the fact that the difficulty of bargaining with a popular left-wing or communist government may be preferable to supporting a reactionary and pro-American regime . . .

To combine a commitment to security and freedom, to stability and change, may be psychologically unsatisfactory, but it is practically indispensable . . . everyone concerned must move from impatient manipulation toward a patient commitment to the multilateral management of more balanced structures. . . .⁸²

Hans Herbert Götz became a member of the editorial staff of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1949, after receiving his doctorate in economics from the University of Freiburg. Of special interest to Dr. Götz are the political implications of current issues of economics and trade between the United States and Europe.

. . . the process of European unification is not something for impatient people--and patience, it should be noted, is not one of the most prominent of America's national virtues.

. . . How does Europe, itself in the midst of turbulent change, view America? The answer will differ according to whether it is given by a professional in politics or by public opinion, however that may be defined. European public opinion about the United States is emotionally changed. It reacts in an excited, unfair, perhaps premature, frequently pathological, and arrogant manner. It is unsure and querulous. This, of course, has repercussions on the opinion-forming process of the professionals.

It is almost superfluous for a European to note that the Vietnam war, with its napalm bombs and defoliation, was the first war the United States was unable to win. Only Kissinger's patience and lucid calculation made the negotiation of a highly fragile armistice possible. Yet armistice is but another of the many concepts that have been called into question during the twentieth century: the arms are by no means silent on the battlefields of Vietnam. The kind of armistice obtained in Vietnam, from a Marxist standpoint, is but a stage on the road to total communist domination, which the United States would hardly be able to oppose. Has Kissinger understood this? Has the average American?

US war aims in Vietnam have certainly not been achieved, and America's sacrifices, in the opinion of many in West Europe, have been in vain.

. . . European observers are wondering whether a . . . process of repression is not to be detected in the United States. They also wonder whether a recapitulation and critical revision of American history may not be inevitable. The past record of the United States may no longer be seen by Americans as an exclusively glorious, honorable, and continuous struggle for freedom and democracy. That view may be eclipsed by the history of violence, oppression of minorities, lack of freedom, and corruption, and America may increasingly be portrayed as an ungracious and soulless consumers' society in which profit is the sole measure of value.

There is no doubt, however, that Europe underestimates not only the vital resources of the New World and its capacity for self-cleansing, but also the ruthlessness with which conflicts are brought into the open in America. Europe also fails to see that, for the majority of Americans, the old ideals have lost nothing of their attraction; that this majority has faith in its own powers of renewal; and that it will come to terms with the consequences of Vietnam, Watergate, Agnew, and the murders of the Kennedys and Martin Luther King as it did with McCarthy's witch hunt.

. . . Structural changes and recessions in farming are continuing at a rapid pace in both Europe and America . . . It would be American, in the positive sense of the word, to accept this challenge: to develop the new discipline of 'agrarian sociology' with boldness, drive, and intellectual impetus, and with a characteristic and enviable lack of prejudice to create a new agricultural future for the year 2000.

. . . A description of current Atlantic relations, moreover, is particularly unsatisfactory because 1973 and 1974, more than any other years in this century, witnessed incredible movements in world politics--a trend that is likely to continue. New elements are emerging. We are witnessing a dramatic, sometimes chaotic, creative process of political change.

A visible indicator of this change is an unprecedented series of almost endless international conferences, held separately and organized under various auspices, but all interrelated . . . Everything is being discussed and negotiated: environment, farm policy, strategic policy, energy policy. What topics have remained exclusively

domestic? Subject matter and methods in foreign and domestic politics have undergone fundamental changes. Would it be too bold to speak of a world domestic policy?

. . . European-American discussions on the future of the Atlantic partnership clearly have become, and will likely remain, difficult. The crisis in the Middle East might cause one of the deepest rifts of the twentieth century. It has already produced fundamental changes in relations between the industrial nations and the Third World. The Europeans have not cut a distinguished figure in the crisis. Their performance has been poor. And the United States has seen itself once again in the role of Atlas.

Europeans suspect that Americans want to keep Europe in a position of relative dependence so that the United States can maintain the advantage in negotiating future relations. They suspect Washington of wanting to force European political unity prematurely into a mold of America's choosing . . . The result has been an awkward dialogue of unequals in which the weaker, Europe, is striving for a position of relative equality with the stronger.

A further but related question is: will 1973-74 also mark the point at which France begins to realize at long last that the freedom of maneuver for medium-sized states--even for atomic mini-powers--is steadily shrinking . . . France seems incapable of imagining that it could share its sovereignty with anyone else. It would prefer to accept political isolation, if that is the price of grandeur. . . .⁸³

Yukio Matsuyama has been associated with Asahi Shimbun, Japan's leading newspaper, for eighteen years as a political reporter. He has served as its Washington correspondent, deputy foreign news editor in Tokyo, and, since 1971, as chief of the New York Bureau. In 1970 he acted as editorial director of The Pacific Rivals, a book on Japanese-American relations sponsored by Asahi Shimbun and published in the United States.

Neither Japan nor Canada was or is seeking American statehood. Many people in both countries, however--and indeed, throughout the world--would like to clamp stronger restraints on US foreign policy. The feeling is especially

strong in nations that see US policy as a sword of Damocles hanging perilously over their heads. Whether they like it or not, the citizens of many countries have to admit that, from time to time, their destiny is charted more by an American president and his foreign policy than by their own national leadership . . .

Americans must realize that if a foreigner's criticism of US foreign policy tends to be more severe than their own evaluation, the reason is that the United States often can place other nations in much greater jeopardy than it places itself. Americans must lend their ears to what other, less powerful nations say and recognize that other countries, too, are trying to develop national identities. That would be noblesse oblige for a great power in the nuclear age. Are America and Americans ready to be noble?

. . . Why is it, then that the United States has often been so clumsy and inflexible? Perhaps it is because too many lawyers, together with too many people with a legal appraisal of issues, dominate US foreign policy. (I am not, to be sure, using the term lawyer in a literal sense, but rather to represent an attitude, a frame of mind.) For legislatures and courts, lawyers are appropriate and unavoidable. But couldn't diplomacy do with fewer of them? So many lawyers, ex-lawyers, and would-be lawyers abound in Washington that to a foreign observer American society appears to be governed by attorneys.

Lawyers have an ingrained habit of staking out a ground of legitimacy. Once they have secured a domain of legal rights, they want to protect and exercise those rights to the utmost. From the viewpoint of the developing nations, however, such claims of legitimacy, vested rights, established order, status quo, and so on, are sources of doubt and dissatisfaction.

. . . Yet all legal points of view tend to be self-centered. For if an attorney sympathizes with the other side, he may lose his own case. And a lawyer is out to win, whatever the means, since that is why he is hired. So lawyers are easily tempted by expediency and short-term gains, they frequently lack a historical perspective, and they often pay dearly for this limitation when the case has seemingly been closed.

The points I have been discussing may be illustrated by the blunder made by American lawyers at Yalta. By arranging for the Soviets to invade Manchuria, they endorsed the expansionist idea of Stalinism, against which they then had to struggle for many years. And while struggling to

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contain communism, they in turn saddled other countries with corrupt, autocratic, militaristic regimes, which have been very expensive and embarrassing for the United States to maintain.

. . . In light of these dispositions, it is not surprising that most of America's diplomatic lawyers have tended to lump all Asian countries into one category.

. . . America expects the peace-oriented bureaucratic administrations of Japan to adopt the same political attitudes as the autocratic, militaristic governments of Taiwan and South Korea. Uniformity of expectations is one of the most remarkable defects of the American approach to other nations. This, in any case, is the view we Japanese have from our side of the Pacific.

America is a nation that has not tasted defeat in war. Its diplomacy may be compared with a man who, never having experienced a broken heart, is prone to give lectures of cold comfort to the young. Isn't compassion required to counsel wisely? Isn't there a compelling need to scrutinize a foreign nation from inside, that is, to look at its needs and desires as well as one's own?

. . . In any event, one thing seems clear. The old approach, relying on a sense of righteous justice, will not do. Unpleasant as it may sound to Americans, many Asian peoples regard the United States as having broken international law by bombing North Vietnam and invading Cambodia without declaring war. This is not the attitude simply of those Asians who are procommunist or anti-American, who would express such sentiments as a matter of routine, but rather of those Asians who are favorably disposed toward America and dismayed by such unseemly behavior . . .

I trust that it is apparent that these and other caustic comments and complaints are motivated by friendship, even affection, and are not those of an 'enemy.' But Americans must understand that the peoples of Asia no longer think the United States is qualified to trumpet the law and order theme--particularly after Watergate.

. . . I make no utopian proposals for the abolition of all US military presence overseas. But I do urge that, whenever any military measures must be taken, a strong balance be maintained in favor of civilian presence and graces. Significantly, according to a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in 1971, 39 percent of the Japanese people prefer to have their closest international relations with the United States, 21 percent with China, and only 4 percent with the Soviet Union.

. . . I find it difficult to understand why the United States tends to treat the United Nations as a stepchild, despite the fact that President Roosevelt was its father and President Wilson its grandfather. Perhaps the estrangement is a result, in some measure, of the American worship of success, the desire always to win in some literal sense, and the difficulty Americans still have in looking beyond the color of skin. The United States does not always win at the United Nations, and the nonwhite skins there enjoy increasing strength.

Success and winning, on the other hand, have provided their own ironies for the United States. The US containment policy succeeded in firmly entrenching the existing communist regimes, with the result that each great communist power is now out to contain the other and is seeking American support. And containment also succeeded in building up the prosperity of Japan and West Europe to the point that their trade policies are now considered a threat to the American economy.

In light of these experiences, Americans might consider a popular Japanese song which describes the secret of judo:

Katsuto omouna,
Omoeba makeyo.

The song says, enigmatically: 'Think to win and you think to lose.' It may be compared with a quotation from the Bible: 'Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it' (Luke 17:33).

. . . It is true that the United Nations cannot expect to prosper without continued strong support from the United States. But can the United States continue to prosper without strongly supporting the United Nations? The most disconcerting feature of American diplomacy is its egotism, its willingness to go it alone by making unilateral and nonconsultative decisions. All nations, of course, do this at times. But one expects something better of the United States, something more enlightened, since Washington is the chief spokesman and protector of the democracies. Yet the United States, as a traditional champion of freedom with no urge for territorial expansion, tends to believe that any means it chooses to employ is justified by good intentions--in short, that the end justifies the means.⁸⁴

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. . . The military supremacy of the Soviet Union and the United States exceeds by far the former relative supremacy of the British and leaves no doubt that great differences persist within the dominant pentagon itself. Only one nation, the United States, is first both economically and militarily. The Soviet Union, while in the first rank in the military area, lags behind in the economic. Europeans and the Japanese, outstanding in the economic area, are dependent in the military. Finally, China has a significant military capacity along with an economy still in a process of development.

This inequality promises the United States a role as rector of the new multipolar world. It offers Americans a clear path in a vast portion of the Third World and may enable them to orient the imperialist structure with an authority even greater than that once enjoyed by England. During the cold war and the subsequent period of peaceful coexistence, the United States aspired to the dominant role in maintaining world order. Today, Americans have recognized four additional great powers, but the United States seeks to retain an intermediary position as primus inter pares.

. . . Beyond the other reactions it provokes, the US strategy has created a radically different international situation. Faced with the task of describing the still rough outlines of this new world structure, I would group them as follows:

The new world is a world of facts and not of principles. In international relations, ideological loyalty and cultural identity are less and less important. What now counts is the effective negotiating power of each country, and this power derives from such verifiable data as military strength, exports, monetary reserves, and development projects . . .

The new world is open. With the ideological and strategic restrictions of the previous era lifted, each country is at liberty to expand its contacts in all directions. A friend is anyone with whom a mutually advantageous deal can be made. An enemy may turn up anywhere. Important

residues of the cold war remain, but the prevailing tendency is toward growing freedom and the formation of an extraordinarily intricate net of international relations.

The new world does not preclude competition or conflict. Although conducive to peaceful relations, the new world is also open to the struggle of some countries to achieve their objectives against the opposition of others . . . The new structure of international relations has not resulted in the cessation of the earlier struggle, but rather in the continuation of the same struggle under new conditions.

The new world limits competition and conflict. Conflicting relationships, like complementary ones, are flourishing, but they are, in the last instance, limited . . . Conflicts on a local scale will be permitted. At this level each nation counts only for itself. Should the conflicts jeopardize world harmony, however, they will be controlled. . . .

The new world is mobile. The pentagonal structure /US, USSR, Western Europe, Japan, China/ is neither static nor rigid. It allows struggles for regional advantage or primacy and provides a wide scope for the establishment of new hierarchies within the Third World. Countries such as India or Canada (which may be considered part of the Third World because it is not an integral part of the pentagon), Brazil or Mexico, Iran or Egypt, can seek positions of leadership close to the summit of the privileged five. Because of this mobility, the Third World, which conceptually projects a false impression of unity, will undergo significant changes.

The new world is a world of nations. It is not a world of religions or ideologies, nor of classes or alliances. It is a world in which each nation, large or small, is bent on obtaining the greatest advantage for itself. National interest stands first in the scale of values. Ideological variations may distinguish each nation; but a particular ideology is no longer regarded as a universal prescription. The United States has ceased being the protector of the free world and has ceased having a mission: it is simply like every other nation, reasonably selfish in outlook and reasonably ambitious in its objectives. The Soviet Union is no longer the homeland of socialism: it is a homeland, nothing more, that happens to be socialist. There are no more crusades or causes, only advantages and disadvantages, good transactions or bad transactions, according to the perspective of each nation . . .

The new world is 'one' world. There are no longer exclusive blocs or outcast nations . . . The historic function of empires and imperialisms is to make human relations universal. The imperialism of the present, which has arisen from the ideological thaw, extends to the limits of our planet.

Finally, the new world is one of scarcity. Ideological conflict is not giving way to an absence of tensions, but rather to a new tension, one that arises from a worldwide depletion of resources under the pressures of economic development and population explosion. The step from confrontation to negotiation is being taken in conditions of scarcity . . . In many instances the Third World is awakening to a new sensation of riches and power based on control of critical raw materials. The scarcity of resources in the face of overpopulation and overproduction may test the world's capacity for compromise perseverance.

The . . . features I have just described are, so to speak, the new rules of international order. But given these rules, how will the international system develop in the decade of the seventies?

The rules will, in themselves, be lasting. Some observers have tried to see the partial withdrawal of the United States as evidence of a cyclical pattern. They assert that the United States is now going through a period of introversion, which in due course will give way to the renewal of extroversion. This thesis cannot be lightly dismissed; it is backed by formidable historical precedents . . .

For the shift from a bipolar world to a multipolar one is not a superficial change: it is a structural change. A new international structure has been created. It might be shaken by unforeseen cataclysms, but in principle it is self-supporting. The bipolarity that came out of World War II tended toward self-destruction. The imperial claims made simultaneously by the United States and the Soviet Union bore all the characteristics of a drama that required a denouement, as with Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage. The structure has grown more complex with the rise of three new principal members, and the resulting multidirectional flexibility of agreements and conflicts now provides hundreds of channels to regulate change within the system . . .

The probable stability of this new structure permits significant changes in its content. There will likely be explosive developments in the international movement of techniques, goods, and people. The new age will be

governed by Hermes /the god of merchants and commerce/. All roads are open to exchanges. That does not mean that commerce must necessarily become more liberal . . .

In a world of such complexity, it will not be easy to identify friendship or enmity among nations. Friends in one sense, adversaries in another, nations will allow their network of international relations to diversify infinitely, even along apparently contradictory lines. The present relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is a model for the future. For it is a relationship of clashes and accords, tension and relaxation, a relationship that fundamentally has lost its unity. Each problem is dealt with on its own merits. The outcome is a heterogeneous mixture of negotiations, pressures, compromises, and frustrations. In the world of the seventies, this example will be widely repeated . . . But compatibility does not necessarily mean homogeneity. . .

In short, the new international system suggests great strength. The bipolar world admitted open defiance by large masses of human beings, from Indian neutralism to Maoism and Gaullism. The new system, however, contains within its limits the greatest concentration of energies in history. It imparts its own fortress-like strength to those who participate in it. If any tendency is foreseeable, therefore, it would be the strengthening of the status quo and, as an inevitable counterpart, the diminution of rational violence. For if rational violence is defined as the use of coercion to attain a viable goal, the growing universal desire for peace is narrowing the field for armed prophets. It is no longer possible even to dream of destroying the powerful system now coming into being. Violence, of course, will persist-- but mostly in its irrational forms. Rational violence will be less practicable than before, and will be relegated to revolutions against especially weak regimes and to local wars under particularly irrelevant conditions. The aggressive instinct that we have not yet completely overcome will still reach its peak in sizable urban concentrations and will follow unsuspected paths. But in a world that minimizes traditional manifestations of violence, violence will become an illness.

The concept of scarcity, too, will take on new meaning. The scarcity of scientific, technical, and organizational talents provided the so-called developed world its present advantage. But the developed world must now cope with an increasing shortage of raw materials and food. Wherever future scarcity reaches critical levels, there will be

sellers bent on maximizing their ability to exert pressure. The case of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) is only a portent of what may occur elsewhere.

The Third World, the repository for a substantial part of global natural resources, has suffered two kinds of subjugation. In the nineteenth century, when the first industrial revolution was critically dependent upon access to raw materials, the policy of colonialism assured that these materials would be available at good prices. In the twentieth century the colonies won political emancipation, but the second industrial revolution again kept the supplier nations in a subordinate role by means of an international market controlled by the buyers. Now, however, we are witnessing the birth of an international market in which the sellers are increasingly important, not only because rapidly growing consumption is hastening the return of scarcity, but because suppliers are organizing and are working out concerted pressure tactics. The Third World thus tends to turn into a salesmen's association that seeks to raise the value of its goods in the world market . . .

But despite this unifying tendency, the Third World will continue to be differentiated into a vast number of intermediate and decidedly minor nations. Each of the intermediate nations--India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Mexico, Argentina, Australia, and so on--will develop its own micro-imperialism and, in turn, will be restrained by its neighbors. As a consequence, the very concept of the Third World will undergo a complete transformation.

Among the Big Five, Japan and the European Nine will have to make the greatest efforts to stay on top. China is comfortably placed in the least ostentatious sector, and from that location can only expect to grow in influence. The United States and the Soviet Union retain decisive positions from the bipolar period. Japan, on the other hand, in a world situation marked by a return of scarcity, will have to face anew its old challenge of a lack of raw materials and food. And the decisive economic advantage of the Nine may well be squandered by their continued lack of unity and political organization.

. . . we are entering a new world. We should not be surprised, therefore, if the 'three worlds' theory undergoes substantial changes . . . Multipolarity is creating a new set of categories . . . We are . . . witnesses to a sort of explosion in the development of political models, which are fragmented into numerous individual and nontransferable experiences.

Nevertheless, within this expanding pluralism some general tendencies stand out. In West Europe, parliamentary government is giving ground to the open presidential form of the French, or to the concealed model of the British: power is being concentrated. In the United States, the Nixon crisis marks a reversion from an inordinately strong presidency--from a government that almost eclipsed such traditional checks and balances to presidential power as Congress, party, cabinet, press--to a better equilibrium: power is being dispersed. In Latin America and the Third World, the military experiments are abating either because of the emerging institutionalization of military revolutions or because of the strengthening of civilian regimes: power is being consolidated. The Soviet Union and East Europe, on their part, are trying to link their old ideological authoritarianism with a new economic flexibility: power is being modernized.

Finally, the state prevails everywhere . . . A look at the contemporary world can only reveal universal reaffirmation of the state in the midst of an era of internal agitation and external interdependency. The adversaries of the state, within or without, are losing hope of transcending it and of moving in the direction of globalism or a new individualism.

All of these features are combined in the countenance of Pax Americana . . . By its action the United States has saved the world from American excesses. This prudence, this deliberate moderation of past enthusiasm by the most important imperialist power of our time, provides hope for a lasting peace. It may not necessarily be a just peace, but at least it offers the possibility of pursuing the objectives of justice and change within a stable international system.

. . . The United States is retreating from the position of almost exclusive dominion it once held in Latin America. This withdrawal, epitomized by the shift from the Alliance for Progress to a policy of low profile and the replacement of Kennedy's idealism by Nixon's pragmatism, is only partial. The United States retains its presence in the region through its investments and loans, its diplomacy and military pacts. Nevertheless, there is room for others to share the US position, which until now was unique, incomparable. Primus inter pares in the world, the United States has also come to be primus inter pares in Latin America. We now can see the expanding presence of the European Community, the Soviet Union, and Japan. In addition, the influence of the larger Latin

American nations is growing, while on a national scale each country is trying to increase its own capacity for decision. Domination solely by the North Americans is giving way to a more complex situation. Latin America is reducing its dependence on one source by diversifying its ties among various power centers and at the same time is enhancing its own capacity for action on both a regional and national scale. . . .⁸⁵

Canadian John W. Holmes became director general of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1960, after seventeen years in the Canadian Department of External Affairs, with service in London, Moscow, and at the United Nations.

The role of Americans in world affairs has shifted from being decisive to being merely crucial. The people of the United States do not need to be told by a foreigner that their country's primacy is not what it once was. On the other hand, US military and economic power is still of such magnitude that in or out of control it can make or break the crudely evolving international community. And the United States retains a capacity for leadership of a different order from that of sectarian powers like the Soviet Union and China, or an ambivalent power like Japan, or an imaginary power like Europe.

Consequently, watching Americans wrestle with the dumbfounding events of the past few years has been considerably more than a spectator sport. An increasing awareness that a distinction must be made between the US government and the American people and that the latter may be an ever more important factor in determining the shape of US foreign policy has caused not a little consternation among foreign observers.

. . . foreigners need to think more responsibly about the kind of place they want the United States and its people to occupy in the world and not just about how they want the US government to behave toward their particular country. In such calculations, the basic design unfolded in the Nixon Doctrine (which might accurately be termed the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine) cannot be ignored, particularly as it appears to be a design for a new era rather than for a single administration and seems to represent a rough national consensus on principles, in spite of vigorous debate on practice. The fact that it has been well received, on the whole--albeit grudgingly and

uncertainly--in the First, Second, and Third Worlds adds to its authority.

The Doctrine is in many ways what the international foreign policy establishment ordered. They disparage it, naturally, but that is their habit. It avoids extremes, as Europeans and other allies have constantly recommended. It recognizes America's inescapable responsibility for leadership, but combines this with a plea for a more equitable sharing not only of burdens but of policy-making and responsibility. As expressed by Secretary of State Kissinger, the Doctrine sounds less pious than other statements of US foreign policy because it is based on some acknowledgment of past error--by previous administrations, of course. It accepts detente as the basis of progress, along with a recognition that detente depends on the maintenance of military balance. Yet military balance is seen as an equilibrium different from the classical balance of power in that the latter involved a continuing maneuver for advantage whereas the new idea is that of consensus, of each power having a stake in the structure.

. . . There are old-fashioned aspects to the Nixon Doctrine which give it strength. But its assumptions about the scope of government are somewhat anachronistic. In the past twenty years, people have tended to believe that most power is ultimately controlled by national governments. Smaller countries, which have had painful experiences with foreign exploitation of their natural resources, have long been aware that this belief is wrong. Control over societies is slipping out of the hands of governments. That fact has become increasingly clear in the United States as well.

. . . Many people in the United States, recalling good works like the Marshall Plan, have difficulty understanding the resentment caused by the activities of US corporations in other countries. The aggressive behavior of such corporations, which Europeans among others would like to bring under closer control, is usually ignored by the US government. But Washington is, of course, ready to protest vigorously if other, less enlightened governments impose restrictions or seek compensation. For example, the US Treasury has berated Canada for wanting a favorable balance of trade with the United States to compensate for the unfavorable balance of payments attributable to extensive American investment in Canada. The latter, presumably, is an act of God.

If the US government would say frankly that it can't control its international and multinational corporations

with headquarters in the United States, that would be understood. The United States can cooperate in efforts already proposed in the United Nations to establish some equitable supervision of the behavior of those international economic enterprises that are now subject to no elected authority at all. . . .

Nationalization, either by the corporation's parent country or by the host country, offers no solution, for nationalized enterprises tend to be more dangerously pugnacious. Multinational and international corporations are, along with exploitation of the seabeds or satellite communications, subjects for negotiation. Some regulation should be possible provided the United States will broaden its definition of the economic forces that can and should be controlled. That would mean, however that Americans would have to abandon the view that the expansion of US economic activity abroad is a form of benevolent and rational internationalism, whereas the protective restrictions of other countries represent emotional chauvinism.

. . . In fact, US uncertainties over energy and the balance of trade or payments are more troubling to most countries than fears of American military pressure. Other nations are much more inclined to worry about the desperate things that Americans in adversity will consider necessary to preserve their own interests.

. . . The United States is still unique. It can work as an ad hoc partner with many countries, but it is not cut out to be an ally. No easy formula of burden sharing will enable the United States to avoid the leadership that its military capacity as a superpower and its enormous, even if waning, economic advantage force upon it. In the Nixon Doctrine there does seem to be a clear idea of what this situation requires--leadership chastened by experience, more sensitive to the interests as well as the prejudices and preoccupations of other countries, but with the United States remaining primus super pares nevertheless. The concept of burden sharing, however, gets in the way of clear thinking. It is not the idea of sharing that is misconceived. The problem is to find a satisfactory definition of burden.

The origin of this dilemma may be traced to the Creation, the structure for peace conceived in the late forties that all freedom-loving states were to uphold. The participants believed in a sense of responsibility according to capacity, a concept that was expressed in the United Nations Charter and later made more explicit in the NATO agreement, which included a common design,

a common strategy, and a pledge to contribute to common strategy, and a pledge to contribute to common security according to means. To this enterprise the United States contributed more than its fair share. It also obtained more than its fair share of policy-making, the consequence less of arrogance than necessity. The big decisions--on hydrogen bombs, for example, on military intervention in Korea, which the allies approved, or in Vietnam, which on the whole they did not--were made by the United States, because it alone had the capacity to act decisively.

For the United States to call on others now to share the burden ignores the fact that in the realm of security there is no equality, and Washington quite properly does not want to encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States alone can conduct SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. In principle, it seems fair to ask that Japan, the EEC, or Canada spend and do more in the cause of collective security, but when one examines what particular countries or regions can do, there are more questions than answers . . .

The responsibility for moral leadership among Western nations still rests primarily, though by no means exclusively, on the United States. In the Third World, the West European powers as a community can have an even greater impact than the United States because of their vast aggregate resources. West Europe's power of initiative, however, is limited by its uncertain political authority.

. . . In economic matters . . . it can be argued that Americans have still to achieve adulthood, that their demands for economic hegemony are the reflection of colonial attitudes. There is immaturity in the idea that a country with the huge foreign investment of the United States must continue to have a favorable balance of trade, the result of which can only be to ruin those countries that owe it dividends. It is also unacceptable to argue that such a return is due the United States as compensation for all it has done to save the world, from Cambodia to Palestine.

No prudent nation with a stake in U. S. strength would want to see that strength jeopardized by a drastic decline in the American standard of living. But other people will be alienated if they are expected to help maintain the present extravagant level of American consumption of the world's limited resources . . . For the first time in at least a century, Americans may be forced to accept a standard of living lower than that of a number of other

countries, because in a desperate situation each country gives priority to the needs of its own citizens. What this might do to radicalize US foreign policy is disquieting . . .

To prevent a collapse of the new structure of peace, the United States must recognize that it is still a country of such devastating strength militarily and economically that it can ruin lesser countries without intending to.

Americans of good will seldom realize the extent to which their country unwittingly intimidates other nations. In some situations . . . too much attention is perhaps paid both by Americans and foreigners to cases where the United States has sounded intimidating and even acted accordingly, and too little consideration is given to the extraordinary tradition of restraint that has also characterized recent American foreign policy. Friends and allies ought to encourage this tradition to make sure it survives the temptations of the present US malaise.

The only international structure broad and supple enough to provide the United States the opportunity it needs to deal with its unequals is the United Nations, and it is most unfortunate that successive State of the World reports have encouraged the prejudices that have brought that organization into disrepute.

. . . a great country like the United States ought not to fear championing the UN cause. The adolescent period when the United Nations was regarded as a failed world government, futilely seeking to increase its capacity to legislate and enforce, has been superseded. Out of dire necessity international bodies, permanent or ad hoc, must seek rules to which as many nations as possible will subscribe in the interests of survival. This is a functionalist concept that eschews grand design in favor of results. Lesser powers, it must be admitted, strongly support this approach because it is the only way they can muster a challenge to the great powers--over pollution of the seas or potential problems in the exploration of outer space, for example.

In some areas, it would seem in the interest of the United States to avoid entanglement in international regulations. But, as in the case of the hijacking, there are also many problems with which the United States can deal only by international agreement. What the rest of the world fears in a new American isolationism is not so much US withdrawal from the responsibilities of the

UN Security Council as the effect of the absence of the United States in efforts to promote more civilized international behavior. If the United States continues to participate fully in the world community, it will undoubtedly have to accept regulations that some members of Congress will consider unfavorable to US interests. The rest of the world also will have to come to terms with limitations on national sovereignty. But it is the humility--and the example--of a superpower that sets precedents.

. . . A crucial role is harder to chart than a decisive one. In the age of alliances, the United States tried to play the role of ally, for which it was unsuited. Alliance was supposed to be a means of sharing a burden, but the burden was and is incalculable and unsharable. The United States remains a unique power, militarily (although not economically) further than ever from equality with its allies. It must continue as a lone power, recognizing that an acceptance of this position does not require alienation from special associates, such as the Atlantic or Latin American allies, Japan, or Australia. Henry Kissinger has rightly said that the influence of the United States, for good or evil, 'will be measured by the world's judgment of our constancy and our self-confidence' and that 'the structure of peace we envisaged would . . . be sustained by a growing realization on the part of all nations that they have a stake in stability and that this stability is ensured by acting from a sense of justice and with moderation.' The challenge for the United States, a generation after World War II, is not to recreate the world in a new American image, assigning roles to others, but to play its own leading role in managing a disorderly and frustrating world that no single nation can aspire to control. . . .⁸⁶

The perspective of those foreigners, who express various degrees of reassurance that it is the United States that is the nation in the position of primacy, may have been put most succinctly by the British journalist Henry Fairlie in 1965:

If I sleep soundly in my bed at night, if I expect my children to be able to lead peaceful and fruitful lives, it is because I count myself and them as citizens of the American empire.⁸⁷

Not all citizens of foreign countries adopt indulgent attitudes towards America. Some are irritated by the pride they claim to observe as America's outstanding characteristic.

Of the seven deadly sins, the one most likely to be associated with primacy, with a Number One Nation, is pride; and a number of instances are cited throughout this study. Such possible association with a nation at the apex of international hierarchy does not, however, exhaust the potential association of one or more of the deadly sins with each and every nation inevitably cast in some international pecking order. If pride seems naturally associated with Number One, covetousness and envy seem naturally associated with some of those in statuses other than Number One.

Even outside of questions of sin, virtue, and grace, envy and suspicion, as we mentioned earlier, may be cultivated as portions of international behavior towards Number One, on the part of other members of the international network. One recalls de Gaulle's basic tenet that, no matter which nation, friend or foe, turns out to be dominant, all other nations should gang up against it.

An illustrative incident occurred at the United Nations, where bigness is disliked and regarded by some smaller states as immoral. A particular voting result appeared to be an expression of gratuitous opposition to the United States, for no reason other than to oppose something favored by the big United States. In this particular vote, all five permanent members of the Security Council abstained; only the ten temporary members voted. One observer, A, asked a gleeful representative, B, of a middle power why he was so elated, and the following (freely rendered) exchange took place:

B: Why, this was the most moral vote ever expressed in the UN, because no big power participated in the vote. Is it not satisfying when morality triumphs!

A: Are you saying, do you actually hold, that America, simply because it is big, is immoral?

B: Certainly! It is impossible for a nation as large as the United States to be in the right, to be in possession of the moral side in a dispute with a smaller nation!

A: A fantastic perspective! However, let me put aside America's status for a moment and pursue one further relationship, that between you and one of the smallest members of the United Nations. Let us observe that the degree of your nation's preponderance over the Maldive Islands, for example, is considerably greater than the degree of American preponderance over your nation. Are you prepared to concede then that in any dispute with each other, your nation will be arguing an immoral position, and that the Maldive Islands will always be right because they are smaller?

B: But of course not! You are carrying out to absurdity a perfectly reasonable principle. Such equations of morality and immorality only hold valid in relationships between the United States, the Number One Nation, and other nations!

A: Why is that so? How can such an argument be justified?

B: Sir, to me the soundness of the argument is perfectly apparent. I regret, however, that I am already late for a speaking engagement at a luncheon given by Hospitality America, and cannot pursue the subject further at this time.

Yet, no matter how eccentric are various negative appraisals of the United States, there often appears a foreign champion of American status and performance.

Such a one occurred, for example, in 1953, when Le Monde chided its countrymen for complaining about the presence of American troops in France, as part of the NATO buildup: "In 1914 and 1939,

we complained because the Americans didn't come to our aid fast enough. Today they anticipate our wishes. Why are we complaining?"

Another example was provided in 1973, when a Canadian journalist, Duncan Sinclair, objected to disparagement of America over its troubles with inflation and recession:

. . . this Canadian thinks it's time to speak up for the Americans as the most generous, and possibly the least appreciated people on the face of this earth.

As long as 60 years when I first started to read newspapers I read of floods on the yellow river of the Yangtze. Well, who rushed in with men and money to help? The Americans did . . .

Germany, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Britain and Italy were lifted out of the debris of war by the Americans who poured in billions of dollars and forgave other billions in debts. None of those countries is today paying even the interest on its remaining debts to the United States.

When the franc was in danger of collapsing in 1956, it was the Americans who propped it up. And their reward was to be insulted and swindled on the Streets of Paris. I was there and I saw it.

When distant cities are hit by earthquakes, it's the United States that hurries to help. Managua, Nicaragua, is one of the most recent examples.

So far this spring, 59 American communities have been flattened by tornados and nobody helped. The Marshall Plan, the Truman policy all pumped billions upon billions of dollars into discouraged countries. Now the newspapers in those countries are writing about the decadent, war-mongering Americans. I'd like to see just one of those countries that is gloating over the erosion in the United States dollar build its own airplanes. . . . Why do all international lines except Russia fly American planes? Why does no other land on earth even consider putting a man or woman on the moon? . . .

When Americans get out of this bind--as they will--who would blame them if they said 'to hell with the rest of the world. Let someone else buy the bonds, let someone else build or repair foreign dams, or design foreign buildings that won't shake apart in earthquakes.' . . .

I can name you 5,000 times when the Americans raced to the help of other people in trouble. Can you name me even one time when someone else raced to the Americans in trouble? . . . Our neighbors (Americans) have faced it alone and I am one Canadian who is damned tired of hearing them kicked around. They'll come out of this thing with their flag high, and when they do they are entitled to thumb their noses at the lands who are gloating over their present trouble. . . .⁸⁸

What with all the woe-saying about the United States that has become endemic in various international and domestic centers and circles, it has been increasingly difficult to employ a broad perspective. However, in the spring of 1975, the Economist of London advanced a remarkable conclusion, derived from contrasting world leadership during the first three quarters of the 20th Century. Holding that the first and second quarters were failures, each experiencing a depression and a world war, the Economist concluded that the third quarter, during which the United States was the world leader, was a relative success. General prosperity, rising living standards, the liberation of colonies worldwide, no world war, and increasing concern for human values--all characterized the third quarter, when the United States acted, as not only the best quarter of this century but possibly the best quarter in world history.⁸⁹

One theme that has emerged from time to time in the foregoing appraisals is that the world expects more equitable, more generous, more cooperative behavior from the United States than from, say, the world's only other superpower. Salvador de Madariaga wrote in 1973:

The core of the present crisis is one of faith and belief in the sincerity of the powerful. Thus defined, the crisis owes a good deal of its gravity to the United

States, not because her citizens are more wicked than those of other nations, but because they are more powerful. The world has come to be more exacting towards them, as clearly shown by the fact that the only citizens of comparable power in the aggregate--those of the Soviet Union--count but little in this context. The higher the tower, the deeper the foundations. The world has cause to worry lest the people of the United States have not delved deep enough to rise to the full stature of their greatness.⁹⁰

Wrote Oswald Johnston, in the Los Angeles Times in April 1975, after surveying foreign correspondents worldwide: ". . . the United States is still recognized to be the dominant economic and military power in the world."⁹¹ It is paradoxical that, in some respects,

America's allies at times seem to have more faith in America than America does in itself. If anything, it is the paroxysm of self-doubt and introspection that Vietnam threatens to release in the United States that worries the Europeans more than does the fall of Vietnam.

Part of this is based on Europe's need to rely on the United States as the dominant power in the West. . .⁹²

For its July/August issue in 1975, the journal SKEPTIC employed the theme: "America, Still No. 1?" The editors wrote:

There are several burdens that go along with being Number One in anything: (a) there is nowhere to go but down, (b) Number Two will try hard to put you there, and (c) history is on the side of Number Two. Now, thirty years after our ranking was certified through World War II, we sense that our hold on the top spot is more tenuous than it was. Some even question whether America is, indeed, still Number One. . . . Still Number One? We are. But maybe that isn't the right question. Perhaps we ought to be asking what being Number One means in today's world.⁹³

So far, we have been endeavoring here to address that very question, among others, and we shall continue to address it in the following chapters. Meanwhile, a final citation is offered, of Henry Brandon, chief correspondent in America for the Sunday Times of London:

A high American official when asked last week if he had been busy reassuring foreign ambassadors about the reliability of the United States as an ally replied: 'Not really, it was they who tried to reassure me about their governments' continued confidence in the United States and suggested that we should have more confidence in ourselves.'

. . . This confidence is based on the continued unrivalled overall power of the United States. That power has remained unaffected by events in the Middle East and Indochina. The United States remains the only military superpower in the non-communist world. The 200,000-strong armed forces in Europe continue to represent the critical numerical and psychological factor in the East-West power equilibrium. The American nuclear arsenal still provides the ultimate protection of the allies.

. . . American economic power with its staggering amount of foreign assets amounting to \$150 billion also remains unaffected. The Soviet Union, although rebuffed by Congress, continues to hanker for American credits, American industrial machinery and know-how. The dollar may be weak these days on the international monetary markets, but that has nothing to do with the latest diplomatic setbacks. It is still the only world currency left that can sustain international trade.

. . . American cultural power, once relying mainly on foreign imports, has not only become a net exporter, but has established an influence on the arts, the theater and on publishing that should not be underrated in the overall balance of American influence in the world today.

All four, American military, economic, financial and cultural power, add up to a vast amount of political influence.

There is little likelihood that the fall of South Vietnam will affect the assessment of American power in Moscow or Peking, even though both are bound to indulge in a certain amount of glee. Both have shown a steadier view of American deterrent and staying powers than have many Americans. They will also continue to maintain their respect for American economic power.

. . . American influence . . . is not only based on being the strongest military and economic power in the world but also on the policies that govern the use of this power.

. . . More likely than not, the basic premises will remain solid except that the era of American omnipresence, the willingness to exercise power alone and the idea that the United States can control events are passing into history.⁹⁴

Still another British observer, Peter Jenkins, correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, reported on a 1974 period spent in the United States:

The United States at the moment is an uneasy place, fearful of its economic future, lacking confidence in its Government, no longer serene in its expectations of God's plenty. But the visitor returning to a small sinking island called Great Britain is less moved by these American anxieties than by the country's resilience, immense wealth, wasteful luxury, and disorderly, undirected, but indestructible strength.⁹⁵

Thus, it appears that we may fairly summarize foreign appraisals of American status and performance in this way: except for the Communist world, and except for ambivalent and sporadic animosities in the Third World, the United States is generally regarded by foreign peoples as unquestionably the world's Number One nation. Even in the Communist world, the facts of American power (if not primacy) are apprehended realistically.

In military terms, the two superpowers are not mirror images of each other; but in the scales that measure overall military deterrence and potential, the United States and the Soviet Union are perceived as being about equal. As seen from abroad, such advantage as the United States now possesses is expected to decline, and such disadvantages as the Soviet Union now suffers is expected to be overcome (whether change will actually occur in these directions remains to be seen).

In development, as distinguished from power, the United States has no rival among major nations. In respect for its institutions, values, and performance, America has been considered for over a century in many foreign quarters as the pacesetter and bellwether of mankind's strivings toward just societies; in many quarters of the world, America is still so considered. Even among peoples who resent international "leadership" and who would prefer that the world do without it, they evidently prefer that, if leadership must be exercised by some powerful nation, the only nation acceptable in that role is the United States. The Soviet Union, the only possible rival of the United States for world leadership, is anathema to all but a handful of the world's peoples outside the Soviet Bloc.

Thus, while the meaning of "being Number One" may be changing in important (not all) respects, it appears that the United States, in the eyes of the rest of the world, remains Number One.

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<u>Favorable Words and Phrases</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Other Western Nations</u>
The Use of Science for the Good of Mankind	73%	5%	--
Ending the Production of Nuclear Weapons	68	2	--

<u>Favorable Words and Phrases (cont)</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>Other Western Nations</u>
Economic Security for the Common People	64%	5%	10%
Economic Opportunity	61	5	3
The Use of Atoms for Peace	57	8	8
Freedom for the Individual	36	14	5
<u>Unfavorable Words and Phrases</u>			
Imposing Own Ideology on the Countries	16%	55%	--
Stirring Revolution in Other Countries	12	53	7
Domination of Other Countries Economically	11	71	2
Imperialism	7	43	28

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I don't care for the United States to be a powerful nation. But I would like for us to be a good nation.

- 58 year old wife of
Deep South farmer

In combining the moral absolutes with the inevitable relative values, the American people are often possessed of a double force. They are not thus saved from error. Their balance, one way or another, is not always perfect. But the position of America in the world today does not suggest that they are always wrong.

- Dexter Perkins
"American Foreign Policy and
the Critics"

CHAPTER 5

DOMESTIC PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES STATUS

General

We have presented objective rankings of United States attributes relative to those other nations, and evaluations of United States attributes, as perceived by foreign observers. In this chapter, we explore rankings and evaluations of United States attributes as perceived by Americans themselves.

Do most Americans seek primacy among nations? Do they see themselves as particularly worthy or deserving of primacy? Do they see America as especially competent to conduct international affairs, to exercise a role of leadership? Do they see themselves and their nation as on the way up, or on the way down? How do they feel about the rest of the world?

Attempts to fathom the character of America and its people are without end. We cited in the previous chapter a number of foreigners who have felt impelled to disseminate their analyses of what makes Americans tick. Nor have our native shores been barren of analysts, benign and fierce alike. Few foreigners have matched the contumely poured on the American "booboisie" and certain American institutions by the so-called "Sage of Baltimore," Henry L. Mencken. He was preceded and followed by a fairly full procession of native critics--probably mostly pro, certainly not sparse in con--Henry Adams, Frederick Jackson Turner, Margaret Mead, David Potter, David

Riesman, William H. Whyte, Jr., Seymour Martin Lipset, Robin Williams, and many others.¹

It may serve as a logical transition from the previous chapter to this one, from foreign to domestic perceptions, to cite the American Franz M. Joseph's 1959 insight on interrelationship between the two vantage points:

An international policy that has to confront every issue with a view to its global implications cannot but baffle those who look upon that issue more narrowly. Even in a limited situation, involving one country alone, the actions of the United States are likely to be misconstrued by one faction or another. Its help is needed in many parts of the world, needed and implored, and, human nature being what it is, the need is resented, and the help as well; it is many times a question of 'damned if you do and damned if you don't,' and the justifications given for the damnings contribute little toward clarification. The world's understanding of United States actions in international affairs is not furthered by the country's characteristically improvising approach to problems, its deep-rooted pragmatism, which makes it difficult for others to discern a set program or a reassuring consistency.

The apparent lack of consistency goes very deep. Stark contradictions in the people's nature and behavior make it possible for any preconception, any observation, to be confirmed. 'Americans' are materialistic, tending toward a quantitative or dollar measure of all values, yet they are also motivated by strong ethical principles. Resolutely competitive, yet altruistic. Addicted to the mediocre or crude or even vulgar in what they enjoy, or tolerate, but also creators of world-acclaimed works in literature, architecture, and other arts. Violent, but with a strong belief in law and justice. Conformist, almost uniform, in their behavior and values, but staunchly individualistic. The list could be indefinitely extended. A foreigner who tries to comprehend this tumultuous complexity is not at all helped by the country's own stereotypes about itself, the shibboleths that it continues to repeat without thought of their validity.²

It may be as difficult as Joseph, an international lawyer, says it is for foreigners to understand America. It may be, on the other hand, even more difficult for Americans to understand ourselves. So pluralistic, individualistic, and pragmatic are Americans that any generalizations about Americans are likely to be largely untrue. John Farrell and Asa Smith, in editing a distinguished collection of essays in 1967, wrote:

The pragmatic bent of Americans, their bias against the theoretical and abstract and in favor of the practical and concrete, is a commonplace. Lionel Trilling in The Liberal Imagination put it well:

In the American metaphysic, reality is always material reality, hard, resistant, uniformed, impenetrable, and unpleasant. And that mind is alone felt to be trustworthy which most resembles this reality by most nearly reproducing the sensations it affords.

In this view, theorizing only serves to obscure reality, to distract the observer from the 'hard, cold facts' that alone will enable him to grasp reality.³

Domestic perceptions and evaluations of American society and American prototypes are, naturally, heavily influenced by American writers. Both foreign and domestic literary critics have observed over time that the overall tone of American literature is negative, pessimistic, alienated. The eminent American critic, Alfred Kazin, wrote almost thirty years ago:

'Who is there to deny that for fifty years the ethos of American literature at its best has been resignation, attack, escape, but so rarely acceptance? Who is there to deny that the very frame of American writing in the modern era, the very effort to create a responsible literature in America appropriate to a new age, rests upon a tradition of enmity to the established order, more

significantly a profound alienation from it? Modern American literature was born in protest, born in rebellion, born out of the sense of loss and indirection that was imposed upon the new generations out of the realization that the old formal culture--the 'new England idea'--could no longer serve. Yet for fifty years, through all the progressions of fashion, the welding of America into the world scene, the growth of the modern movement unforeseen by those who helped--stumblingly, like all their generation--to build it, its spiritual history remains curiously the same. Modern American writers have 'covered' the country exhaustively, steeped themselves in its reality; but there is a sense in which they have never learned to live in it.⁴

David Potter insists that almost all theories about the American character fall into two principal categories: one, first propounded by Jefferson, describes the modal American as an individualist with profound idealistic impulses; the other, formulated earliest by de Tocqueville, sees the typical American as a conformist with very strong materialistic drives--dedication to equality is included in both orientations.⁵

David Boorstin feels that we are driven to certain quests in American life--for novelty, for community, for autonomy, and, stemming from the interaction between technology and democracy, a belief in solutions, such as the belief that democracy is attainable. Our experience should have taught us, says Boorstin, that in the long run of human history there are no solutions, only problems.⁶

Whether or not this insight can be widely substantiated, it has not dissuaded, and will probably not dissuade, Americans in general from continuing to believe that solutions do exist and can be found if one is relentlessly determined to find them.

Some aspects of America's experience are not inconsistent with a drive for parity, if not primacy. As Seymour Martin Lipset termed it, America was the first new nation, created deliberately with "instant" status among nations. All other nations, up to that time, had emerged out of cultural and ethnic (and a few forced political) groupings that had existed and had been identified over a long time.

This new nation was not of one single, homogeneous culture. While the English heritage became predominant early, there always remained large pockets of residual, fluctuating French, Dutch, Swedish, and Spanish influence; and cultural inputs from still other sources came with successive waves of immigrants.

Howard Mumford Jones comments, for example, on the fate of Spanish cultural influence:

Into the New World a rich and complex Old World culture--cultures would be the better word . . . flowed from Europe westward in great parallel streams. One of these, Latin, Catholic, and Mediterranean, spread over South America, Central America, Mexico, and most of the Caribbean, and at one time or another reached as far north on the one coast as the Carolinas, and on the other, San Francisco Bay. The organization of this culture, Spanish and Portuguese, was, as it were, sui generis . . . Latin American culture developed an economy, an educational system, and a set of social values not found in British North America . . . American studies as usually pursued ignore this culture of the South. Americanists do not commonly read either Spanish or Portuguese, know little or nothing about Latin-American history, and are still more ignorant of its great cultural achievements . . . /yet/ One-third of the continental area of this republic was for a long period, as modern history goes, under the governance of Spanish viceroys or of Mexico.⁷

Cultural assimilations proceeded unevenly, for Americans were busy taming a continent; and various cultural inputs to the so-called

"melting pot" were absorbed unevenly, such as the incorporation of French centers within the Mississippi valley and region, and the incorporation of Spanish influence, as Florida, the Southwest, and the west coast were added to the Union.

Culture and Character

As the earliest sustained integrated culture, the New England, or English-speaking, or WASP, culture set early standards that persisted long and permeated a wide area of America.⁸ At the same time, some spokesmen for established foreign cultures regarded the United States as a newcomer, a tyro, a latecomer, a scrap personality, a raw parvenu; and many Americans were self-conscious about their lack of tradition, about the heterogeneity of their culture, about their primitiveness in the arts. In 1820, the eminent English critic Sydney Smith dismissed American pretensions with the question: "Who reads an American book?" It took almost a generation for Emerson to respond in 1837 with "The American Scholar," a declaration of independence of American from European culture.

As noted, there was a continent to tame, and many Americans were busy about it; the transition from frontier to civilization took time and focused effort. Gradually, many Americans in earlier-settled areas sought to develop a more civilized society; some cultivated what Santayana called "The Genteel Tradition," the endeavor to imitate, as Americans conceived it, the life style of the British landed aristocracy. In the terms of the well-known Avis advertisement, because they perceived themselves to be culturally inferior,

they "tried harder." To be sure, there were many individual Americans who refused to concede any cultural inferiority at all.

Self-conscious attempts to put behind them any categorizations as raw and uncultured added a layer of social and aesthetic ambition to other forms of dynamism that came to be demanded by, and associated with, life in America. The exercise of energy paid off; to the energetic citizens of this expanding nation, horizons seemed unlimited. The culture certainly was pluralistic; some themes were more influential than others; some themes were opposed by others; and there were usually a number of contending strains. And deeply ingrained became the egalitarian principle; one man might have or receive or gain more than another, but that did not make him better. Stratification emerged, as it does in all societies; but in America, aspects of class were muted and never achieved towering proportions.

Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect a strong competitive strain in the American psyche, on all levels--personal, group, and national. Americans sought to put their shortages and shortcomings behind them and to achieve status as good as that of anybody else. There was a will to achieve status.

Of course, no matter what their desire or will was directed toward, without the material resources and the other advantages that America enjoyed, the United States would not have achieved primacy among nations--perhaps not even parity. But all the necessary ingredients blended--resources, external and internal events, conditions, timing, and will (and including, at times, choices of roads not taken). So that one may choose to argue either chance or purpose

as primarily responsible; but both contributed to the emergence of America to its position of power and influence.

Professor Kenneth Boulding, an economist with broad vision, describes a familiar perspective toward American society:

. . . American society up to now has stressed the idea of a 'melting pot' and has sought to create through public education a uniform culture. With increased affluence and increased political skill, this ideal can now be called into question. Can we now invent a 'mosaic' society, composed of many small subcultures, each of which gives to its participants a sense of community and identity which is so desperately needed in a mass world, and which can at the same time remain at peace with its neighbors and not threaten to pull the society apart? . . .⁹

Margaret Mead emphasizes the renewing influence of repeated waves of diverse immigrants, and some effects on the generations, and partly echoes the perceptions of Geoffrey Gorer, cited in the previous chapter. The modal American, she believes, is the third-generation citizen:

In the first place, the American parent expects his child to leave him, leave him physically, go to another town, another state; leave him in terms of occupation, embrace a different calling, learn a different skill, leave him socially, travel if possible with a different crowd.

. . . parents see themselves not as giving their children final status and place, rooting them firmly for life in a dependable social structure, but merely as training them for a race which they will run alone . . . /there comes also the expectation that the child will pass beyond his parents and leave their standards behind him.¹⁰

Anthropologist Mead discerns certain effects in the modal American:

It has often been said that America is a middle-class country, that our behavior, our ideals, our manners are

middle-class. This statement has been made to mean a variety of things.

But the true member of the middle-class denies this fixity . . . he is taught from birth that upon his own effort will depend the valuation which is placed upon him.¹¹

Kenneth Boulding is also one who discerns emphasis on middle-class values:

The American educational system in the past has been quite successful in preparing people to be middle class, to the point indeed where middle class values permeate perhaps 80 percent of our population. The system has not succeeded in preparing people to live useful and cheerful lives at the lower end of the income scale, mainly because educators are themselves middle class and hence are unsympathetic to the values of a lower-class culture.¹²

Mead stresses another aspect of "middle-class character" that is found "to an exaggerated extent in almost all American families" --the bringing up of children by mothers who teach children how they should act toward their mothers. "European children chafe under the father's authority; American children chafe less against the father but escape less from maternal influence." To be good is to follow mother's instructions, most of them prohibitions; and the average American man thinks of good works, town planning, clean politics, etc., as feminine. "He never throws his mother's influence off entirely. . . ."¹³

All through American life, love is meted out--or so it seems to a child . . . the initial conditions inserted into the mother's simplest kiss, that 'I will love you only if you achieve as much as other people's babies. I can't love you if you don't,' survives into every competitive situation in life.¹⁴

Is this true, one asks? It seems a neat and impressive explanation. For many of us, there is surely something in it. But as an

explanation of the "American Character," it leaves a good deal to be desired. Mead wrote at the time of World War II:

We have a certain kind of character, the American character, which has developed in the New World and taken a shape all its own; a character that is geared to success and to movement, invigorated by obstacles and difficulties, but plunged into guilt and despair by catastrophic failure or a wholesale alteration in the upward and onward pace; a character in which aggressiveness is uncertain and undefined, to which readiness to fight anyone who starts a fight and unreadiness to engage in violence have both been held up as virtues; a character which measures its successes and failures only against near contemporaries and engages in various quantitative devices for reducing every contemporary to its own stature; a character which sees success as the reward of virtue and failure as the stigma for not being good enough; a character which is uninterested in the past, except when ancestry can be used to make points against other people in the success game; a character oriented towards an unknown future, ambivalent towards other cultures, which are regarded with a sense of inferiority as more coherent than our own and with a sense of superiority because newcomers in America display the strongest mark of other cultural membership in the form of foreignness. . . .

We may ask first whether such a character has a future; whether it was not specially suited to pioneer conditions when success could be regarded as the reward for industry and abstinence . . . It takes very special circumstances to back up a belief in the close connection between virtue and success. Most other cultures have had to construct their ethical systems on a less exacting model.¹⁵

Americans will not fight merely for power, not merely to protect their property; they will not fight for honor alone, nor yet for the love of fighting. They will fight only if they believe . . . that their cause is just . . . that they are fighting for a new and better world, not for the perpetuation of an old, indifferent one.

So the sober recognition of this aspect of our morale must carry with it some sober planning. If we are to help build this new world, we must be made aware of just what our special abilities are which fit us to do so.¹⁶

Anthropologist Mead speaks of "our traditional moral repudiation of imperialism." We referred earlier to charges of imperialism

leveled at the United States from two principal sources: (1) Marxism-Leninism, contending that capitalism must continue to seek markets aggressively and hence engage in aggressive imperialism; and (2) native Americans with unexplainable but enormous guilt complexes. Lenin and the rest of the Communist leaders early singled out the United States as Target No. 1 (the best defense being a good offense, this Leninist tactic served, with some success, as diversion from other countries' paying close attention to really imperialistic activities of the Soviet Union). We may benefit from a closer look at this activity; for the characteristic behavior of America in this respect may tell us at least as much about the American character as purely verbal diagnoses will tell us.

Imperialism?

Whether deserved or not, charges of "imperialism" intermittently become associated with the status of primacy of any great nation in modern times. Liska wrote in 1967 that the issue of empire had been brought forward by three interconnected events: the reaction in both halves of Europe against the "imperial sway" of the two superpowers, resulting from the decline in prospect of a major war between them; the apparent decline of the Soviet Union relative to the United States in the mid-1960's; and the war in Vietnam, "dictated by the concern for upholding minimum world order globally . . ." To Liska, "a world power and a globally paramount state becomes automatically a power primarily responsible for shaping and maintaining a necessary modicum of world order."¹⁷

Whether or not the United States retains the degree of primacy it may have possessed in 1967, so long as it retains some differential of primacy, it retains the highest degree of single-nation responsibility for upholding (not determining) world order.

Liska labels one indiscriminate modern manner of applying the term "imperialism" and its derivatives as "doctrinaire and propagandistic."¹⁸ Morgenthau holds that indiscriminate usage by partisans, enemies of certain nations, and others, has denuded "imperialism" of all concrete meaning; he specifies the "devil theory of imperialism" as one being widely held by pacifists and Communist propagandists.¹⁹

The basic definition of imperialism is simple enough: the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation completely over foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and other dependencies. Morgenthau improves understanding by also citing "what imperialism is not but is most often supposed to be": viz; not every foreign policy intended to increase a nation's power, says Morgenthau, is necessarily evidence of imperialism. Nor, even in past decades, was every foreign policy that was aimed to preserve an existing empire evidence of imperialism. In an example of the substitution of ideology and blind bias for reason, Marxists equate capitalism with imperialism,²⁰ and fail to see the mote in their own eyes, namely the repression of subjected peoples that is characteristic of Communist ideology.

Nor can imperialism be attributed to single causes, even economic causes. Says Morgenthau, "All economic explanations of

imperialism, the refined as well as the primitive, fail the test of historical experience."²¹

Rapid expansion of the United States occurred preponderantly in contiguous territory on the continent of North America; the vast expanse of territory over which the nation increased its domain did not consist of metropolitan territories of other nations but comprised colonial territory of overseas nations--most of them not organized political entities but never-developed wilderness. When the same areas became territories of the United States, they rapidly became integrated as full-status metropolitan states of the Union. Thus materialistic imperialism, intended to enrich a motherland at the expense of "colonies," was incompatible with American national values and had a very short, near-zero, acceptance in the United States.

Daniel Bell labels a few spokesmen of the turn of the century, specifically naming Brooks Adams and Admiral Mahan, as "straightforward imperialists." Senator Thomas Hart Benton, in 1846, referred to America and the Pacific Ocean: "Futurity will develop an immense, and various, commerce on [The Pacific], of which the greater part will be American . . ."²² Brooks Adams, younger brother of Henry Adams, published four notable books between 1897 and 1913. In one of them, The New Empire (1902), he wrote:

Supposing the movement of the next 50 years only to equal that of the last, instead of undergoing a prodigious acceleration, the United States will outweigh any single empire, if not all empires combined. The whole world will pay her tribute. Commerce will flow to her from east and west, and the order which has existed from the dawn of time will be reversed.²³

However, the spate of jingoism was, on the whole, short-lived.

Ernest R. May, in American Imperialism, wrote:

After 1900 scarcely a Congressman or newspaper editor raised his voice in favor of further colonial extension. Imperialism as a current in American public opinion appeared to be dead . . . The American establishment once again possessed an anticolonial consensus as firm as that which had existed in the early 1880's.

For example, Charles W. Eliot, the president of Harvard, was active in the Anti-Imperialist League, an association financed by Andrew Carnegie.²⁴

When the opportunity arose to acquire German possessions at the end of World War I, for example, the United States would have none of it. Americans were not enchanted by foreign examples of imperial conduct; they had not admired England's conduct during the Boer War. When Kipling addressed a poem to America, beginning each stanza with "Take up the white man's burden," the verses were, in America, jeered as much as they were cheered.

Professor Karl Deutsch studied imperial and colonial dynamics in depth. What benefits or detriments accrued to actual colonies? Did "less developed" colonies make out better than less developed countries that remained independent? If one supposes, for example, that French rule was beneficial for colonies, Algerians, after 130 years of French colonialism (1830-1960) should at the end be

appreciably better off than, say, Syrians, who experienced only 25 years of French colonialism (1920-1945).

What were Deutsch's findings? In 1960, he could find no perceptible difference at all between Algeria and Syria in literacy, education, life expectancy, or per capita income.²⁵ He verified that, overall, countries which had experienced colonial rule, and those which had not, have done about equally well or poorly over several generations. There is one exception to this result in the record of Western-country rule over non-white, non-Western populations: that exceptional record belongs to the United States. Deutsch ascribes the beneficial effects of United States administration to two features: the United States clearly implied that the relationship was transitory (e.g., providing a time-table for full independence for the Philippines); and the United States made extensive capital investments for the benefit of the colony, not itself (e.g., the United States made massive investments in education in the Philippines, with the unique and significant feature that the high-school level was included). What kind of imperialism was that?

Certain aspects of America's past performance are seldom accorded full weight: despite American interventions in the Western hemisphere, America never placed any other nation in the category of colony. And in an age of colonizing without recrimination by great powers, America prevented the placement, by any major power, of Latin American nations in the category of colony. American interposition of its own agencies, in many instances, converted the Monroe Doctrine from rhetoric to reality. America exerted influence

of varying degree on other Western nations, as they exerted influence on America and on each other; one crucial outcome attributable partly to America is that other Western Hemisphere states, once they achieved independence, remained free and independent nations.

Throughout its history, despite a few brief lapses, the United States generally acted sympathetically, including the extension of early recognition, toward genuine revolutionary movements contesting internal reactionary oppression (though not to ideological and subversive crusades fomented by totalitarian activists trained by, and acting at least partly in the interests of, a foreign predator). Two theme-roots of the classic American viewpoint can be supported in argument:

1. America had itself set the example of successful revolution to the rest of the world. The French Revolution (so different in many ways) followed the American Revolution, and the Russian Revolution followed a century and a half later. Ever since, both France and Russia have fostered a partially-true-partially-false view of themselves as motherlands of the revolutionary spirit aspiring toward "liberty, equality, fraternity." Whatever the varying degrees of validity attached to each nation's claims to preeminence in revolutionary spirit, all three experience and foster a revolutionary image of themselves, as one theme among a symphony of sentiments which, individually, wax and wane according to circumstances. The United States, accordingly, has been regarded legitimately by many foreign peoples from time to time as a

motherland of revolution and as being likely to respond favorably when appealed to via revolutionary invocation.

2. Uniquely among major nations in recent centuries, America's attitudes towards colonialism were undoubtedly shaped by individual and collective American experience of having been, for 150 years prior to the emergence of the United States as an independent entity, colonials themselves. The experience and its institutional memory doubtless led many Americans subsequently to resist impulses and opportunities to become colonial masters themselves over other peoples. To be sure, a deviant strain developed as in all human affairs involving the domination-submission dyad (such as the member of a pecking order who resents being pecked on but who enthusiastically pecks on any others he can, or such as the child who is battered badly in his early years and grows up to become a child-beater himself). From time to time, some Americans arose to expound the alleged righteousness of their proposals to extend American control over others; but on the whole, they have not fared well with the preponderance of Americans. The United States has, with relatively brief and minor exceptions, preserved the sovereignty and integrity of many nations that, in different circumstances and in conflict with other great powers, might well have become colonies.

Thus, the United States performance of resistance towards becoming a colonial power itself was enhanced by two facets of the American self-image: that of a friend of genuine revolutions against tyranny, and that of an ex-colony that had no desire to impose the status of colony on anyone else.

As one analyzes actual American performance contrasted with allegations of "imperialism," "economic imperialism," and similar slanders, one recalls a number of considerations hardly consistent with any tendency towards imperialism.

The United States stated its goals and lived up to its statements, in both World Wars and other wars, to the effect that it wanted no other nation's territory, no control over foreign peoples or governments, no material spoils or reparations. That set of fundamental national policies was imperialistic?

--The reverse of taking material reparations from the defeated, America poured money resources, talent, and effort into rebuilding its prostrate foes, so that, for example, the economies of Japan and Germany, in shambles only three decades ago, are now among the four strongest in the entire world! How could analysis of such sweeping acts be distorted so as to warrant categorization of them as imperialistic?

--Cognizant that its allies were also prostrate, a genuinely imperialistic power would have taken all possible measures to transfer as much of their resources as possible to itself while preventing them from recovering sufficiently to become rivals and competitors again; but what did the United States do? The exact opposite--the United States poured enormous resources into its allies, so that their economies and statuses were restored to strength, to competitive positions; so that the allies were able, relatively quickly, to actually become rivals and competitors to the extent that they were able to do so. No nation that was even slightly imperialistic in nature would ever have undertaken such programs. No nation other than America ever did undertake such programs.

--It was even alleged that American participation in Southeast Asian conflict was a demonstration of "economic imperialism." It takes a perverse approach to reality to describe the American economic investment in Vietnam (men, billions of dollars, materials, and effort), with not the slightest likelihood of ever receiving any economic return whatsoever, as "economic imperialism."

--The dynamic expansionist thrust in the post-World War II international arena was inherent in only one worldwide major-power ideology: international Communism. That ideology, analyzing the

dynamics of fate, concluded that the United States constituted the chief obstacle to Soviet expansionism, already swallowing up one independent country after another in Central and Eastern Europe. The United States did not seek the position of leader of the Western nations' defense; that position was conferred on the United States by the relative weakness of all other Western nations and by the deliberate singling out of America by the Communist bloc as their No. 1 enemy. Once undertaking the position of defensive leader, however, the United States, with characteristic vigor (and as vigorous defense has always been interpreted) undertook to establish a forward defense that made further Communist encroachment more difficult. Imperialism should thus be properly associated, not with the defensive power, but with the expansionist power.

--Among numerous aspects of its defensive programs, the United States, by mutual agreement with the nations concerned, stationed armed forces units in some 40-50 countries around the world, despite the highest degree of sensitivity associated in all nations with the presence of foreign troops. Not one foreign nation involved lost an iota of sovereignty, freedom, political autonomy, treasure, lives, or any other concrete or abstract attribute of value due to the presence of American troops. When the few governments concerned (e.g., France, Morocco) requested that the troops be removed, they were promptly withdrawn, without resistance or recrimination. Such results are not only totally inconsistent with any imperialistic values or objectives whatsoever but are also wholly incompatible with perceptions of America as imperialistic.

--Many similar considerations could be cited. Far from being imperialistic and interventionist, the United States' characteristic position throughout its existence until the end of World War II was defensive and isolationist. With a whole subcontinent to develop, the nation had enough to handle. With a bedrock central philosophy of live and let live, America withdrew time and time again from opportunities to enter conflicts with foreign peoples. From time to time, certain Americans voiced chauvinistic, even imperialistic, sentiments. In some particularly provocative incidents threatening hemisphere security, the United States did intervene with force, frequently at the invitation of the people concerned. But the incidents involved were relatively rare and practically never involved more than a small proportion of American people or interests. In almost every instance of intervention, the United States brought order out of local chaos; administered groups that were unable or unwilling at the time to administer themselves; and in most instances, left peoples free and better off than they had been before the United States entered the situation.

And the important element is that invariably, almost without exception, the United States withdrew without compromise to the sovereignty of others.

At the risk of devoting too much coverage to this subject, I would like to cite one more contention as an outstanding candidate for a prize in derangement: the contention that the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, and the 1965 American intervention in the Dominican Republic were comparable, equally reprehensible

imperialistic actions. Let us consider this allegation in a detailed comparison:

Czechoslovakia

Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in order to prevent free political choice.

The invasion by forces of the Soviet Union and other Communist neighbors of Czechoslovakia was endorsed by the Communist nations whose forces were used; the invasion was universally condemned by all other nations.

The forces of the Soviet Union and the other neighbors of Czechoslovakia invaded in 1968. Those forces are still there.

Dominican Republic

The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic in order to eliminate prevention of free choice--so that free choice would be protected.

No countries are more sensitive to foreign intervention and the presence of foreign troops than the Latin American states. Yet the Organization of American States supported the intervention. Military forces were contributed by four Latin American member states. The entire composite force, including the US contingent, was commanded by a Brazilian.

Within a year, after free elections had been conducted and the results implemented, all foreign forces, including American forces, were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic, which has since conducted its own affairs, unimpeded.

Between these two, which is the imperialistic country?

A number of the foreign observers cited in the previous chapter contribute to dispelling the image of the United States as imperialistic.

Myopia and Bombast

A number of expressions, and expressionists, have been taken over time to represent American opinion and bespeak the American character. Writers about the "manifest destiny" of America (writing before and after the phrase was coined) included Thomas Paine, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Walt Whitman; however, "manifest destiny" was mostly taken to mean, not adventures abroad, but consolidation of the American portion of North America.²⁶ Some spokesmen--elected, appointed, and self-designated--have uttered certain words out of a search for personal power, out

of ecstasy, or despair, or ignorance, or personal pride or frustration, or benign indulgence, or mystic oratory, or a hundred other pressures eliciting one or another emotion. Many expressed values widely held, but it is questionable that many others spoke for anyone other than themselves. The combination of extremely free society and free press and few inhibitions on parading wisdom or ignorance produced much bombast. Whether or not many of the loudest thunderers truly bespoke the values of their fellow-Americans may be less significant than the fact that their words were taken, on occasion, literally.

America has evidenced that a euphoric streak about itself overcomes a substantial number of Americans from time to time; but how deep does it run and how long does it last? The record of national political and social action does not accord with the myopic and bombastic nature of verbal assertion by numerous individuals. I reproduce here, largely without comment, a number of appraisals sung to, or hurled at, America, by Americans. One should be cognizant, of course, that a number of these quotations, while genuine, are not necessarily typical of the quoted individual's philosophy; Woodrow Wilson, for example, said the things quoted here, but on other occasions he had wiser and more perceptive things to say. Whatever the individual validity of these citations, they certainly illustrate diversity.

The Founding Fathers set a heady early pace. John Adams, for example, wrote to Jefferson in 1813 that "Our pure, virtuous,

public-spirited, federative republic, will last forever, govern the globe, and introduce the perfection of man."²⁷

Woodrow Wilson's pietistic proclamations did not pass unnoticed. America's responsibilities, he said, had not come of our own doing, but "by the hand of God who led us this way." He denied any validity to American motivation confined to self-interest: "We have no selfish ends to serve . . . We are but one of the champions of the right of mankind."²⁸ Brogan has identified a recurrent American theme that America, alone among nations, has purely moral objectives; he, too, quotes Woodrow Wilson: "Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well, that is the way I know I am an American. America is the only idealist nation in the world."²⁹

Has this self-conception declined? One wonders, noting that in a 1973 book on American strategy the United States was referred to as "ethical standard-bearer for the non-communist world . . ."³⁰

Herman Melville had one of his characters assert in White Jacket (1850): "And we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people--the Israel of our times; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world . . ."³¹

Richard Olney, Secretary of State, declared in 1895: "Today, the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interpositions."³²

At the turn of the century, Albert V. Beveridge, a historian, also a senator, in one of his speeches in the Senate chamber, said of expansion:

Mr. President, this question . . . is elemental. It is racial. God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for

nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are trustees of the world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace. The judgment of the Master is upon us! 'Ye have been faithful over a few things; I will make you ruler over many things.'³³

Theodore Roosevelt declared in 1904:

Chronic wrongdoing . . . may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.³⁴

Charles Denby, a member of McKinley's commission to study the Philippines, expounded economic imperialism:

We are coming to our own. We are stretching out our hands for what nature meant should be ours. We are taking our proper rank among the nations of the world. We are after markets, the greatest markets now existing in the world. Along with these markets will go our beneficent institutions; and humanity will bless us.³⁵

On another occasion, Senator Beveridge declared: "God . . . has marked the American people to finally lead in the redemption of the world. This is the divine mission of America . . . We are the trustees of the world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace."³⁶ Theodore Roosevelt spoke to the Harvard Club in 1917, referring to the American entry into World War I: "If there ever was a holy war, it is this war."³⁷ But he was outdone by the Rev. Randolph H. McKim,

in his Washington pulpit: "It is God who has summoned us to this war. It is His war we are fighting . . . This conflict is indeed a crusade. The greatest in history. The holiest . . ."³⁸

The influential publisher of Time Magazine, Henry Luce, wrote in February 1945:

They /the American People/ have failed to play their part as a world power . . . And the cure is this: to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world, and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit . . .³⁹

Before his election to the White House, in his book Six Crises (1962), Richard Nixon said that "our beliefs must be combined with a crusading zeal, not just to hold our own, but to change the world . . ."⁴⁰

One interjects here an observation of realistic George Kennan, in his Realities of American Foreign Policy, criticizing some aspects of the American Dream; while it was "innocent of every conscious evil intent," he said, "it encouraged a sort of 'adolescent self-esteem.'"⁴¹

The conviction of many Americans that this nation has been given a special mission has been repeated often enough. John F. Kennedy in 1961 spoke of the role that destiny had assigned to America as "watchman on the walls of freedom." Lyndon B. Johnson said in 1965 that "We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else." Richard M. Nixon said in 1971 that "We have fought four wars, selflessly and for no gain . . . The United States wants nothing--nothing but the right for everyone to live and let live."⁴²

How large, or small, a portion of these assertions reflected realistic assessment of America's status in the world? How much of real American foreign policy was accurately reflected? How many of these assertions were reflected in actions by the United States, and how many were merely bombast borne away by the winds?

As we have seen in Chapter 2 in reference to France, the United States is not alone in the world in the possession of some jingoes (nor is France the only other country to possess some). Despite the thin thunder of those who claim a zealot's role for America, the weight of the record of American international performance--defensive, cooperative, generous--speaks above all other means of expression as most genuinely representative of America's credentials.

Being Number One

The American poet, Archibald MacLeish, created a verse play for radio, in connection with the American Bicentennial celebration. Entitled The Great American Fourth of July Parade, the play counterposes running dialogue throughout between the voices of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as they comment on the condition of the United States 200 years after its founding.⁴³ In one passage, the poet's purpose of wry commentary is powerfully rendered in this passage on primacy:

* * *

Adams: . . . whatever they expect to hear
may God be with them now. The orator has risen.

Bullhorn Voice: Ladies and Gentlemen! Ladies and Gentlemen!
Pray silence for the Honorable . . .

* * *

Orator: Thank you! Thank you!

Adams: Here he goes . . .

Orator: I have one thing to say to you, my fellow Americans
. . . one thing.

Jefferson: Right so far at least.

Orator: One thing you must never for a single moment,
least of all this greatest, this most glorious moment,
this solemn ceremony of the year . . .
(applause)
I say the year. I mean the century . . .
(applause)
Nay, I mean the second century . . .
(louder applause)

* * *

One thing . . .

Adams: Well, get on with it! Get on with it . . .

Orator: One thing you must never, while you live and breathe,
Whatever else excites your interest,
Whatever else concerns your thought . . .

Jefferson: Give him time: he's coming to it.

Orator: One thing you must never, while you live, forget:
The U.S.A., my fellow Americans . . .

Adams: He refers to the Republic.

Orator: The U.S.A., my fellow Americans . . .
The U.S.A. . . .

(anticipatory pause: the thunder of expected cheers gathering
behind it)

IS NUMBER ONE!

(silence--dead silence)

Jefferson: Not, it seems, the kind of reassurance
even a frightened people welcomes.

Orator: (rattled: a nasty edge to his voice)
And I have one more thing to say!
Never forget it yourselves and never,
Never while you breathe and live,
let anyone else on earth forget it!

(pause)

Will your admirable buglers rise?
We need the emphasis of music. Thank you.

(shattering amplification)

THE U.S.A. IS NUMBER ONE!

(the bugles: ta-ta-ta-TAAA!)

(the whole band: ta-ta-ta-TAAAAAA!)

(silence)

Adams: Not one answering handclap. Not a sound.

Jefferson: Conceivably they think there's something more to say . . . or should be.

* * *

Discussion of strategic equations in recent decades has exhaustively analyzed the meanings of superiority, supremacy, parity, and sufficiency. One writer says that the United States hopes to maintain "technical and numerical superiority" with the \$1 billion TRIDENT submarine. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger is quoted as assessing SALT talks as "fine, but if the Soviet Union fails to exercise restraint in SALT II, then we will exercise our options to remain first best."⁴⁴

Such statements are sometimes taken to support a belief that the United States is obsessed with the position of No. 1 nation. While President, Lyndon B. Johnson, vowed: "We are the number one nation, and we are going to stay the number one nation."⁴⁵ While President, Richard Nixon, sounded that note repeatedly, as in the early 1974 State of the Union Message: "We must never allow America to become the second strongest nation in the world."⁴⁶

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was quoted as predicting that, if budget reductions continue,

in four or five years the United States will end up being 'second class' militarily in relation to the Soviet Union . . . If we are going to disarm as a nation and accept second-class status as a military power, we should do so consciously . . .⁴⁷

American competitiveness and alleged obsession has been ascribed by some to be related to America's alleged absorption with football and the football coach's nonacceptance of any result but winning. Coaches like Vince Lombardi and Woody Hayes are frequently referred to as cultural authorities on winning. Hayes is quoted as saying:

I don't think it's possible to be too intent on winning . . . This country is built on winning and on that alone. Winning is still the most honorable thing a man can do . . . as Napoleon said, I'd rather die a winner than live a loser.⁴⁸

New York Times writer William Shannon issued muted criticism:

For a quarter century, the United States has been trying to do good, encourage political liberty, and promote social justice in the Third World . . . In trying to do good, we have been living beyond our moral resources and have fallen into hypocrisy and self-righteousness. We have tried to export our idea of democracy and of the economically abundant good life, and have discovered this dream is not for export . . .

The theologian Reinhold Nubuhr warned us at the beginning of the postwar era in 1945 when these secular missionary efforts first began: 'No nation or individual, even the most righteous, is good enough to fulfill God's purposes in history.'⁴⁹

American author Fletcher Knebel expressed in 1974 his disillusionment at the state of American institutions which he had once accepted uncritically:

As a young man I accepted the touted wisdom of authority with but sporadic grumbling and rebellion . . . I for the most part respected authority, gave it obedience and felt guilty when I defied it.

Vietnam changed all that . . . I saw my country as a swaggering bully engaged in a futile, brutal, immoral enterprise . . . I've had a bellyful of unrestrained authority and I trust I'll never again give blind allegiance to anyone solely because of the office held . . .

No. 1. I once took quiet pride in America's seeming superiority in forging the good life. Now I believe that if the whole world followed our example, we would quickly mount an ecological and spiritual fiasco . . . Now I think that if America would but pause and listen to some of the so-called backward societies, we might gain insights on formulation of a desperately needed new set of values.

Competition. Compete, win, beat out the other guy. So read the counsel of my youth. Pulpit, school and locker room chanted the vast character glories deriving from unfettered struggles to win. I believed. I competed with vigor. Up Knebel. Down you and you and you . . . But a funny thing happened on my way through life. I found that, not competition, but cooperation turned me on . . .

In broader terms, while rugged individual competition may be justified in a world of ever-expanding economies and resources, only cooperation and joint planning fit a contracting world . . . if our vital resources, from fuel to metals to food, are seen as limited, as they must now be, then exhortations to greater individual and national productive rivalry can lead only to ugly confrontation. Today we Americans, with about 5 per cent of the world population, consume a third or more of the earth's goodies. Are we prepared to preserve that ratio by competition which, eventually, must mean by tank and missile? My new attitude, formed in the last few years, is this: There is but one pie, and if we do not cooperate in equitable sharing, we face hatred, retaliation and perhaps destruction.⁵⁰

Lombardi is frequently quoted: "Winning isn't everything; it's the only thing!"⁵¹ A biographer of Lombardi writes

. . . there were those who were appalled at the positive narrowness of the Lombardi code and its values, which had led to what Senator Fulbright called 'the arrogance of power': The American need to win and succeed whatever the cost, whomever it hurt, and to justify the process as a moral crusade.⁵²

One antiwar American produced a biased film about Vietnam; one favorable review mentioned that:

Images of football recur throughout the film . . . the coach whipping the players into a frenzy in the locker room; the stupid gratuitous violence of the game itself and the exultation which accompanies winning. 'We want to win.' says Lieutenant George Coker. 'That was our number one ambition. That's what we really wanted to win this war.' To many, Vietnam was a Super Bowl . . .⁵³

While this particular analysis of American motivation in the Vietnam War is, I believe, wildly inaccurate, few would quarrel with rejection of gratuitous violence and a mindless spirit of "winning." (To be sure, the ideology and naivete underlying such widespread judgments as this are disturbing. For that matter, what end, winning or losing, had been unswervingly pursued in the war by the North Vietnamese and their Communist allies? What nation, engaged in war, ever sought to lose?)

British critic Henry Fairlie has provided a handful of examples of the peculiarly American (?) penchant of a proportion of American citizens to assail their own society. Fairlie addresses one frequent anti-American theme: the allegation that American society is uniquely violent; the allegation is simply not true, says Fairlie, and cites William R. Brock, one of the best of British scholars in American studies, to that effect. Fairlie also cites others:⁵⁴

The capacity of Americans for self-criticism has often been noted by outsiders . . .

I am not speaking of the steady criticism that any nation--and in particular its intellectuals--ought to maintain of its own society, but of a virulence of tone--a kind of bile--which seems to spring from self-doubt into self-hate. . .

As Philip Guedalla, then one of the liveliest British commentators on the contemporary scene, wrote in 1933: 'The fierce alacrity with which American citizens denounce their institutions without the slightest effort to improve them is a perennial surprise.' . . .

'Nowhere else is national self-criticism practiced with a severity so relentless and a mockery so bitter,' wrote L. P. Jacks in 1933. 'Thoughtful people are to be met with all over the country whose minds seem to be constantly exercised in the diagnosis of the national disease.' Cyril Connolly said twenty years later: 'At a time when the American way, backed by American resources, has made the country into the greatest power the world has known, there has never been more doubting and questioning of the purpose of the American process; the higher up one goes the more searching becomes the self-criticism, the deeper the thirst for a valid mystique of humanity.' Twenty years later still, in Love-Hate Relations, Stephen Spender has talked of 'that passionate hatred of their own country which sometimes affects the most cultivated (and perhaps deeply patriotic) Americans.'

. . . In the late 1960's, a British journalist, Ferdinand Mount, who was visiting the United States, said: 'You can't stop people hating themselves if

that is their preferred choice. . . . But even the strain of the Vietnam war does not explain why, for the first time, this cyclically recurrent self-doubt should have weakened the universality of belief in the American ideal.' . . . But to the American anti-American--who makes the historical country itself the target of his complaints--this confusion of past and present is necessary. The anti-American lives outside his country's present, in a myth of its past; and from this myth, he condemns what ought to be the numerous possibilities of its future to be those only of repetition, a curse that is never to be lifted.

This is not criticism of one's society, in fact it prohibits just and effective criticism; it is a tremor in the mind of the country, which is never stilled and at times of difficulty can send a shock through the whole land. One reason why it can have this effect is that anti-Americanism in America (and this is to some extent . . . true also of it abroad) is in some of its aspects a reflection of Americanism . . . it is true that, during the late 1960's and to some extent since then, whatever the provocations, the repulsion of many Americans from their own country and its total experience has been not merely virulent, not only monotonous, but itself a kind of sickness. . . .

Some Americans have been unrestrained in their assertions about American competitiveness. Howard Zinn, a Boston political scientist, attacked "the privation, the selfishness, the murderous competitiveness which combine in our culture to defeat all ideas of equalitarianism . . ."55 (An allegation that all equalitarian ideas are "defeated" in American culture must boggle the gods of Truth and Reason.) David Horowitz, editorialist of Ramparts magazine, sounded paranoiacally aggressive himself in denouncing certain government activity as "aggression":

The government that Secretary Kissinger represents is a gangster regime. It is not legitimate, even by the limited precepts of the democratic system as we know it. It has committed murder on a colossal scale internationally, while domestically it has usurped power by fraud and deception. These are the men who lied to us to create the Cold War, lied to us to lead us into Indochina, will go on lying to us because they represent a system in which virtue is identified with their own privilege and power.

. . . I believe the murder of Vietnam is not a betrayal but a fulfillment of the American tradition.⁵⁶

Another critic even found "The Star Spangled Banner" insufferable, in a passage remarkable for incoherence (does he really believe that Americans are loyal to a "flag" in opposition to loyalty to "land and people"?):

We will choose a new anthem only when we comprehend that the arrogant sense of national independence, so painfully apparent in our present anthem, must be replaced by a sense of our international dependence, and that loyalty to the flag must be replaced by a loyalty to our land and its people. We will be ready for a new anthem when we realize that if the bombs once more burst in the air, the flag will not still be there in the morning because nothing will be there.⁵⁷

When Senator Fulbright was retired from government, the Saturday Review dedicated an article to him in its January 1975 issues. He was described in this way: "For three decades, in books and speeches, he has castigated what he describes as America's equation of power and virtue."⁵⁸

The Senator was quoted thus:

. . . the present outlook, for the Western world at least, is a gloomy one--largely because of the irrationality of the leadership, especially in the United States . . . We're constantly out in front--which we take pride in doing--like being on the moon first.⁵⁹

In what must have been a moment of aberration, a 1971 US-sponsored survey of foreigners included this among a large number of questions: "All things considered, which country do you think is ahead at the present time in the cultural field--music, literature, the arts--the United States or the Soviet Union?"⁶⁰ As though one could measure relative rankings in art; or as though, even if one could measure cultural "rankings," one would then know anything about relative power and influence!

There is no dearth of individual critical opinions, testifying more, perhaps, in evidence of the freedom and diversity of opinion in America than to the soundness of judgment of the individual opinion holders. In this connection, Melvin Maddocks asserted, "The limited objective, the merely reasonable expectation, has never been the American style."⁶¹

Longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer commented: "The superficiality of the American is the result of his hustling . . . People in a hurry cannot think, cannot grow, nor can they decay. They are preserved in a state of perpetual puerility."

Erik Erikson, at 72 probably the most influential living psychoanalyst and the most optimistic thinker the Freudian tradition has produced, recently repudiated the "sunny view" of the American

character to which he had subscribed for a long time, and came to think of the nation as "a world bully that has transgressed against humanity and nature."⁶²

An American poet, Robinson Jeffers, referred to by Lawrence Levine as "bitter and misanthropic," once addressed America thus:

Unhappy country, what wings you have! . . .
Weep (it is frequent in human affairs), weep for
the terrible magnificence of the means,
The ridiculous incompetence of the reasons, the
bloody and shabby
Pathos of the result.⁶³

An experienced journalist, Chalmers Roberts, wrote recently that older Americans have seen the United States play "king of the castle most of their lives."⁶⁴

Thoreau is frequently quoted: "I would remind my countrymen that they are men first, and Americans at a late and convenient hour."⁶⁵ In a famous 1966 speech Senator Fulbright said:

When a nation is very powerful but lacking in self-confidence, it is likely to behave in a manner that is dangerous both to itself and to others.

Gradually but unmistakably, America is succumbing to that arrogance of power which has afflicted, weakened and in some cases destroyed great nations in the past.

If the war goes on and expands, if that fatal process continues to accelerate until America becomes what it is not now and never has been, a seeker after unlimited power and empire, then Vietnam will have had a mighty and tragic fallout indeed.

I do not believe that will happen. I am very apprehensive but I still remain hopeful, and even confident, that America, with its humane and democratic traditions, will find the wisdom to match its power.⁶⁶

Is there some truth in any of these assertions by Americans about their country? Is there much truth? Little? Any?

Professor Brzezinski speaks of the

. . . new fad of pessimism within the style-setting circles of our society. It is fashionable today to be a pessimist, to decry American traditions, to condemn American practices, and to compete in exposing American misdeeds. I am in complete agreement with the editors of Commentary who note that the present tendency is 'to dwell upon (American) failings and sometimes even to acquiesce in the most hostile descriptions of the country's character, its past record, and its future prospects.' There is, indeed, something sick about the competition among our mass media to expose--and thus to nullify--American intelligence efforts to gain more precise knowledge of Soviet strategic hardware; there is certainly something reminiscent of the 1930's in the rash of film and television 'documentaries' glorifying the totalitarian regimes of the Left; there is something highly destructive in the persisting campaign to link the Kennedy assassination with the CIA (but why not with Castro or the KGB?). All of that is part of a self-late syndrome that has become very evident within those circles of our society which most directly set the tone of the written or the spoken words destined for mass consumption.⁶⁷

To be sure, there always have been, and still are, also moderate spokesmen available. Adolph Berle comments on alleged transcendence in America of "economic imperialism":

For practical purposes, capacity for widespread empire is presently limited to two great powers--the Soviet Union and the United States . . . potentiality for empire, of course, is far from being empire itself . . . Economic influence is still present, still appreciable, and, in some cases, still important. But of the four main impulses toward empire--defense, sacred mission, national esteem, and economic advantage--economic impulses are now the weakest.⁶⁸

Margaret Mead has been quoted on "our traditional moral repudiation of imperialism." A number of others, cited elsewhere in this study, reflect the same view.

Some of the most sensible, modest, and reliable appraisals of recent American performance, at least in the 1960's, were provided by former Secretary of State Dean Rusk:⁶⁹

--The United States has never agreed or arranged explicitly concerning spheres of influence, the influencers, or the subjects of influence.

--The United States is not "the world's policeman," was not, has never tried to be, and has not the capacity or interest to be. About 400 uses or threats of force occurred since the end of World War II till the late 1960's; the United States was involved in a handful. For example, sixty coups d'etat occurred, not one caused by the CIA.

One myth repudiated by Rusk still surfaces from time to time, involving statement and implication. The statement is that "Communism is no longer monolithic." The associated implication is: "Therefore, Communism and the Communist movement no longer constitute a threat to other nations." The first statement is partially true, but only partially. When all the existing Communist states, whatever their differences, combined to provide the means of war to North Vietnam, they were, in their effect on the Vietnam War, still monolithic. The second statement, the implication that declining monolithicity makes the movement no longer dangerous, is spurious. The danger of monolithic activity has merely lessened, not disappeared; the dangerous capabilities of one or more Communist states to act in total or partial concert are, in most cases, as powerful as ever.

One outcome of denigration of national policy during the Vietnam War has been little studied (or even acknowledged) so far: the negative expressions and resolutions by various organizations. Some of the "bandwagon" condemn-the-war activities along the lines of "non-think" might well give us concern over obviously widespread misconceptions of the nature of international relations and prudent alternatives for an American role in world dynamics as they really are not as one might like them to be. Only a few examples are given here:

- A number of religious and semi-religious bodies (such as the American Friends Service Committee) launched moralistic denunciation of American policy. For example, the April 1972 general conference of the United Methodist Church called on "the leadership of the United States to confess that what we have done in Indo-China has been a crime against humanity."⁷⁰ An ecumenical assembly of Protestants, Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Jews, in January 1972, charged that our Vietnamization policy was immoral because "it forces Asian people to be our proxy army, dying in our places for our supposed interests."⁷¹

- The National Academy of Sciences, in April 1972, voted almost unanimously to urge the President to de-emphasize US "reliance on military force." How the military forces of North Vietnam were to be resisted successfully by other means, the NAS did not say.⁷²

- The highly educated members (76.5% with master or doctor degrees) of the World Future Society were polled on the question: "How much effort [priority] should be expended to reach our various goals." Among 12 goals, the responses listed "National Security" as # 12. The

members were given a list of possible developments and asked to rate them from 1 (very desirable) to 5 (very undesirable). Developments listed included "increasing affluence and leisure," "breakup of large corporations," "major change in family structure," and others. No development was voted "very undesirable." The only two suggested developments receiving consensus as "Undesirable" were: "Defeat of Communism," and "U.S. predominance in the world."⁷³

Changing American Values

Among a number of citations of American values, the well-known set compiled by Professor Robin Williams⁷⁴ appears most satisfactory to me. In the following table, Williams lists (not in any order of priority or importance) the principal values he believes that Americans accept widely. He also indicates in two columns whether commitment to each value appears to be strengthening or weakening during the approximate periods 1900-1945 and the 1945-1965 periods (a + indicates strengthening; a minus sign indicates weakening).

<u>Value-belief</u>	<u>1900-1945</u>	<u>1945-1965</u>
Activity	Indeterminate	-
Work	-	-
Achievement	-	+ (after Sputnik)
Success	+	+
Material comfort	+	+
Humanitarianism (domestic)	+	+
Humanitarianism (war)	+	-
"Absolute" moral orientation	-	no change
Practicality	+	-
Efficiency	+	-
Science and secular rationality	+	+
Progress	+	-
Freedom	Indeterminate	-
Equality	+	+
Democracy	+	Indeterminate
Conformity (to social pressure)	+	+
Individual personality	+	Indeterminate
Nationalism and patriotism	+	- to +
Racism (group superiority)	-	-

Sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset argues that "the massive technological and social changes have left relatively intact the main values and such enduring tensions as democratic equalitarianism versus achievement orientation."⁷⁵ Sociologist Talcott Parsons favored the thesis that relative constancy, rather than fundamental change, has characterized American values over a long period.

During the past 50 years, no completely new major value-orientations have appeared, nor have any major value-orientations disappeared completely; the most important changes have occurred in emphasis and priority among values.

Sociologist Clyde Kluckhohn suggests that the United States has experienced a set of changes in values resulting in heightened emphasis on group rather than individual goals, on security rather than future success, on adjustment rather than competitive achievement, and on expressive rather than instrumental values.

More specifically, he suggests eight appraisals:⁷⁶

(1) Strictly personal values have given way, in favor of more publicly standardized "group values," whether those of a community, an organization, or a profession.

(2) More emphasis is being placed on psychological desiderata relating to mental health, the education and training of children, and self-cultivation (as an adaptation to 'normality' in group living.).

(3) Respectable and stable security has risen in the scale of values at the expense of high aspirations and effort directed at long-time future success.

(4) Aesthetic values have received increasing favor.

(5) Participation in organized religion has risen in approval, but the emphasis seems to be heavily on group affiliation and stability rather than on intensified personal religious commitment.

(6) Heterogeneity in certain respects is becoming a principle of organizing the value system; variety is valued.

(7) Ideals for women have changed, as have sexual codes.

(8) There is an increased concern for abstract standards;
greater value is placed on explicit values.

In the course of another analysis of changing American values, Gordon and Helmer conducted an extensive Delphi exercise concerned with what is happening to American values. One exercise in their surveys compiled appraisals of certain "folklore" assertions about our values:⁷⁷

<u>Folklore Assertion</u>	<u>Delphi Appraisal</u>
That we are losing our commitment to values in general. Nothing is dear to us throughout our lives--we choose only what momentarily fills the gap.	Probably False
That we have lost our attachment to the serious values that reflect genuine human needs (health, friendships, freedom, etc.). Increasingly we value what is essentially frivolous (escape, diversion, amusement).	Probably False
That our values are becoming more and more man-directed (health, success, group-acceptance) and less and less God-directed (living God-fearing lives, doing God's work, accepting what God ordains).	True
That our traditional commitments to moral values are going by the board. Honesty, probity, etc., are becoming obsolete. Moral indignation is out of fashion. We are less and less prone to bring to bear the ideas of right and wrong, and are increasingly diffident about our ability to make such discriminations. (No statistically significant agreement.)	No statistically significant agreement
That we are becoming more and more materialistic. The spiritual qualities of man are no longer precious to us.	No statistically significant agreement
That American values are going to pot. The traditional American value foci (country, honor, independence, probity, etc.) are becoming things of indifference to us. They are no longer upheld or worried about.	Probably False
That our taste and our aesthetic values in general are being debased (by mass-culture, television, pulp magazines, etc.).	Probably False

Folklore Assertion (cont)

Delphi
Appraisal

That our values are becoming more and more social values, with less and less emphasis upon individual values (e.g., social injustices worry us more than individual ones.)

Probably
True

An interesting development relative to the interest in and support of national primacy on the part of the American people was included in a different Delphi exercise reported by Baier and Rescher.⁷⁸

Respondents numbered 58, in relation to a question asking indications of the expected direction of change of certain American values over the next generation (say, out to the year 2000). The question asked whether there would be greatly increased emphasis, slightly increased emphasis, little or no change, slightly decreased emphasis, or greatly decreased emphasis. In addition, respondents were asked whether the indicated change should be regarded as very desirable, desirable, neutral, undesirable, or very undesirable.

Responses relating to the American value of "patriotism" were as follows:

- 28 (the largest number) out of 58 predicted "slightly decreased emphasis" and 5 others predicted "greatly decreased emphasis."
- 24 out of 58 considered such a change "desirable."

In different contexts, what does "desirable" mean in reference to decreased emphasis on "patriotism"? What is meant by "patriotism" in these contexts? It is difficult to guess.

While we conjecture about possible future courses of the attribute of "patriotism," let us turn to a few acute American appraisals of the pluralistic American political context itself.

American Political Ethos

The illusion that a nation can escape, if it only wants to, from power politics into a realm where action is guided by moral principles rather than by considerations of power . . . is deeply rooted in the American mind . . . three types of American statesmen emerge: the realist, thinking in terms of power and represented by Alexander Hamilton; the ideological, acting in terms of power, thinking in terms of moral principles, and represented by Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams; and the moralist, thinking and acting in terms of moral principles and represented by Woodrow Wilson.⁷⁹

In an age of relentless negative criticism of American foreign policy (frequently advanced by commentators who have never themselves formulated a successful foreign-policy program, or negotiated a successful treaty or agreement or armistice), some 1954 observations by Professor Dexter Perkins on foreign policy appraisals may be reassuring:

As foreign policy occupies increasing attention in the public press and in the public mind, it is natural that the policy of our government should be subjected to more and more criticism. Much of such criticism is extremely shallow; much of it springs from partisan motives and is vitiated by the partisan spirit which dominates it. In particular, there is little to be said for that kind of appraisal which confidently assumes that the decisions of the American government are all-controlling and that the United States has it in its power by its own decisions alone to fix the fate of all the world. Nor is it wiser to assert with dogmatic conviction that if such-and-such a course had been followed by those in power all would have been well. In the complex world of international events we are simply not in a position to make such judgments. We cannot go back and re-enact the past, thus proving the soundness of our criticism. We cannot be sure that the alternative course which we have favored would inevitably have produced the results we desired. We cannot, therefore, if we are acting as thinking men and not as partisans, pillory those in power for what they have done, and confidently assert that if they had acted as we wished all would have been well.⁸⁰ . . . Such criticism is shallow and sometimes vicious . . .

Professor Perkins, a proponent of the moderate way, took particular issue with two perspicacious critics, Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, for what he considered unfair allegations of American naivete and sentimentality, and for too great dependence on negotiation as the preferred diplomatic technique:

. . . the American people will never hand over their affairs to a small diplomatic caste, however wise that caste may be . . . Professor Morgenthau seems to advocate the impossible. I have already said that he exalts the processes of negotiation. In the course of doing this, he approves the kind of deal of which European history is full, which is made at the expense of somebody else. It can, I think, be stated as a proposition of undoubted validity that the American people would disapprove of such bargains. There are almost none of them in the history of the United States . . . cynical disregard for the position of others will not in general be supported by public sentiment in such a democracy as ours.

Now let us turn from these general considerations to look at the diplomatic record of the United States. Both Mr. Kennan and Professor Morgenthau seem to suggest that it is a melancholy one.

I confess to a twinge or two on reading Mr. Kennan's pages on the Spanish-American War. The taking of the Philippines, in my opinion, involved far more sacrifices than advantages for the United States . . . But is it wise, is it historically-minded, to pass a moral judgment on this whole business? The American people in 1898 shared a view held by many others in the golden age of Western imperialism; they were, indeed, as our author states, keeping up with the Joneses; they were doing what others were doing; they were acting in the frame of reference of their time. Still, we are entitled to lament the decisions of fifty years ago if we want to, even if we cannot reverse them; and I am even ready to brush away a tear myself if Mr. Kennan insists.⁸¹

. . . There is no doubt in my mind that there are elements of American opinion that attach far too great an importance to the judicial settlement of international disputes. It is quite true, as Mr. Kennan points out, that the great international controversies are not legal controversies at all. There is really no legal principle to govern them. Nor would it necessarily be wise if there were. Rigid formulae are not the bases of successful diplomacy. In emphasizing

this both our authors perform a valuable service. Nations are in much the same position in their altercations as capital and labor in their collective bargainings. The conflicts between them are not juridical; they are essentially matters of power and of will. If anything . . . we have rarely been swayed, in important matters, by an unwarrantable faith in courts as an agency for the settlement of international disputes.

The question I would ask is this: just when has American diplomacy, in practice, sacrificed the national interest on the altar of judicial settlement? When have we arbitrated a question which we ought not to have arbitrated? When, indeed, in any mighty matter, have we arbitrated at all?⁸²

. . . The United States has not been an aggressive nation . . . it has a real stake in international peace and security . . . But we would be wrong if we assumed that the foreign policy of the United States was a determinative factor in the events of the twenties and the thirties.⁸³

. . . Sentimentality, they both constantly assert, is an American diplomatic vice. Perhaps so. But there was not much sentimentality in [one policy after another] . . .⁸⁴

What troubles me a bit in the Morgenthau thesis is the assumption that there is some cool, rational, mathematically sound approach to questions of foreign policy and that the answer to these questions is to be sought by excluding emotion from the account and getting down to brass tacks. Frankly I do not think the thing is possible, either for popular governments or for totalitarian states.⁸⁵

And here we come to a problem of central importance. Both Mr. Kennan and Professor Morgenthau are apt to write as if the American people were so in love with legal theories that they were incapable of concessions to reality . . . democratic diplomacy naturally seeks to moralize and elevate the issues. It is wise statesmanship to do so. It is good practical politics to do so--provided one is not caught in the net of one's own generalizations. I maintain--and I want to emphasize this--that the people of this country know a hawk from a handsaw and have been able to recognize situations in which they had to climb down from the lofty platform of principle and march along the dusty path of reality . . . they have done it again and again in their diplomatic history. They irk the foreigner, no doubt, by the moral tone of their discussions on foreign affairs; but it is not often that they remain, for long, divorced from reality. They talk democracy, but deal with Franco

and Tito; they talk of defending the whole world, but vote limited appropriations for the support of a part of it; they approve collective security, but give it a restricted meaning and application; they dream of utopia, but arm for Armageddon . . . The errors of American diplomacy are no doubt in part a result of our national temperament, of our excessive optimism, and of our illusions as to the role of power in international affairs; but it is easy to overstate the matter . . .⁸⁶

As in so many other matters, the middle way is best, the way that voids mere sentimentality on the one hand and too harsh and narrow a view of interest on the other. Foreigners reproach the United States very frequently for its combination of high-sounding language and very practical action. In reality this is one of our strengths. The high-sounding language is a tonic and a power. The practical action is a recognition that language may exceed the bounds of feasible conduct. In combining the moral absolutes with the inevitable relative values, the American people often are possessed of a double force. They are not thus saved from error. Their balance, one way or another, is not always perfect. But the position of America in the world today does not suggest that they are always wrong.⁸⁷

Not even all foreign affairs specialists would agree with Professor Perkins, but his thoughts speak for very many Americans. A relevant discussion on the endurance of democracies in long wars was recently contributed, in the spring of 1975, by Earl C. Ravenal (the first paragraph below echoes the comment, quoted earlier, by Kenneth Boulding on the United States as a "mosaic society"):

Vietnam demonstrated how fragile, tentative, and partial is the American social contract. But the confused condition of public support was not a momentary "dissensus" brought about by the trauma of Vietnam. It is a basic condition that was accentuated by the Vietnam war. Perhaps this country was not destined to be a coherent society, but rather an ill-fitted composition of heterogeneous groups, most of which came here to assert their separateness, affirm their identity, keep their distance, and maintain their autonomy--at most willing to join in selected common projects of limited duration and purpose. Ours is still a precarious society that cannot long bear the strains, such as mobilization for foreign adventures, that expose the different stakes of these groups. Such a

fragmented society is not a sufficient base for a policy of upholding world order and contesting a series of border challenges . . .⁸⁸

The trouble begins with limited wars. Most of the literature supporting limited wars has stressed their feasibility as opposed to total war. But that misses about half the point--the half that is relevant here. Public constraints on prosecuting a war will be tighter as the purposes of a war are seen to be more limited. Indeed, it is quite likely that support for war will diminish even faster than the scale of the war is reduced. If a government can either coerce support or anesthetize opinion, it may consider itself lucky; but that sort of thing becomes a contentious point in itself in a constitutional democracy such as ours. It might be--whether fortunately or unfortunately--that a country such as ours can fight, and therefore ought to fight, only very important wars, or none at all.⁸⁹

Tocqueville pinpointed a central and endemic dilemma of foreign policy in any democracy:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law in all classes of society: all these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles . . .⁹⁰

Nevertheless, Hans Morgenthau highlights the need, even in a democracy, for close linkage between foreign policy and domestic opinion:

Consensus and consent of the governed, indispensable for an effective foreign policy in a democracy, flow from the allegiance of the citizen to his nation--its nature, institutions, and objectives--not from the solution, or lack of it, of social grievances. To propose that a nation can conduct its foreign policy without consensus and consent of the governed is to argue against an active foreign policy altogether.⁹¹

With this cardinal principle in mind, we take up efforts to determine what is the state of consensus among the American people in reference to primacy and other significant aspects of American relationships in the international arena.

Surveys of American Opinions

Well aware of the limitations of polls and surveys, we turn to various sophisticated surveys which reflect, as nearly as we can determine it, the state of American opinion on crucial American questions in 1974. In several instances, trends over a decade are shown.

Table 5-1 shows, not only the allocation of internationalist and isolationist sentiment in America in 1974, but the trend among Americans over the past decade:


Table 5-1: Internationalist/Isolationist Trends 1964-1974⁹²

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Completely Internationalist	30%	25%	18%	11%	--%
Predominantly Internationalist	35	34	38	30	--
<u>TOTAL INTERNATIONALISTS</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>45</u>
Mixed	27	32	35	38	35
<u>TOTAL ISOLATIONISTS</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>
Predominantly Isolationist	5	6	5	14	--
Completely Isolationist	3	3	4	7	--

Obviously, the data for 1975 halt, and gingerly reverse, the steady decline, since 1964, in American internationalists, and the steady increase in isolationists.

The following Table 5-2 merely reproduces the preceding statistics graphically:

Table 5-2: Internationalist/Isolationist Trends 1964-1975 ⁹³



The following chart reflects the problems about which Americans expressed the greatest concern in 1974. The priority of domestic over international concerns is evident; note that no defense issue surfaces until No. 17.

Table 5-3: Degree of Public Concern About Major National Issues⁹⁴

	(Composite scores)
1. The rise in prices and the cost of living	93
2. The amount of violence in American life	91
3. Crime in this country	90
4. Corruption and lawbreaking on the part of government officials	90
5. The problem of drug addicts and narcotic drugs	88
6. Insuring that Americans in general, including the poor and the elderly, get adequate medical and health care	85
7. Protecting consumers against misleading advertising, dangerous products, and unsafe food and drugs	81
8. Cleaning up our waterways and reducing water pollution	79
9. The problems of our elderly, "senior citizens"	78
10. Shortages of oil, gasoline, coal, gas, electricity, or other fuels	78
11. Improving our education system	77
12. Reducing poverty in this country	77
13. Reducing air pollution	76
14. Unemployment in this country	75
15. Economic and business conditions generally	75
16. Collecting and disposing of garbage, trash, and other solid wastes	75
17. Keeping our military and defense forces strong	74
18. Maintaining respect for the United States in other countries	73
19. Maintaining close relations with our allies	72
20. The significance of the Watergate affair in terms of our political and governmental system	72
21. Providing adequate housing for all the people, particularly low-income families	71
22. The threat of communism	69
23. The problems of our cities in general	68
24. Rebuilding run-down sections of our cities	67
25. The danger of the United States becoming involved in a major war within the next few years	66
26. Improving mass transportation systems, such as buses, trains, and, in some cities, subways	66
27. The problem of the Soviet Union	65
28. The conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab nations	64
29. The problem of Communist China	63
30. The problems of black Americans	61

Americans' ratings of their own government in 1972 and 1974 as shown in Table 5-4:

Table 5-4: Ratings of Governmental System as a Whole⁹⁵

Honesty, Fairness and Justice		
	1972	1974
Excellent	7%	6%
Good	34	29
Only fair	47	48
Poor	10	14
Don't know	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
	100%	100%

Efficiency		
	1972	1974
Excellent	5%	4%
Good	33	20
Only fair	50	55
Poor	11	18
Don't know	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>
	100%	100%

Consideration and Responsiveness		
	1972	1974
Excellent	5%	4%
Good	28	25
Only fair	49	49
Poor	16	18
Don't know	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
	100%	100%

Here in Table 5-5 is the hierarchy of power and influence of the United States and other nations today, as perceived by Americans in 1974, on a scale from 0 to 10:

Table 5-5: Ladder Ratings of International Power and Importance⁹⁶

	<u>Present</u>
United States	8.8
Soviet Union	7.8
Communist China	6.0
West Europe	5.8
Japan	5.6
Arab oil countries	5.4

On the gloomy side were impressions about the current image of this country abroad, as shown in Table 5-6:⁹⁷

Table 5-6: Assumptions About Foreigners' Image of America

Question: Now let's think of the image--or picture--that most people in other countries have of the United States. From what you have heard or read, do you think that on the whole United States prestige abroad is high or low at the present time?

Responses:	<u>Present</u>
Very high	5%
Fairly high	18
Fairly low	45
Very low	21
Don't know	<u>11</u>
	100%

These depressingly unfavorable assumptions stand in sharp contrast to the generally positive figures obtained ten years earlier on a similar question posed by the Institute for International Social Research; the comparative results on views about the image and prestige of the United States abroad are as follows:⁹⁸

Table 5-7: 1964 Assumptions

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1974</u>
High (Very high plus fairly high)	52%	23%
Low	39	66
Don't know	9	11
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

What may be particularly depressing about these figures is that, on the whole, foreigners have a much more favorable image of the United States (as shown in the previous chapter) than Americans expect them to have.

A number of surveys have been compiled and analyzed by Daniel Yankelovich on the perceptions held towards America by a particularly significant sector of the American population: its youth. A number of trend comparisons are provided, for which data were obtained in 1-2 hour interviews with 3522 youths, aged 16 to 25:⁹⁹

Table 5-8: Identification of Youth With American Sub-Groups

	<u>Noncollege Youth</u>		<u>College Youth</u>	
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1969</u>
<u>Identification with:</u>				
Other people of my generation	61%	68%	68%	83%
Family	61	75	68	78
Middle class	48	57	54	71
Students	46	48	84	88
People of my race	24	49	27	58
People of my religion	23	41	28	45
People of my nationality	22	38	30	54
Conservatives	12	14	20	23
New Left	5	3	9	13
Old Left	2	2	5	7

Table 5-9: Youth Views On Social Questions¹⁰⁰

	Total Noncollege Youth	Total College Youth
<u>Attitudes Toward Marriage</u>		
Disagree that marriage is becoming obsolete	62%	67%
Look forward to being legally married	48	53
<u>Children</u>		
Interested in having children	78	76
<u>Belief in Traditional American Values</u>		
Doing any job well is important	89	84
Business is entitled to make a profit	85	85
People should save money regularly	80	71
Commitment to a meaningful career is very important	79	81
Private property is sacred	74	67
A "strong" person can control own life	70	65
Competition encourages excellence	66	62
Duty comes before pleasure	66	54
Hard work will always pay off	56	44
Man is basically good, but society corrupts	50	46
People who accept things are better off	31	15
<u>Activities Thought to be Morally Wrong</u>		
Destroying private property	88	78
Taking things without paying for them	88	84
Collecting welfare when you could work	83	77
Paying for college by selling dope	80	64
Interchanging partners among couples	72	57
Using violence to achieve worthwhile results	72	66
Cheating big companies	66	50
Extramarital sexual relations	65	60
Having children without formal marriage	58	40
Living with a spouse you do not love	52	41
Having an abortion	48	32
Relations between consenting homosexuals	47	25
Casual premarital sexual relations	34	22
<u>Other Points</u> ¹⁰¹		
People's privacy is being destroyed	84	86
I am tired of hearing people attack patriotism, morality, American values	78	65
There is too much concern with the welfare "bum"	77	64
Basically we are a racist nation	77	79
We are rapidly losing our right to dissent	73	67
There is too much concern with equality and not enough with law and order	71	53
Police should not hesitate to use force to maintain order	69	55
The country pays too much attention to college students and not enough to other people	62	45
The Establishment unfairly controls every aspect of our lives	60	50

Table 5-10: Reasons Worth Fighting A War For¹⁰²
(College Youth)

	1973	1971	1970	1969	1968
Counteracting aggression	50%	50%	50%	56%	64%
Protecting our national interests	34	30	31	39	54
Protecting our allies	34	31	28	38	44
Containing communism	30	29	32	43	45
Maintaining a position of power	23	19	17	25	35
Fighting for our honor	19	18	17	25	33
Keeping a commitment	11	14	14	14	20

Table 5-11: Countries I Have A Favorable Impression of¹⁰³

	Total Noncollege Youth	Total College Youth
Canada	79%	86%
England	68	78
Sweden	62	73
France	57	59
Mexico	54	56
Spain	50	48
Japan	48	*
West Germany	41	60
Greece	38	40
Argentina	34	36
Israel	32	44
Thailand	28	31
Chile	28	28
India	27	33

* * *

Table 5-12: Countries I Have An Unfavorable Impression of¹⁰⁴

	Total Noncollege Youth	Total College Youth
North Vietnam	64%	69%
Russia (USSR)	54	46
Cuba	52	58
South Vietnam	44	52
East Germany	42	52
Mainland China	38	42
Egypt	31	52
Pakistan	28	41
Israel	28	33
India	19	26
Indonesia	19	23
Thailand	18	20
West Germany	17	12

Another "youth" survey,¹⁰⁵ this time a survey by the Yale Daily News of Yale University graduates of the Class of 1975, produced these among a larger body of responses:

Are you proud of your country? Yes, 45%; No, 55%.
 Do you believe in God? Yes, 46%; No, 54%.
 Do you consider yourself: Capitalist, 33%; Socialist, 24%;
 Indifferent, 33%; Anarchist, 10%.
 Would you join the FBI or the CIA? Yes, 29%; No, 71%.
 Do you care who wins the Yale-Harvard football game?
 Yes, 65%; No, 35%.

Relinquishing concentration on youth, we turn to a larger arena. The entire American population was scientifically surveyed on the question: whether in the next few years relations with the Soviet Union and China would improve or worsen:¹⁰⁶

Table 5-13: Future U.S. Relations With China and the USSR

	<u>With China</u>	<u>With USSR</u>
Get better	41%	27%
Stay the same	37	50
Get worse	11	10
Don't know	<u>11</u>	<u>13</u>
	100%	100%

A couple of pages back, we presented Americans' 1974 estimates of national statuses, measured from 0 to 10; below we repeat the current estimates and add estimates of what the respective statuses are expected by Americans to be ten years from now.

Table 5-14: Ladder Ratings by Americans of Future International Power and Importance¹⁰⁷

	<u>Present</u>	<u>Future</u>
United States	8.8	8.0
Soviet Union	7.8	7.9
Mainland China	6.0	6.8
Western Europe	5.8	6.0
Japan	5.6	6.0
Arab oil countries	5.4	5.2

Observed the principal analyst of the Potomac Associates team producing these results:

The great bulk of the American population . . . saw essential equivalence ahead between the United States and the Soviet Union. Peoples less than 30 years old were a notable exception, expressing the view that ten years hence the Soviet Union would rank first at 8.1 with the United States in second position at 7.6 . . .¹⁰⁸

Thus, Table 5-14 above is a critical element in understanding self-assessment by Americans. It seems of some significance that the summarized perceptions of general publics and elites in eight foreign countries, as presented in Chapter 4, (e.g., Table 4-24), averaged expectations of relative power of the United States and the Soviet Union ten years from now as approximately equal (at 8.3 on the scale of 10), whereas young Americans expect the USSR to be ahead of America ten years from now, in power and importance.

The following question and the results also appear particularly significant for the purposes of the study in hand.¹⁰⁹ The question asked was: "The United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the very brink of war if necessary?"

Table 5-15: Remaining Number One

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>
Agree	56%	50%	39%	42%
Disagree	31	40	50	43
Don't know	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>15</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The principal analyst gathering these results wrote:

Our 1974 survey showed that taking all necessary steps to maintain the dominant position of the United States was disapproved by at least small majorities among the college

educated (66 percent), families with incomes of \$15,000 or more (54 percent), professional and business people (56 percent), political independents (52 percent), and persons under thirty years of age (60 percent). To the extent that these groups traditionally enjoy, or in the future are likely to attain, above average political power and influence, their views may come to have special impact in our overall policy process. On the other hand, small majorities in favor of doing everything possible to maintain American dominance were to be found among people with only a grade school education (54 percent), families with incomes under \$5,000 a year (56 percent), and those fifty years of age and above (51 percent).¹¹⁰

Time, Inc. conducts quarterly "Time Soundings" on political and social indicators scientifically developed by the public-opinion firm of Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. In June of 1975, "Time Soundings" reported that 62% of Americans believe that the United States is losing some of its power, but that most (52%) say they are bothered little or not at all by that trend. Nearly 75% agree that the United States needs foreign allies to sustain its own military security, and needs foreign trade to sustain economic security. Some 71% refused to rule out future military intervention by the United States outside American borders, and only 13% regard the United States as a second-class power.¹¹¹

Two domestic images of America elicited during the Potomac Associates survey referred to above seem particularly quotable in any current discussion of international primacy:

I hope there's no more involvement/i.e., war/ with the military. We don't need to see who's the best (a statement by a stenographer whose husband owns a milk route in rural New Jersey).

I don't care for the United States to be a powerful nation. But I would like for us to be a good nation (Statement by the fifty-eight-year-old Protestant wife of a farmer in the Deep South).¹¹²

On approximately the same wave length as these citizens was Senator Frank Church; in a passage referring to allegations that the CIA was involved in projected assassinations of foreign political leaders, Senator Church remonstrated: "I don't care who may have ordered it, murder is murder. The United States is not a wicked country, and we cannot abide a wicked government."¹¹³

The American "Aristides," who has observed that "the truest things written about us as a nation seem to have been written by foreigners," speculated about what de Tocqueville would say if he returned today and perceived the things that "Aristides" perceives:

Among his many intellectual qualities, de Tocqueville had a special skill for recognizing and resolving contradictions. Surely no more fertile field for this skill is available than America. What would he make of our combined confidence and our taste for self-denigration, our decency and our brutality, our acquisitiveness and our guilt about our affluence, our liberality and our conservatism? What, above all, would he make of the fact that we devote more time and energy to national introspection than any other nation yet remain most in the dark about ourselves? Would he find a source of strength in our ignorance about ourselves? Unity in our division? A strain of uniformity in our variousness? Whatever he would find, whatever he would make of it all, it is difficult not to believe that, nearly a century and a half after his original visit, de Tocqueville would feel America still offers the most interesting show on earth.¹¹⁴

Currents of Change in American Opinion

There is considerable evidence, some reported in the next chapter, that significant changes are occurring among American values and attitudes, and that some currents of change are running fast and deep. A number of citations expressed earlier have already pointed toward such a conclusion.

One pervasive major domestic condition involves uncertainty.

Margaret Mead observed:

There are, in fact, many kinds of Americans who are frightened by the place of the United States in the world. Whatever is done internationally by this country activates their fears, not their hopes. But a program of active self-aggrandizement would in no way solve the problem. A program of conquest . . . would arouse in Americans not fear but guilt. Our traditional moral repudiation of imperialism would come into play as well as our fervent belief in the right of autonomy and self-determination for all peoples in the world.¹¹⁵

At a January 1975 meeting of the American Association of Political Consultants, it was said that "the atmosphere was thick with doubt about themselves and the political system in which they operate." In the major address, Sanford Weiner pointed out that in the last November election, only 38% of eligible voters came to the polls; "American democracy has developed flaws which suddenly

appear acute."¹¹⁶ In a national survey of non-voters, V. Lance Torrance, Jr. found that among the under-35 nonvoters, the college-educated outnumbered those with less education; 7 out of 10 voters, and a higher proportion of nonvoters, gave it as their conviction that "government serves the interests of a few organized groups."¹¹⁷

Yale Professor Bruce Russett has cited long-term American support for defense expenditures, from the late 1930's until polling on the subject was interrupted in the early 1960's. When polling on the subject was resumed in December 1968, a great change had taken place, revealing "a massive decline of enthusiasm for American political and military commitments abroad" (while expectations of expanding economic activities remain high). These attitudes of declining support are now "concentrated among those most likely to take an interest in international affairs, to vote, to make campaign contributions and otherwise to be politically active" (italics original).¹¹⁸

Professor Alan Barton and colleagues at Columbia University in 1972 interviewed over 500 top business executives, labor leaders, senior civil servants, political leaders, major interest group leaders, and media executives; 64% said the defense budget should be cut. Another survey of 600 vice-presidents of America's largest corporations recorded a response of 51% in support of cutting defense spending. Some 54% wanted a decrease in economic aid, and 71% a decrease in military aid.

No less than 86% said that the Vietnam War damaged American political and social institutions, and 77% felt that it had damaged

the American economy. A survey of even 600 senior military officers attending American war colleges yielded evidence of retrenchment in their views of America's political and military policy; for example, the majority would defend very few foreign countries (Mexico, West Germany, Brazil, Japan, Thailand) with American troops against Communist invasion, and only Mexico against Communist insurgents.¹¹⁹ And, overall, in considering priorities among foreign and domestic concerns, even "those who remain hawks, as well as those who are doves agree in rating foreign policy problems as the least important." Declares Professor Russett: "The great backlog of popular anti-communism and determination to fight no longer exists."¹²⁰

Professor Russett and the American Association of Political Consultants are not alone in their observations of change. Even official spokesmen concede substantial change in status and perception. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, in a January 1975 "gloomy" review of the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, commented that "the world no longer regards American military power as awesome."¹²¹

Perhaps the most definitive expression of America's revised perception of its world role was that contained in the Nixon Doctrine:

. . . it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defense and progress of other countries must be first, their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility.¹²²

Former Undersecretary of State George Ball presents a thoughtful view of ourselves:

. . . we have walked, without blinking our eyes too much, into the full glare of the klieg lights--amid, of course, both hisses and applause. . . . Elected to the job by a unanimous silent vote . . . because we are the only Western nation competent to take up the burden. . . .¹²³

. . . I think on the whole that we have done reasonably well and that there is no historical precedent for the generosity of our policy. But that does not mean that other peoples completely share our own appraisal of our own motives or our own effectiveness. Most fair-minded Europeans would agree that we have no discernible selfish motive for much of our involvement in far places, although this sometimes leads more to suspicion and incredulity than to admiration.¹²⁴

. . . given the preponderance of our strength, we cannot fight in a foreign land against a native population without seeming to many that we have picked up the torch of white colonialist power. This is particularly true in a so-called 'war of national liberation,' which, almost by definition, contains a built-in ambiguity as to the nature of the conflict.¹²⁵

. . . whenever we get involved in a protracted war the ends will inevitably be discolored by the means. War is brutal and brutalizing, and when brutality is made efficient by technology the means we are compelled to employ affront the humane sensitivities not only of our own people but of the rest of the world. Nor is it a completely satisfying answer to point out that the other side is still more brutal. Even though we chafe at the unfairness of it, there is and always will be a double standard whenever the United States is concerned; for we have emblazoned our shields with the device of moral purpose and the world expects a great deal more from us than from the wretched Viet Cong.

As a result we are reduced to a fight in which the kill ratio becomes the only significant way of keeping score and in which our hopes for success depend on causing so much bloodshed that we break the will of the other side. From the moral point of view this is a particularly detestable type of conflict and we suffer the odium of it. A civilized people can scarcely take much comfort from the macabre statistic of each day's body count even though our own troops have been conspicuously valiant. Nor does it raise us high in the world's respect, since in spite of our own casualties the struggle does not look even . . . Our dilemma in using force is particularly frustrating since we encounter problems whatever we do. If we show no restraint in our choice of weapons we are regarded as a bully . . . I have been told by European

friends that we Americans use our air power too casually; they attribute this to the fact that we were never attacked and hence we do not know what it means to be bombed.¹²⁶

John Coyne in the Wall Street Journal reviewed a recent book by R. J. Whalen, a political observer who is said to have achieved a fairly high order of successful prophecy in the past; his appraisal of the current condition of American primacy is particularly gloomy:

'America today is weaker and more vulnerable than ever before,' he tells us. We are a weary, enervated people afflicted with a profound 'sickness of spirit,' in sharp contrast to the Soviets, 'a rising breed of convinced imperialists, full of a sense of their own righteousness and ruthlessly willing to use power.'

Because of our 'sickness of spirit,' Mr. Whalen believes, we are forfeiting our place in the world to the Russians. The 'detente' of which the administration was so proud is actually nothing more than 'gradual accommodation to Soviet dominance and phased capitulation to Soviet demands.'

We are bargaining away our nuclear superiority, says Mr. Whalen. We are allowing the Soviet navy to assume command of the seas. We are in the process of selling out Israel. We no longer command the respect and loyalty of our NATO allies, and the Russians no longer fear us.

'The Soviet Union made a thorough assessment of the October 1973 Middle East crisis,' says Mr. Whalen in a chilling passage, 'and, according to US intelligence sources, reached a menacing conclusion: the United States is no longer capable of asserting power and influence on a global scale.'

Eventually, says Mr. Whalen, given its military strength and control of the oil weapon, the Soviet Union will dominate the economies of Western Europe, and ultimately, our own economy.¹²⁷

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, political scientist at M.I.T., provides a number of thoughtful insights, within a critically constructive approach to American foreign policy:

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Public opinion polls can be misleading, and what Canning called 'the fatal artillery of public excitation' is notoriously fickle. I myself hold to Abraham Lincoln's belief in the rightness of popular sentiment over time, although sobered as I am by Walter Lippmann's warnings about the 'malady of democratic states.' As that wise man wrote,

'The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace, and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or too appeasing, or too intransigent.'¹²⁸

The people I am thinking of are quite well informed, and often supply apt illustrations of Mark Twain's observation that 'it ain't ignorance that causes all the trouble, it's that people know so dang much that ain't so.' Their kind of invincible ignorance is, of course, most typical of political extremes, where all explanations end in conspiracy theory.¹²⁹

It seems reasonable to suspect that where ravishing utopias combine with savage intolerance, there lurks a kind of madness. In his very last piece, the incomparable James Thurber, blind, dying, and frantically articulating some serious things he had subtly buried in his line drawings in the New Yorker, wrote:

'It isn't what the ideologist believes in, but what he hates, that puts the world in jeopardy. This is the force, in our time and in every other time, that urges the paraonic and the manic-depressive to become head of a state. Complete power not only corrupts but it also attracts the mad.'¹³⁰

I do not for a minute expect or want U.S. foreign policy to rest on pure sentiment or unalloyed humanitarianism. The world is much too hard a place for that . . . the trouble with many conservatives is that they do not understand democracy, while the trouble with many liberals is that they do not understand Communism. Life is far too complex to allow fanatics to run it for us.¹³¹

Much of U.S. policy was right for the period 1945 to the early 1960s, and, despite the revisionists, was so

recognized by virtually the entire non-Communist world
[italics added] . . . The trouble came in believing, two
decades later, that nothing had changed. President
Johnson had said: ' . . . we did not ask to be the
guardians at the gate, but there was no one else. . . .'
This same worldview was spelled out by Freedom House,
a centrist American organization dedicated to world-wide
freedom--plus steadfast anti-Communism. A statement
published in December 1970, signed by forty leading
Establishment figures in business, public affairs, and
intellectual circles, concluded with the following state-
ment:

' . . . the United States has a clear call to contin-
uing leadership in world affairs. This is not a role it
chose. It was chosen by events. America now has no real
choice in abdicating this role; it has the choice only
between fulfilling and defaulting its responsibilities
to free men and free institutions, and to future genera-
tions. (Freedom at Issue, January/February, 1971, p. 5).'

In other words, despite everything that has happened,
the United States retains a unique mandate to lead the
non-Communist world. I for one do not believe it. I do,
however, believe that policies of greater co-operation
and economic equity will meet a warm response; and if we
want to call that 'leadership' or being 'Number One,' that's
perfectly all right with me.¹³²

. . . the deepest tensions in our body politic con-
cern conflicting beliefs about the nature of man and the
meaning of morality in public policy. The contradictions
in American foreign policy reflect this underlying tragedy
of the human condition. At the root of both is an
unresolved clash between values and power. . . .¹³³

All the trends may point toward a new American
neoisolationism, with this country dropping out from a
broad range of activities, from economic assistance to
leadership in the building of new institutions. And yet
both the facts of U.S. power and the norms of America's
broad interests call for more rather than less involve-
ment in those respects. . . . I would also echo former
Urban Affairs Secretary George Romney, perhaps the only
man in the United States or any other government honest
enough to admit it, when he said 'The truth is, none of
us are sure what are the right things to do.'¹³⁴

Such sentiments, disturbing as they may be in many ways, are
also positive and hopeful in others. The net philosophical

premises of all the evidence we have adduced seem to include a temporary shaking of confidence among Americans, but an abiding faith in American institutions over the long run. American youth and other sectors of American society are obviously in the throes of self-appraisal and the indicators point to genuine change. But the basic values of American society are seen by both foreigners and Americans themselves, despite imperfections in the complete attainment of those values, to be still strong and worthy enough to sustain continued pursuit of their realization. After all, are there alternative values that are better?

Americans appear to be reasonably well informed as to the facts of United States power and to be well-oriented as to the opportunities and limitations relevant to the use of power within current world relationships. They are certainly not bellicose--but then, they never have been.

The United States may have come to the point described by Daniel Bell, when he wrote: "We now become aware of the end of American exceptionalism, on both national and international levels."¹³⁵ As the nation's social and cultural institutions analyzed the implications of New York City's near-default of late 1975--e.g., whether the crisis was merely an early indicator of conditions likely to be duplicated in many other American communities--Dr. George Steinlieb, of Rutgers, offered a warning similar to Daniel Bell's: "I would suggest that what we are presiding over is none other than a decline in the American standard of living."¹³⁶

Nevertheless, overall, it appears that American perceptions, compatible with the perceptions of foreigners, accept the fact of some decline in American "exceptionalism" (whatever that may be); but they appear skeptical that they have seen the end of it.

ENDNOTES

1. In addition to the better-known systematic analyses by Tocqueville, Bryce, and Myrdal, one should also call attention to Francis J. Grund, The Americans (Marsh, Capen, and Lyon, 1837); M. Y. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System in the United States (Macmillan, 1910); Lucien Romier, Who Will Be Master, Europe or America? (Macaulay, 1927); and Harold Laski, The American Democracy (Viking Press, 1948).

What came to be called "American Studies" had many roots and early practitioners before the field of study emerged from an interesting miscellany, particularly from studies of American literature. The first volumes of the Cambridge History of American Literature appeared in 1917. The American Literature Group of the Modern Language Association was founded after World War I. Vernon L. Parrington's Main Currents in American Thought appeared in 1927, and the scholarly journal American Literature began appearing in 1929. (See Joseph J. Kwiatt and Mary C. Turpie (eds.), Studies in American Culture: Dominant Ideas and Images. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960.) Previously, scholars and authors in various fields provided analyses of the American character, from Jonathan Edwards, Washington Irving, and Emerson, through the historians Bancroft, Parkman, Prescott, Motley, and Frederick Jackson Turner, to Mark Twain, H. L. Mencken, and many others. In modern decades, analyses of American values and character have proliferated beyond the possibility of extensive citation here. Still one of the most highly regarded linkages of American values to foreign policy is in Gabriel A. Almond's The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960). A 1947 work, America in Perspective, edited by Henry Steele Commager, presents an interesting mixed bag of outsiders' perceptions, including quotations by de Tocqueville, Dickens, and others. American Civilization Since World War II (Albert Karson and Perry E. Gianakos, eds.) presents readings on character, style, and quality. Russell Kirk's The American Cause (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957) gives insights not available anywhere else. One should mention David Potter, People of Plenty, 1954; Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, 1955; and Oscar Handlin, The Dimensions of Liberty, 1961.

More recent "free-wheeling interpretive essays about American history and culture, often highly insightful" (in Professor Michael Kammen's phrase) may be found in, for example, Robert H. Wiebe, The Segmented Society: An Introduction to the Meaning of America, 1975.

Finally, many of the foregoing works contain extensive bibliographies and lists of suggested readings in American studies.

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3. John Farrell and Asa P. Smith, eds., Theory and Reality in International Relations, p. v.
4. Alfred Kazin, On Native Grounds, p. .
5. David Potter, "The Quest for National Character," in Lawrence Levine and Robert Middlekauff, ed., The National Temper: Readings in American History.
6. Boorstin, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
7. Howard Mumford Jones, Violence and Reason, pp. 213-215.
8. It is a mystery to this writer that some current ethnic writers appear outraged that, as immigrants, ethnic groups should have been expected to conform to the prevailing culture they found here. But why not? Was not such an expectation natural? If a number of Americans emigrated and entered, say, Czech culture, should they have been surprised and outraged at being expected to adapt to the prevailing Czech culture? Were they entitled to expect that the Czechs would adapt to American culture?
9. Kenneth Boulding, "Expecting the Unexpected: The Uncertain Future of Knowledge and Technology," in Edgar L. Morphet and Charles O. Ryan, eds., Prospective Changes in Society by 1980, p. 212.
10. Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, pp. 39, 41.
11. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
12. Boulding, "Expecting the Unexpected," op. cit., p. 212.
13. Mead, Powder, op. cit., p. 109.
14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 193-194.
16. Ibid., pp. 253-254.
17. George Liska, Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy, pp. 3, 10.
18. Ibid., p. 3.
19. Morgenthau, PAM, op. cit., pp. 45, 50.
20. Ibid., pp. 46, 50.
21. Ibid., p. 50.
22. Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," The Public Interest, Fall 1975, p. 200.
23. Brooks Adams, The New Empire (1902), pp. 208-209. Cited by Bell, Ibid., p. 195.
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31. Jewett, Captain America, op. cit., p. 9.
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34. Cited by Kenneth J. Hagan, "American Naval Intervention," in Robin Higham (ed.), Intervention or Abstention, p. 25.
35. Ibid.
36. Jewett, op. cit., p. 9.
37. Ibid., p. 59.
38. Ibid., p. 48.
39. Henry Luce, "The American Century," Life, February 1945. Cited by Albert Guerard, The Testament of a Liberal, pp. 148-149.
40. Jewett, op. cit., p. 9.
41. Ibid., p. 59.
42. Cited by Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 63.

43. Archibald MacLeish, The Great American Fourth of July Parade, 1975, pp. 23-26.
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45. Quoted by Richard J. Barnet, "The Great Foreign Policy Debate We Ought to Be Having," The New Republic Magazine, January 17, 1976.
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47. John W. Finney, "With Inflation, the US Re-Examines Its Defense Needs and What It Can Afford," New York Times, November 7, 1974, p. 14.
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49. William V. Shannon, "The Dream Not For Export," New York Times, September 28, 1974, p. 29.
50. Fletcher Knebel, New York Times Magazine, September 15, 1974, pp. 40, 44, 46, 48.
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
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